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Abstract
There are many different ways of describing a series of events
in time; for instance, (a) X MppguM arid, (then) I (b) X
happened before Y happened, (c) Egfore Y happened. X happened, (d)
After X happened. Y happened. and (e) Y happened after X happened.
Three principles — order of mention, derivational simplicity and
choice of theme —• are proposed to account for how adults choose tem¬
poral descriptions in various contexts. The principles are all sup¬
ported by psychological and linguistic data. These three principles
serve as the basis for a developmental hypothesis which predicts the
order of appearance of the syntactic constructions used by young
children to describe events in temporal succession. It predicts that
the main stages that will appear in the children's descriptions during
an early period of language acquisition are, first, compound description
as in (a) above, then complex descriptions with a subordinate clause in
second position, as in (b) and (e), and lastly, complex descriptions
with the subordinate clause in first place, as in (c) and (d).
This hypothesis is confirmed by data collected over a six-
months period from fifteen three-and-a-half year-old children, some of
whom had just begun to use temporal subordinate clauses in their speech.
The principal subordinate conjunctions that were used by the majority
of the children in this study are when, if a.nd because. A number of
other temporal conjunctions also appeared but their use was not so
widespread.
Developmentally, the notion of time seems to start with the
recognition that events happen at particular times (i.e. at lunchtime)
and to progress successively to the relating of these events simul¬
taneous with, preceding and following eaehlother. Evidence that
temporal subordinate clauses develop in this order is provided by the
types of temporal adverb and conjunction used in the very early stage
of language acquisition.
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I. Introduction: l££i£lim£. Acquisition.
1.0 In this thesis, I shall attempt to answer two closely related
questions: How does a child of 3j6 - U years describe events in time
(i.e. the relations involving before, after, and simultaneous with)?
and, Is there any developmental sequence in the type of description
given as a result of constraints imposed by the process of language
acquisition? I shall present evidence that there is a developmental
sequence, and that the child's repertoire of temporal description types
appears to depend on the stage he has reached in the language-acquisition
process. In presenting background material for the problem, and in dis¬
cussing previous studies that touch on it, I have followed approximately
the following plan: in the first four chapters I have presented the
general background to the problem in language acquisition, and in par¬
ticular the theoretical issues that arise if one accepts a Chomskyan
linguistic theory together with a mentalistic outlook on psychology in
general, and on language-acquisition in particular. In the second chap¬
ter, the philosophical sources of the different concepts of time are
briefly explored, and the confusion between 'subjective' and 'objective'
time is discussed in relation to some psychological studies. The next
two chapters describe and evaluate some past studies of the acquisition
of language and of the concept of time in children. In the fifth chap¬
ter, I have introduced three principles which can be used to classify
adult descriptions of events in time^ the three principles are backed up
by psychological evidence. It is from these principles that my develop¬
mental hypothesis is indirectly derived. Data supporting the hypothesis
are presented in Chapter VII after a brief description of the subjects
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and data-collection methods,, A linguistic analysis of temporal
Adverbial clauses is then proposed and its applicability to the develop¬
mental study is assessed. Finally, the two main sentence-types used in
temporal descriptions ('compound8 and 'complex' sentences) are compared
from a linguistic point of view.
1.1 For some time, empiricist theories of mind have dominated
psychology. The empiricist claims that the content of the mind
(acquired knowledge) is derived only from learning (experience), and
that any internal structure is merely the result of associating sensory
ideas. The mentalist (rationalist) position was strongly maintained in
the seventeenth century, especially by such inciters as Descartes, Herbert,
Cudworth and Locke. Leibnitz, for instance, did not distinguish at ail
sharply between innate and learned, saying that "The mind leans upon
these [innate] principles every moment, but it does not come so easily
to distinguish them and to represent them distinctly and separately,
because that demands great attention to its acts.... Thus it is that
one possesses many things without knowing it..." (194-9:7-i). Humboldt
(1836) applies rationalist views to the special case of language learning
and decided that language could not be taught3 however, the conditions
under which language will develop spontaneously in the mind on its own
can be presented: the form of a language (the schema for its grammar)
is largely given (i.e. innate) although it will not be available without
appropriate experience to set the language-forming operations in action.
Such rationalist views contrast with the empiricist notion that language
appears adventitiously, either by "conditioning" with reinforcement
(Quine, i960j Skinner, 1957), or by imitation (Wittgenstein, 1953)
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with drills and explanations, but in each case independently of any in¬
nate structure. The empiricists have assumed that only the procedures
and mechanisms for the acquisition of knowledge constitute an innate
property of the mind. The form of the knowledge acquired is quite
free. The rationalist, on the other hand, has assumed that the general
form of any system of knowledge is fixed in advance as a general dis¬
position of mind, and that the function of experience is to realize
this structure and to carefully differentiate it from others.
Although rationalist and empiricist views cannot always be
sharply distinguished, particular versions of theories can usually be
contrasted ana presented as explicit hypotheses about the acquisition
cf knowledge in specific areas, e.g. the innate structure of a language
acquisition device. Learning theory, in the empiricist tradition, has
concentrated on the question of species-independent regularities in the
acquisition of items in some "behavioural repertoire" which is manipulat¬
ed under experimental conditions (cf. Miller and Dollard, 194-1; Mowrer,
1950j Skinner, 1957). On the whole, learning theory has looked at
tasks that are extrinsic to the organism's cognitive capacity (Skinner,
1957) rather than looking at the structure of the cognitive ability
underlying observable behavior (cf. for example, Newell, Shaw and Simon,
1958).
Behaviourist (learning) theories of language acquisition
(Miller and Dollard, 1941282s.; Mowrer, 1950: ch. 23; Skinner, 1957)
have claimed that the necessary condition for learning language is the
arrangement of the contingencies of reinforcement by the verbal conmruiiity
in which the child finds himself: "A child acquires verbal behavior when
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relatively unpatterned vocalizations, selectively reinforced, gradually
assume forms which produce appropriate consequences in a given verbal
community" (Skinner, 1957:31), and, in a more general context: "Dif¬
ferential reinforcement shapes up all verbal forms, and when a prior
stimulus enters into the contingency, reinforcement is responsible for
its resulting control.... The availability of behavior, its probability
or strength, depends on whether reinforcements continue in effect and
accoi'ding to what schedule" (ibid.:203-204)» However, it is extremely
difficult to define Skinner's (1957) view of reinforcement, which ap¬
pears to be so wide in its application as to become vacuous; for
example, after defining some observable types of reinforcement, Skinner
appeals to "automatic self-reinforcement" in those cases where there is
nothing observable: "A man talks to himself... because of the reinforce¬
ment he receives" (ibid.:l63), "the child is reinforced automatically
when he duplicates the sounds of airplanes, streetcars..." (ibid.:164),
"the young child alone in the nursery may automatically reinforce his
own exploratory verbal behavior when he produces sounds which he has
heard in the speech of others" (ibid„L58), "the speaker who is also an
accomplished listenex- 'knows when he has correctly echoed a response'
1
and is reinforced thereby" (ibid.:68)~a
The behaviourist approach to language acquisition has
recently been challenged by linguists such as Chomsky (Chomsky, 1959,
1965; Miller and Chomsky, 1963) &nd philosophers such as Xats (1966)
and Koravcsik (1967); they argue (as mentalists) that language is
Cf. also Chomsky, 1959, for a very detailed critique of the
empiricist position.
both too complex and too abstract in its structure (cf. Lashley, 1951)
to be acquired by a child without some innate knowledge, which must
almost certainly take the form of certain universal (linguistic) prin¬
ciples. Chomsky, in considering the importance of the processes in¬
volved in language acquisition, points out that the first step is to
characterise the specific patterns imposed by the language; subsequent!
"it should be possible to derive from a properly formulated grammar a
statement of the integrative processes and generalized patterns imposed
on the specific acts that constitute an utterance" (1959:56). The
corollary to this, of course, is that "A general linguistic theory...
must therefore be regarded as a specific hypothesis, of an essentially
rationalistic cast, as to the nature of mental structures and processes
(1965:53j cf. also Chomsky, 1959? 1962, 1964). In Chomsky's view,
most Bloomfieldian linguistics has been too empiricist in its outlook
in that it has assumed that general linguistic theory consists merely
of a set of procedures for determining the grammar of a language from a
corpus of data. General linguistic theory should, however, mirror some
thing of what we, as speakers of a language, know about its structure.
Such knowledge as we have cannot be induced from the application of
step-by-step operations such as segmentation, classification, slot-
filling and substitution procedures, or association, etc., of any type
which has so far been developed within linguistics, psychology or
philosophy. The limitations on previous linguistic theories which are
taxonomie are that they are unable to say anything about how we use
language: "..such speculations have not provided any way to account
for or even express the fundamental fact about the normal use of langua
namely the speaker's ability to produce and understand instantly
new sentences that are not similar in any way to those previously
heard in any physically defined sense and in terms of any notion of
frames or classes of elements, nor associated with those previously
heard by conditioning, nor obtainable from them by any sort of
"generalization" known to psychology or philosophy"(Chomsky 1965:53).
The behaviourist tack, which is to avoid the problem by assuming that
the language acquisition device works on very simple lines, -will never
tell us anything about how a language is structured nor how it functions
It is, therefore, necessary to construct a model of language that is
complex enough to account for language acquisition while at the same
time being general enough to have a universal application. The con¬
struction of a general (universal) model for language acquisition no
account for the structures that are "learnt" during a period of roughly
eighteen months. (between the ages of 2-|- and U) must of necessity posit
some innate structures, and these in turn must be related to those as¬
pects of language that are universal. Otherwise, it is difficult to
see how any model to account for all language acquisition could be
constructed.
What arguments, though, can the mentalist produce to support
his contention that language can only be learnt because of the presence
of innate structure(s) in the mind? The assumption behind any such
claim is that there exist a number of features common to all languages
r\
(Greenberg, 1966) which allow the child to extract the relevant
2
However the study of surface structure for universals (e.g. Greenber
1963) will only reveal statistical tendencies, not deep structure
universalsj Cf. Chomsky, 1965sllfij Fillmore, 1963:2.
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information at some level and then gradually to differentiate the
finer points of structure that are peculiar to each language. Chomsky
(1965) proposes that "the structure of particular languages may well ho
largely determined by factors over which the individual has no conscious
control and concerning which society may havo little choice or freedom..
it may well be that the general features of language structure reflect,
not so much the course of one's experience, but rather the general char¬
acter of one's capacity to acquire knowledge — in the traditional sense,
one's innate ideas and innate principles" (1965^59)e
Chomsky (and likewise Lenneberg, 1967, and McNeill, 1966) is
led to the mentalist position by his re-definition of the problems in
linguistics. Traditionally, the role of the grammar was to assign to
each of an infinite range of sentences a structural description which
would show how the sentences were understood. The grammarian's task
was not defined, though, in the sort of terms used above, but as the
description of a language. Traditional grammars concentrated on the
structural descriptions that can be given, but they did not make ex¬
plicit the underlying regularities in the language, e.g. the relations
between different sentence-types. Although the idea of universal
grammar has been current for a long time (Chomsky, 1966; Salmon, 1969),
among twentieth century linguists (besides e.g. Hjelmslev, Jakobson and
Kurylowicz) Chomsky has recently been the most emphatic in stating the
necessity of supplementing the grammar of a particular language by a
universal grammar, and of dealing explicitly with the creative side of
language. Both the creativity (the ability to both generate and under¬
stand infinitely many new sentences) and universal grammar are con¬
sidered central concerns of linguistics by Chomsky and the Transformational
Generative group: "A theory that aims for explanatory adequacy incor¬
porates an account of linguistic universale, and it attributes tacit
knowledge of these universals to the child. It proposes, then, that
the child approaches the data with the presumption that they are
drawn from a language of a certain antecedently well-defined type, his
problem being to determine which of the (humanly) possible languages is
that of the community in which he is placed« Language learning would be
impossible unless this were the case. The important question is: What
are the initial assumptions concerning the nature of language that the
child brings to language learning, and how detailed and specific is the
innate schema (the general definition of "grammar") that gradually be¬
comes more explicit and differentiated as the child learns the language?
For the present we cannot come at all close to making a hypothesis about
innate schemata that is rich, detailed and specific enough to account fo
the fact of language acquisition. Consequently, the main task of lin¬
guistic theory must be to develop an account of linguistic universals
that, on the one hand, will not be falsified by the actual diversity of
languages, and, on the other, will be sufficiently rich and explicit
to account for the rapidity and uniformity of language learning, and
the remarkable complexity and range of the generative grammars that are
the product of language learning" (Chomsky, 1965527-28).
One of the tasks then of a linguistically adequate theory
is the construction of an "acquisition model" for language (Chomsky,
1965J Katz, 1966). The language acquisition device (IAD) must consist
of the various linguistic universals. McNeill (1966) has discussed two
which must be included: the hierarchy of categories (ie. NP, VP, etc.)
and the basic grammatical relations (subject-of, object-of, etc.).
There may well be others# IAD, first of all, has as input primary lin¬
guistic dataj this material is scanned for distinctions that match
those distinctions drawn from the hierarchy of categories# As the
input is natural language, some of the (-universal) distinctions are
bound to be present. Whenever such a distinction is observed, it is
incorporated into IAD's own grammar that is in the process of being con¬
structed# The primary input serves the purpose of making IAD choose be¬
tween various universal distinctions between categories. At the same
time, LAD also looks for sentence-patterns corresponding to the "basic
grammatical relations# This is not independent of the search for
hierarchical structure# The role of the primary data to which the
child is exposed is to direct IAD's attention to the relevant features
(the universal ones) of the language: "## the role of experience is
primarily to provide the data against which predictions and thus hy¬
potheses are judged# Experience serves not to provide the things to
be copied by the mind, as on the empiricist's account, but to help
eliminate false hypotheses about the rules of the language11 (Eats,
1966:278 fn.23). IAD has therefore to be equipped with the specific
aspects of linguistic "competence" which cannot be induced from speech,
i.e. appropriate generic grammatical classes and hierarchical structures#
Chomsky (1965) made an important distinction between competence
and performance in language (this is a distinction somewhat similar to
that drawn by de Saussure between lamwe and parole. 194-S). Competence
is the speaker-hearer's knowledge of his language, and performance is the
actual use of language in concrete situations® Competence. as specified
by the linguistic theory is the knowledge in the mind of the idealised
speaker-hearer, 'unaffected by "grammatically irrelevant" considerations
such as memory limitations, lack of attention, errors, etc. which occur
frequently in performance. A competence grammar, then, is an idealized
version of what the speaker is familiar with in everyday speech. The
linguistic grammar (transformational generative) is meant to represent
this competence. In addition, the competence grammar is assumed to be
a part of the "performance grammar": CG "=" LG (where "=" means
"equivalent in some way"). Although, in adult speech, there is a check
on what are extraneous performance factors, like length of attention
span, memory, bad hearing, etc., which can be abstracted from the lin¬
guistic (phonological, syntactic and semantic) component of the
speaker's utterances to make up the Linguistic Grammar, it is not clear
whether the CG is in fact underlying the performance grammar directly.
There are many extra-linguistic factors in performance (situational and
contextual cues, shorter processing time for certain deletion con¬
structions, etc) which appear to indicate that there may not be a
one-to-one correspondence between the complexity of CG and whatever
processes are used in performance: there may well be performative short¬
cuts where the derivational complexity of the Linguistic Grammar does not
correspond to the psychological complexity of performance. I think there
is no reason to expect that there will necessarily be a direct cor¬
respondance, although much early psychological work as well as some of
the developmental studies of language appear to have worked under this
assumption (Miller, 1962 j Miller and McKean, 1964-5 Mahler, 1963 5 Brown
and Hanlon, in press). The correspondance between the two is probably
at least a partial one, but there are several points at which it seems
that an "abstract performance grammar" must diverge from the linguistic
grammar which characterises competence, (cf. Watt, in press, for
further discussion).
The problem then, for both the linguist and for the child
learning language, is to decide from the data of performance (primary
linguistic data) what the underlying system of rules is that is being
put into practice in performance. The immediate difficulty, in seems
to me, is that the induction of rules would seem to depend crucially
upon the identity of the competence grammar and whatever the linguistic
processing device is that appears in performance. Clearly, an abstract
performance grammar must at some point also incorporate the competence
grammar, possibly in such a way as to be a reference device when the
abstract performative grammar on its own is not adequate (in this way,
as Watt suggests, the competence grammar would be an "archival" com¬
petence grammar).
Given the theoretical problems of the relations between com¬
petence and performance grammars, there arises a further question: what
is the relation between the Competence Grammar and the child's IAD?
McNeill (1966) implicitly subscribes to the notion that the child's IAD
is fully included in the adult's Competence Grammar: "We have in the
basic grammatical relations another reason that adults find children's
speech interpretable: all children's sentences are generated by simple
rules — or their inversions — that also exist in adult grammar"
(l966:5l)» This view has been contested, very cogently, by Watt (in
press) who claims that there must be a more complex: relation between
the child's construction of a grammar (an "Abstract performance grammar"
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and the Competence as represented economically by the Linguistic
Grammar. Watt bases his argument on the fact that if the child's Com¬
petence Grammar is contained in the adult's, there are conflicts between
what is the simplest grammatical rule, and the developmental sequence
in ontogeny. If the Linguistic Grammar of the adult has to be re¬
adjusted to include the child's rules, there is a loss of simplicity in
the LG (and hence in the CC- too, if it is isomorphic with the LG)» Thus,
the real problem that remains to be investigated in detail is whether
linguistic complexity, defined as some measure in the LG, corresponds in
every case to the psychological complexity of language. It seems more
likely that there are certain performance considerations (as in the case
of truncated passives, and deictic reference) where the linguistically more
complex form is in fact perforraatively (psychologically) simpler.
It would seem then that the child first has to acquire some
form of performance grammar, which should, in the mentalist view, incor¬
porate those universal features and hierarchy of categories that allow
the child to induce something about the structure of his language; it is
possibly only later that the child also incorporates the adult competence
grammar as a part of his knowledge about his language.
II. Philosophical T3.EIQ as& Sprqs Psychological S-fcuflfos??: Surrey
2.0 Philosophers, among others, have asked many questions about
time: does time exist apart from objects? Is time a construct of the
mind? Does time move, or do objects 'move' (i.e. change) in time? Is
time a continuum, or a series of static states? Is order fundamental to
time? How is order related to duration? What are past, present and
future? Are they merely reflexions of our experience of time? How can
the present be defined in relation to the past and future"? Are past
and future related to earlier and later in time"?
2*1 The first real attempt to analyze time was made by Aristotle.
In his Physicst he defines time as the "number of movement in respect of
'before' and 'after'." Motion is an attribute of any substance, and
time in turn is an attribute of motion. Time itself is not motion, but
the measure of motion, which includes all growth and alteration. Without
motion there is no time. Motion is potentially time and becomes time in
actuality when its temporal succession is noted and measured by some
sentient being. Time is no more made up of 'now' moments than a line is
made up of mathematical points. Instead, time is made up of a finite
number of parts, each of which can be divided up infinitely many times
(Ross, 1930). Plotinus (in the Third Ennead) raises a number of ob¬
jections to Aristotle's notion of time. His main point is that 'before'
and 'after', if they are to refer to temporal relations, must mean
before and after in, time rather than in the space traversed. Aristotle
was aware of the circularity of his argument, for he wrote at one point
that "we measure the movement by the time and vice-versa". In fact
some cyclical process is chosen to serve as our clock and equal temporal
intervals are defined in terms of the cyclical events which comprise the
clock. Real numbers are correlated with the events comprising the clockj
the larger the number, the later the event, and then the date and dura¬
tion of other processes' or states are determined by correlating them
with the numbered events on the clock. The definition of any clock
involves temporal notions as well as spatial ones since a clock is
defined as a closed material system which will return, to exactly the
same state in which it found itself at some earlier instant of time.
St. Augustine, in his Confessions (194-8:XI) discusses his
dilemma with respect to time: although he has immediate experiential
knowledge of time and knows how to use all the temporal expressions in
his language concerning past, present and future, he is still unable to
give a verbal definition of time itself (Si nemo a me quaerat, scioj si
quaerenti explicari velim, nescio. - xv). There is no straightforward
way of defining time ostensively. For St. Augustine, neither the past
nor the future exists, only the present really is. We cannot say that
past time is long because it does not exist now. What we must mean by
such statements is that when the past (future) was (will be) present, it
is long. However, this is impossible because the present has no finite
duration. St. Augustine's solution is to say that time is a "protraction
of the mind, and in measuring time, we really measure a certain expanse
of our conscious memory. Time past and time future then only exist as
'memory1 and 'expectations', both of which are present things (xx).
Furthermore, time is subjective or psychological5 it exists in the
human mind which remembers, considers and expects (xxviii). Time order
is apprehended in the experience of one event's following another, al¬
though the flow of duration is in some way external to the individual,
St. Augustine's argument is still a circular one, since we cannot define
what we mean by 'memory' or 'anticipation' -without making an explicit
reference to a past or future event in time which is remembered or
anticipated.
The mediaeval philosophers, like St. Augustine, held that
there was no time before the Creation since time is only with things
existing and is perceived in the measure of one duration by another.
They distinguished, between one duration which was referred to another
(and thus measured) as in the time of that other duration, but when
talking of the duration or process (motion) of something in isolation,
they spoke of it as being with time. For example, Anselm defined time
as motion, whether of growth or of change in things, and as the
measure of one duration by another (Sussell, 1945)«
Newton believed in a space composed of points and a time com¬
posed of instants which had an existence independent of the bodies and
events that occupied them, in defining time, he states that "An abso¬
lute, true and mathematical time, of itself, and by its own nature, flows
uniformly on, without regard to anything external". Kant also (in the
C-r-itique of Pare Reason) saw time as unrelated to objects, defining it
as a universal aesthetic structure which was transcendental to objects.
Objects in themselves, which are the cause or source of our sensations,
are not knowablej they are not in space or time, nor are they substances.
Space and time are subjective; they are part of our perception of things.
Eecause of this, we can be certain that whatever we experience will
exhibit the characteristics dealt with by geometry and the science of
time. Thus Kant reverses Aristotle's position since he begins with the
logical priority of time as a form of our sensibility, and then he
argues from the continuity of time to the continuity of change. Kant
emphasises the continuity of consciousness in anticipation, preserving
and repeating, as the indispensible ground for the mind's forming any
concepts. Therefore, time is the necessary condition for there being
any human meaning. Locke, Berkeley and Hume all claimed that time was
apprehended only through experience, but Hume, for instance, puts all
knowledge about the future together with all observed portions of the
past and present only as probabilistic or uncertain because our know¬
ledge of them depends on inferences drawn from empirical data that are
not demonstrable (0£ knowledge and probability)a Both spatio-temporal
and causal relations are included here by Hume because knowledge about
them also is only based on probability (Smart, 19&4-)*
Twentieth century philosophers have realized that the problem
of defining time is not just one problem, but is closely linked to a
group of questions which concern different concepts like truth, identity,
causality, change and knowledge (cf. Gale, 1967). The relation between
these different questions and the nature of time itself is found in the
temporal relations of before, after, and simultaneous with and the tensed
distinctions between past, present and future. For example, "Can
statements about the future be true now, and, if so, does this entail
fatalism?" "Can our present actions have past effects, and, if not,
why not?" "Can an individual who does not yet exist be identified now?"
(C-ale, 1967 :viii ) .
Wittgenstein (1953 :A2ff. j 195S :6,26ff.) takes the stand
that the question asked by philosophers such as St. Augustine is a very
strange one: "What is time?" They are not enquiring about any natural
science, and St. Augustine, for instance, knows what time is in that he
understood it in different contexts and used temporal words correctly
in different contexts (Waismann, 1967). Wittgenstein proposes that
St. Augustine has lost himself in the language because of surface gram¬
matical analogies between temporal expressions and expressions referring
to objects and events, i.e. Ha lives in ifoa house beside Ha lizaa in iha
cast. Oar use of language can dispel St. Augustine's paradox about
the present (Findlay, 1967).
Early in the twentieth century, McTaggart (1903) wrote a paper
in which he argued that the two different ways of conceiving time, (a)
as the dynamic process of becoming (A-series), which is concerned with
the past, present and future tenses3 (b) as a series of equal states
(B-series) designated by the relations before, after and the same
time as. were completely incompatible, and therefore time itself (as
defined by previous thinkers) had no reality. Many efforts have gone
towards resolving McTaggart's paradox (Gale, 1963). Goodman (1951),
for instance, points out that "The 'past', 'present', and 'future'
name no times. Rather the 'is past at', the 'is present at', and
the 'is future at' are themselves tenseless two-place predicates that
may respectively be translated by the tenseless predicates 'is earlier
than', 'is at', and 'is later than'." ['is at' is the same as 'is
simultaneous with1] (1951:295). Russell (1903), whose theory is de¬
fended by Goodman, developed a theory of time based on what McTaggart
called the B-determinations (from the B-series). He argues that A-
determinations are notions derived from psychology, since to under¬
stand them reference has to be made to consciousness (of. St. Augustine
and others). To understand what is referred to as the 'past', we have
to make one of our past experiences an object of experience, while to
•understand the 'present' we have to refer to one of our sensations
since 'to be present' is to be the object of a sensation. Since A-
deterxainations are psychological, then temporal becoming is also psy¬
chological. The temporal becoming of a physical event can be analysed
in terms of its having different B-relations (states before, after or
simultaneous with) with a series of mental events consisting of ex¬
pectation, perception and memory experienced by a single mind (19031
esp.<453-4-76).
Different philosophers, then, claim that time (or one aspect
of it) originates from within the mind via experience. We experience
successions of events, which take on an order in time. Others also say
that time has an existence outside objects, and that time itself is un¬
affected by objects. Others have pointed out the relation between time
and change or motion, and thence between time and space. Duration is
more difficult to categorize because many arguments hinge on whether
time is conceived as a continuous flow or as a linear array of discrete
instants, or as some relation between these two concepts. Nonetheless,
there can be little duration which doe3 not involve change in some way,
so within durations as well as between them, there must be a perceptible
order in time. Order in time, realized both in the tensed distinctions
of past, present and future, and in the relations between different
events or states with respect to one another (before, after, simultaneous
with), is fundamental to the perception and understanding of time from a
psychological point of view. Order in time itself is, of course,
dependent on a prior recognition of points in time. Philosophers have
been concerned mainly with the concept of time and its definition, and
not so much with the words used, whereas psychologists have not always
distinguished between the language and the concept.
2.2 Psychologically, the apprehension of time includes the per¬
ception of points in time and their order, the estimation of time-periods
memory and the ability to make inferences or predictions, linguistic
coding and the reflections of spatial representation of time in
language. Psychologists have studied those aspects of time that are
more 'clock'-like in most detail: the inherent, physiological rhythms
and cycles. These cycles can be measured in the same way that the
earth's rotation can be measured, and are as regular, unaffected by
environmental conditions. However the length of the feeding-sleeping
cycle, for instance, can be changed from a twelve hour to a twenty hour
cycle. This aspect of the psychological study of time could be com¬
pared to tho physical examination of time, the periodicity of certain
movements from the stars down to a pendulum. Fraisse (1963) reviews the
results from a large number of studies of biological time in animals and
concludes that nearly every species has various diurnal or seasonal
y
Rhythms. These rhythms are often referred to as a "physiological clock"
since they are not dependent on periodic changes in environment (Renner,
1965). likewise has periodic rhythms regulating pulse, blood-pressure,
body temperature, protein levels, and the functions of different organs
like the liver and kidneys (Fraisse, 1963 *27f•). This form of time is
what we will call objective or 'clock' time, here of a biological or
physiological type, of which we are not usually aware.
Clock-time is 'registered' objectively by the use of clocks,
calendars, schedules and social conventions, e.g. mealtimes, coming-of-
age, etc. Clocks comprise highly structured, segmented systems with
different points shown in relation to each other schematically. It is
against these clocks that events are compared, either in order to name
the point in time at which they occurred or to 'measure' their duration
by the amount of movement on the clock. All clocks and calendars are
derived from natural periodicities such as the repeating cycles of
seasons. Although some divisions of time are very clearly delimited,
e.g. lunar months, day and night, etc., some of the smaller divisions,
like weeks, hours and minutes are arbitrarily derived by segmenting
larger time periods.
Secondly, there is subjective or personal time. At one
level this kind of time can be characterized by comments such as "That
took a long time" or "The day went by in a flash". There is experimen¬
tal evidence for the fact that such judgments do not correspond to the
objective duration. For instance, the time spent learning a single
task seems shorter than the same amount of time spent learning several
shorter tasks identical in character (Harton, 1939). Also the serial
order of two events experienced within a very short period of time may
seem reversed if attention is directed to one rather than the other (Lee
1949). In the same way, the weaker of two simultaneously presented stim
li will seem to be the later of the two.
Clearly, subjective time and objective time must share some
common ground: the common ground is probably provided by the most
tangible aspects of the objective time system, i.e. perception of the
difference between day and night, feelings of hunger, tiredness, etc.
which are available without direct recourse to a clock. Otherwise,
psychologically, subjective time covers both perception of time and
estimations of duration (measured against a clock, or certain points on
a clock), the recognition of points in time and the serial relation
between the points in time, awareness of the passage of time and the
duration of stated periods, both simultaneous and overlapping, codifica
tion of different perspectives in time and the way in which this affect
the conceptualization of time, e.g. in spatial terms (cf. Bull, 1960:18
axes of orientation for the perspective of the speaker re events and al
re the 'area1 in time, i.e. past, present or future, of the utterance).
Even if subjective time must touch common points with ob¬
jective (clock) time, it is not isomorphic with it since it does not
have to do with the calendrical representations of time. It is de¬
pendent, though, on language (just like calendar time) for 'coding5
the different perceptions of time, both in terms of the relations of
events to one another and in respect to a very precise, structured set
of names for the calendar, i.e. "It took more than two minutes to do",
"It happened about three hours after lunch". The relations are ex¬
pressed in terms of before, after, and simultaneous with, and in addi¬
tion may be referred to the calendar or clock for further specificity.
There are other non-calendrical reference points that are relational:
today, tomorrow, yesterday, now, then, first, etc. which may vary in
number and type from language to language. These reference points all
have to do with the position in time of the utterance relative to the
events being described at any one point in time. Judgments and estima¬
tions are related to the calendar by convention so as to give the
listener a reasonably clear indication of the objective frame of
reference and of how the subjective estimations correspond to the very
structured 'clock' we use everyday to give events a location in time
that is identifiable by others.
Thus subjective time is related to clock (objective) time
through language because of the use of language to relate subjective
judgments to the calendar. This does not involve any physical cor¬
respondence between what is called a day after watching a clock for
twelve hours and what a person feels has been a period of twelve hours
duration. The processes used in judging subjective time are internal
ones while those used to judge objective time are all derived from
external phenomena. The internal processes of understanding time must
involve language use, memory, an internal representation of a temporal
framework (most probably based on the clock time used by the surround¬
ing community), ability to recognize points in time and their serial
order, duration and passage of time, and the different temporal per¬
spectives, i.e. the position in time of the utterance in relation to
the event just described. Some processes could well be time-specific,
but those like memory, emotion and language will influence the pro¬
cesses specific to understanding time in differing degrees, depending
on the situation and the culture. For instance, the degree to which
time is spatialized within a particular language, i.e. the number of
spatial terms which have been incorporated as adverbs or conjunctions
of time, may affect the conceptual framework to which time-relations
are related (cf. further in Chapter VIII below). Similarly, whether
a language has a tense system or an aspectual system, or a combination
of the two, may likewise affect the concepts of past, present and
future, or, at least, their relation to each-other (cf. eg. Whorf,
1950).
In many psychological studies it is not clear whether the
. concept of time studied consisted merely of an ability to produce all
the calendar names that are prescribed by convention, or whether it
involved such operations as the recognition of points in time ana
their relations of sequence. The latter processes have rarely been
distinguished from the naming of points on the calendar. Dobson (1954-),
for instance, seems to have confused clock time (objective) with sub¬
jective time (the processes involved in knowledge of time). He as¬
sumed that time-disoriented schizophrenics (who are so classified if
unable to name the days of the week, or the year, correctly) would do
more poorly on a task involving time features than normals or than
those schizophrenics who did not suffer from disorientation. In fact,
he found no difference between the three groups. I think this must be
because the ability to name various items on the calendar may have very
little to do with one's ability to judge duration or the serial order of
events. Fraisse (1952) found that such disorientation held for calendar
time (i.e. days and year), but not for the different hours of the day.
Patients were aware of the sequence of bed-making, visits, meals, etc. a
of the fundamental organic rhythms, i.e. sleeping and waking. Fraisse
also found that such time-disoriented patients were able to give the
correct hour to within sixty minutes (equivalent to the degree of
accuracy in normal adults). This is surprising because it would suggest
that some parts of calendar or clock time are more basic than others.
The estimation of time itself is possibly an organic, shythm-connected
process and hence is unaffected by the loss of certain lexical items
such as 'Tuesday', 'June', etc. The question then, it seems to me, is
why are the only lexical items affected those that are not so closely
linked to biological rhythms? As yet, we have no answers, nor do we
have any real knowledge of how cognitive processes (and, in particular,
linguistic coding) might be related neurologically to a physiological
process.
Most psychologists, in studying time, have started (like
James, 1890) from the premiss that the concept of time is built up
through individual experience; in addition, they seem to have assumed
that there is only one 'time'. The distinction between subjective and
objective time has been largely ignored, and therefore the potentially
different processes that may be involved in their understanding have not
been taken into account.
This duality of time has been discussed by some philosophers
who contrast cosmic (physical - objective) time and human (psychological -
subjective) time. For Bergson, this was the distinction between clock
time and "real" duration (1959), while Heidegger contrasted the two as
primordial time and 'vulgar1 understanding of time (Barrett, 1967). This
duality is, to some extent, reflected in language: there are sets of
lexical items naming calendar time and also items naming points in
time and the relations between them. In considering the concept of
time, the psychologist has not only to look at the relevant cognitive
processes such as memory, but has also to ask to what extent the
grammatical ana lexical structure of our language determines our view
of time.
In the present study, I shall be concerned with some basic
relations (in subjective time) which underlie the eventual understand¬
ing of objective time. These basic relations seem to be the first
thing learnt by the child acquiring the notion of time. The relations
consist of 'before', 'after' and 'simultaneous with'. From past develop-
mental studies of time (e.g. Decroly and Degand, 1913)> it seems that
the latter relation — simultaneous with — is the first one that
children learn. Next, they learn the notion of 'before', and lastly,
that of 'after'. These studies of time will be discussed in the next
chapter.
III. The Acquisition of the Concept of Time: Survey.
3.0 Decroly (1932), in discussing studies of time, stressed the
importance of language as a clue to the developing concept. He pointed
out that "... Le rdle du langage est ici d'une telle importance pour
faciliter le controle du developpement que dans toutes les recherches
faites, c'est surtout 1'evolution du vocabulaire temporal qui sert de
critere" (1932:174-). This is also true of most subsequent research. In
the following section, I shall discuss the different types of study that
have been done on the small child's developing concept of time. The
research that has been done can be classified roughly under four head¬
ings: firstly, the vocabulary studies which are specifically concerned
with the vocabulary of time as well as some that deal with the general
increase in vocabulary with maturation in individual children. Secondly,
a number of detailed longitudinal studies (biographies) of individual
children and their language development. (These two groups will be
treated together in the following discussion.) Thirdly, a group of
studies, still dependent on the language used by children, which have
looked at how relations in time are described, and finally, some studies
of slightly older children, in which the separation of the concepts of
time and space and the recognition of duration have been examined. This
last group does not look directly at language, but is dependent on it
in investigating the children's concepts.
3.1 The vocabulary studies (e.g. Boyd, 1914-j Nice, 1915J Court,
1920) do give a fairly good indication of the temporal vocabulary at
certain ages, but have one insurmountable drawback: nowhere in the
vocabulary studies is there ever any indication of whether the child
was using the word correctly or even appropriately. There are seldom
any examples of the sentences in which the temporal words are used,
and, where there are, it is impossible to gauge the degree of 'correct¬
ness' without any detailed knowledge of the context of the utterance.
From this point of view, biographical studies like Deeroly's (1913,
1932) are invaluable.
However, a number of the biographical studies (Deville, 1890,
1891J Gregoire, 1941; Preyer, 1908) cover too short and too early a
period of linguistic development. For instance, Preyer (1908) kept
records only for the first three years, and it seems that it is only
later that the concept of time is substantially reflected in language.
Deville (1890, 1891) likewise kept records only for the first two years,
concentrating heavily on the sounds and words used by the child. Leopold
(1949), on the other hand, kept an extremely detailed phonetic record
for his first child for her first two years, and continued to keep a
fairly detailed diary of her speech until her fifth or sixth year (as
she got older, the diary - beyond the sixth year - consists mainly of
the peculiarities observed in her bilingualism). Stern and Stern (1928)
made numerous observations of speech in context and kept detailed notes
on the speech, Including temporal references, until their children
were five and half or six years old. Decroly (1913, 1932) takes into
account the most detailed contexts, and does not just present the
words (e.g. Bush, 1914-, and Boyd, 1914-) nor the percentages of tem¬
poral words at different ages (e.g. Nice, 1915). The data from one
child are presented, in their contexts, in great detail so as to il¬
lustrate exactly how some terms are confused or misunderstood by the
child at different ages.
3.11 Verb tense
Stern (1924) and Stern and Stem (1928), in discussing the use
of the verb in German to indicate time, point out that children at first
(l;0 - 1;6) do not make any distinction of tense, using the same verb
form (which the Sterns call the infinitive) to refer to past, present
and future events. A past tense form, which may be regarded as
marked^ in contrast with the non-past (present and future), emerges
about six months later. The past participle appears at about two years
old, but the imperfect forms do not appear until 3;0 or 3;3. The
future is at first referred to by the non-past verb form, but later an
adverb such as "tomorrow" is added. The future tense appears at about
3;3 in the children's speech. Leopold (194-9) found the same sequence,
at slightly earlier ages: the past tense was used fairly frequently
by 2;3, and the future tense came in subsequently between the ages of
2,-4- and 2;6. The smaller gap between the appearance of the past
tense forms and the future could be due to a difference of structure-
between German and English. Court (1920), in presenting a little data
^■'Marked' and (further on) 'unmarked' are used throughout this study
in the Brague School sense of these terms, cf., e.g. Greenberg, 1966; esp.
9.3 below.
for an English-speaking child, claims that the child used all three
tenses (past, present and future) by the age of 2;9. She gives no
information about the prior differentiation of the tenses. Gvozder
(194-9) found that adverbs like "soon" appeared at about the same time
as the future tense in his son's speech (in Russian).
Adams (1933) studied the verb forms used by twelve four-
year olds. Their speech records were compared to an adult speech
sample. Adults shows a slightly larger percentage of simple present
tense verbs, 59.4- to 56.3$, but the four-year olds used a much larger
percentage of progressive present verb forms: 17.0 to 5.0$. Among the
present progressive forms, he noted that "I'm going to.." was parti¬
cularly frequent. The future (will) made up about 10$ of each child's
verb forms at age four. The simple past was found about as often as
in adult speech: 11.8$ in the children, versus 10.5$ in the adults.
However, past references were all to the immediate past; only four
children referred to any time earlier than the previous day in Adams'
data. Most of the 'compound' tense3 (Adams' terminology, e.g. 'he will
have been', 'they had been intending', etc.) were missing completely
together with all the passive verb-forms.
To summarize, the past tense is the first to be differentiat¬
ed from the 'unmarked' form of the verb: this is true of English, French
and German in the studies considered. Next the future is differentiated
from the present by the use of an adverb with the 'unmarked' form of the
verb (Stern and Stern, 1928), or by some meaning-equivalent form, i.e.
"I'm going to..", (Decroly, 1932), and then by the future tense itself
(Stem and Stem, 1928; Leopold, 194-9).
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3.12 Global notion of time
A number of investigators have noticed, that the child's
first use of temporal adverbs is global in nature: an adverb referring
to the near future (e.g. soon) will be used to refer to the future in
general, and sometimes even to refer to the past in general too, that
is, to any time that is distant from the child. Thus the first adverbs
used are indeterminate in meaning although adults use the same words very
precisely (Stern and Stern, 1923). For example, the first meanings at¬
tached to today, tomorrow and yesterday are generally equivalent to now
or .fi.offn, a£i££(wards), and before or earlier. (Decroly, 1932; Leopold,
1949). These concepts become more precisely defined with time; as the
child gets older, he begins to understand not only that such words have
to do with clearly delimited "spaces" in time, but also that they are
relative to other points in time, e.g. the changing relation of
"tomorrow" to any one named day of the week. In the case of one child
studied by the Sterns, at 2;5 - 2;6, "Moagen" (for Morgen: tomorrow)
and "Moagen mittag" were used indiscriminately to indicate a vague
future. "Gestern" (yesterday) was similarly used to indicate a vague
past. By 3;0 - 3j3, this child (Hilde) appeared to use "Morgen" more
accurately, insofar as she is now aware that it means a lapse of be¬
tween the moment of her utterance and the event she refers to. However
there is an added point of confusion here for German-speaking children
because "Morgen" does have the meaning morning as well, and is fre¬
quently used with an immediate past connotation in such expressions
as "Heute Morgen" or "diesen Morgen" (this morning). For example,
Hilde, 3J5, asked "Ach das Tannenbaum hat ja Morgen ebrennt?", which
can be translated either as 'Did the Christmas tree burn tomorrow?'
or as 'Did the Christmas tree burn (this) morning?'. Stern points
to the former interpretation only and cites this as an example of
the child's confusion. In the context, the event had apparently
occurred previously, so, in fact, it is not clear to me whether the
child really confuses the two meanings of "Morgen", or whether the two
meanings cause the adult 'interpreter' difficulty when the modifier
("Heute —" or "diesen —") is omitted. Decroly (1913) also cites
the global use, initially, for the expression "la semaine prochaine"
(next week). It is used to indicate both future and past at first, e.g.
"La semaine prochaine, j'ai ete au cinema" in the context of referring
to a past event, (1913sl4l)• Gesell and Ilg (1943, 194-6) similarly
report global uses of adverbs to begin with,
3.13 Adverbs of time
Gesell and Hg (194-3, 1946) mainly studied the appearance in
children's speech of various time words. They tabulated the appearance
of "now" at about eighteen months, "soon" by two years, and "when" and
"today" by three years old. Later still the child learns "Tomorrow",
and after that "yesterday". Other temporal words like "morning",
"afternoon", "Tuesday", "week", "two o'clock" and "year" emerge as the
child matures, but they are first used in concrete situations e.g.
"I am going to school this morning" long before they are used as part
of any abstract notion of time e.g. the ability to define what a year
is. This progression from concrete exemplar to abstract idea is pro¬
bably characteristic of concept formation in general. Boyd (1914)
finds a form of progression, parallel to that observed in tense
distinctions, in the acquisition of temporal words; adverbs referring
to the present and future generally appear in advance of adverbs re¬
ferring i»o brre wmmeu& and m gMwaaiiy riMfn'itii1 in a^sssteee ©£' sets-
■waste mStm/img to the past, i.e. now, soon, today, first, all appear
before lor? ago, then, yesterday, after, etc. Nice's (1915) records
do not begin until the child is three, so there are both present/
future and past reference adverbs in the child's vocabulary already.
Stern and Stern (1928) also point out that the expressions referring to
present and future like &£ once, then, now, tomorrow, soon, appear
several months before adverbs referring to tho past: .just then, yes¬
terday. before. Decroly (1913, 1932) noted a similar phenomenon.
There appears to be a general agreement that adverbs re¬
ferring to the present and future appear earlier than those referring
to the past. This is parallel to the finding with respect to verb
tense. The present and future seem to be unmarked with respect to the
past in adverbs as well.
3.14- Relations in time (a)
One complex temporal relationship for children is the con¬
stant relation between yesterday, today and tomorrow. These three
never change with respect to each other but they do change with respect
to the point in time identified as any one of the three. For instance,
the question of a three-and-a-half year old reveals part of the problem
"Where is yesterday - you know, that was 'today' before I went to sleep'
(Court, 1920:83). However, Court at the same time claims that this
child understood the relation between the three terms at the age of 2;9.
She also claims that this child used "morning", "noon" (mealtime) and
"afternoon" correctly by 3;6. Gesoll and Ilg (194-3, 194-6) report that
"today" is generally used by the age of threej next appears "tomorrow",
and finally "yesterday". Leopold (194-9) unfortunately did not keep
any systematic notes as far as temporal expressions were concerned,
and only comments at one point that his daughter used "yesterday"
correctly by the age of 3J7. Stern (1924-) and Stern and Stern (1928)
also noted that "Morgen" (tomorrow) appears before "Gestem" (yesterday).
However, they also commented that at A;3, Hilde still sometimes confused
the two, although this happened far less often than in previous months.
Decroly and Degand (1913) found that both "demain" (tomori-cw) and "hier"
(yesterday) were used at age three, but usually incorrectly, i.e. both
words were used to refer to the future and to the past. "Aujourd'hui"
(today) was correctly used by 3;S, and "demain" by 4-j2. "Hier" was still
used with some uncertainty at the age of 4-5 S.
Relations in time (b)
A more fundamental relation in time, which underlies that be¬
tween yesterday, today and tomorrow discussed above is the relation
of succession, that is, the order of experience. These relations
seem to be observed and made explicit linguistically at an early age.
Decroly reports that his subject had the notion of priority in time
at the age of 2jll. She used "d'abord" (first) to designate the first
in a series. A month later, she began using "avant" (before) as well,
in similar contexts. It was three months later that she began using
"apres" (after), also correctly in context. For example, when sent to
see her mother one day, Suzanne instead came back into the roomj -"Eh
bienl Tu ne vas pas chez ta maman?" - "Mais oni, je va aller anros"
(1913 5137). By 4-; 5, she used "avant" to refer to both recent and
remote events in the past (cf. 3.12 above).
Thus it appears that of the 'before-after' relations in time,
children first grasp those terms referring to points in future time
(i.e. tomorrow) and some idea of prior time (before, first), and then
later they come to the terms for the corresponding past times, e.g.
yesterday, and later times, e.g. after, next. In each case there
seems to be a period of initial confusion in which either term is used
to apply to either time (to both future and past or to both before and
after), then the unmarked term of the pair is correctly learnt and
applied (cf. 3.12). After this, the marked term appears and is grad¬
ually adopted into the system.
It is not until some time later, between 4-jlO and 6;0, that
the child evinces much curiosity about the cyclical nature of weeks,
months, seasons, etc., or learns the names of the calendar and relates
them to one another. His interest in timetables and schedules of all
sorts appears generally around 7;0, but it may not be until he is ten
that he fully understands historical, (clock) time (dating systems, etc.),
life-cycle time and objective time in general (Bradley, 194-7; Court,
1920; Gesell and Ilg, 194-3, 194-6).
3.2 The next group of studies is also concerned with the re¬
lational aspects of time under various guises. Lewis' (1937) study,
rather than describing which temporal words are used, deals solely with
the utterances of a very young child (l;l - 2;2) and the functions of
his utterances in context. Lewis is most concerned with the question
of reference to objects in the immediate physical environment of the
child, and considers the means by which past and future come to be
differentiated and referred to in the child's speech. She points out
that most of the work prior to 1930 paid more attention to the acqui¬
sition of different grammatical forms (parts of speech, tenses, etc.,
e.g. Young, 1941) than to the functions of the language itself. One
aspect of learning what time is, is the growth of the ability to refer
to absent objects: it is this detachment, through adult contact and
conversation, that allows the child first to become aware of things
outside his immediate environment, and then to refer to events remote
in time. "For through conversation, more than any other factor, the
child is helped to free his speech from the dominance of the present
situation" (1937:45). Through speech contact with adults, the child
is able to attend to remoter objects; the adult is also likely to relate
the remoteness to distance in time. This will lead to spontaneous ref¬
erence to the past on the child's part (1937:49; also Decroly and Degand,
1913; Decroly, 1932) when he has been struck by a particular sight or
experience. The adult's subsequent questions encourage him to continue
such references. Reference to the future seems to develop in much the
same way: much of the child's earliest speech is directed towards ful¬
filling his needs, and thus, from very early on, looks forward. Lewis
points out that "this reference to the future is made possible because
the future resembles the past, and ... the child's replies at this
stage [l;8 - 2;0] are determined by past occasions" (1937:50). Lewis
therefore, rather than looking at any vocabulary of time, looks at the
functions of some of the child's one- and two-word utterances, and con¬
siders how these functions could help to build up the notion of time as
far as past and future are concerned. The factors most stressed here
are the child's own manipulative and declarative needs in speaking and
the influence of adult reference to past and future.
Grigsby (1932) investigated the developmental trends in
various concepts in pre-school children (under six) at different age-
levels. He looked at the children's replies to questions about various
relationships, causal, part-whole, spatial, temporal, etc. The results
as far as the temporal questions were concerned are somewhat meager:
the questions were all of the type "When do you get up?" or "When is it
time for school?", dealing only with the day's routine. The youngest
children's responses showed that even they had some concept of time but
it was so vague as to be of no practical help in answering questions
about their daily routine. This comprised the most immature stage.
(The subjects in the study ranged from 2j8 to 6j4- in chronological
age.) Grigsby found that it was not the terminology that caused dif¬
ficulty here but rather the diffuseness of the concept expressed by
the words that made impossible relations in time. At the second stage,
the questions were answered by the child's citing incidents that occurr
in relation to himself: he is still the centre of his world. The third
stage is marked by the citing of incidents of a more impersonal nature.
The final stage is characterized by the ability to tell time by the
clock. One point to be noted here, which is in accord with other
studies, is that "Throughout the three stages in the development of the
concept of time, explanations were in terms of incidents which were
characterized almost entirely by their spatial attributes" (l932:l6o).
The percentage of children relating different times to simultaneous
Incidents rose from 31$ in the youngest group to 82% in the oldest of
the four groups. Children establish such relations not on a before-
after basis but as contiguous (simultaneous) with the event asked about.
This was also found by Decroly (1932) in the child's knowledge of the
days of the week and different times of the day which were tied to
relatively unvarying routines. The fact that this relation was always
a contiguous one is partly a function of the questions asked by
Grigsbyj none of them were of the type "What do you do after (before) Y?"
The child clearly acquires his temporal vocabulary some time before his
concepts have become very clearly defined. On the whole, Grigsby's
results regarding the children's knowledge of calendar time correspond
to Gesell and Ilg's (194-3, 194-6) and to Bradley's (1947) observations
that the child gradually 'decentres' in his references to time as he
matures.
Bradley (1947), replicating a study by Qakden and Stuart (1922)
used a questionnaire to test acquisition of knowledge about time. Un¬
fortunately, the questions were only concerned with specific vocabulary
items naming points and durations in calendar time. The children in
the study ranged from five to ten years in age. Bradley's results are
somewhat parallel to Grgisby's: first the child uses personal references5
later he begins to use calendar reference, and finally uses those items
referring to durations. The continuous development over time thatshe
found refutes Oakden and Sturt's claim (1922) that there is a sudden
spurt of development at age ten or eleven. There have been several
other studies of this type: a listing of the ages at which certain con¬
ventional (calendar) notions of time are presumed to be present because
of the vocabulary use of the child. Most of the children have been of
school age (five and upwards), and the emphasis has been on the ac¬
quisition of specific vocabulary items (cf. Farreil, 1953J Friedman,
1944; Pistor, 1939).
Lastly I include two early studies by Piaget (Margairaz
and Piaget, 1925, and Krafft and Piaget, 1925). Both these studies
looked at the child's ability to order a sequence of pictures to make
up a logically or causally coherent story. The first study (Margairaz
and Piaget, 1925) is an analysis of the stories children told in re¬
lation to two pictures representing the beginning and end of a story:
it was therefox-e a question of understanding the pictures and subse¬
quently constructing a story by deducing the intermediary scenes. The
second study (Krafft and Piaget, 1925) showed, according to Piaget,
that children are incapable before the age of seven or eight of finding
or even looking for the correct ordei- of pictures in even the simplest
stories. The precedure was to give the child a certain number of pic¬
tures (between four and ten) which represents the essentials of a
story. The pictures are presented out of order and the child is asked
to change them in any way he wishes so that they are in the right order.
Piaget then asked the child to tell him the story which these pictures
represented, whatever their order1. Piaget thus had some check on how
many of the temporal, causal or logical relations between the different
events pictures were understood, quite apart from the way in which the
child had rearranged the pictures: a correct arrangement did not
guarantee a correct understanding of all the relations holding between
the different aspects of the story, although a correct recital of the
story did mean that the pictures had been correctly ordered. The
children were encouraged to make furthor changes in the order of the
pictures while telling the story if they wished; few did this.
Piaget's subsequent discussion of the results is slightly
confusing: he explicitly claims that they were attempting to show that
the child under seven or eight could not order a sequence in time; what
was shown was that many causal or logical relations immediately per¬
ceptible to adults are not immediately available to children. This is
not the same thing as being unable to construct a temporal order for a
series of events. Piaget makes a distinction at this point between
"ordre" (order) and "serie dans le temps", (series in time), claiming
that the former subsumes the latter and is more complex because it in¬
volves causal or logical relations as well. Causal relations can be
deduced from the cause-effect relation perceptibly present; it is not
quite so clear to me how one should define logical relations: Piaget
says they are what adults use when it is not possible to deduce which of
two events preceded the other in time (1925:330), and claims that in
these instances all the child has to do is to put the pictures in such
an order as to render the rest of the story intelligible. The inability
to order these pictures in a coherent series by adult criteria, he argues
is due to "l1incapacity de reconstituer une histoire bien ordonnee en
partant des donnees isolees. Ou plutot, nous chercherons a etablir
que la difficult^ a comprendre la consigne du test tient elle-mene a
1'absence de la notion d'ordre chez les petits, et non a des difficultes
exterieures a la nature de la pensee" (1925:330). More to the point is
a subsequent remark of Piaget's (ibid.:331) to the effect that the
children "ne cherchent pas a construire un recit iogique". Before the
age of seven, there is considerable reluctance to re-order the pictures
once they have been given and a story will be constructed around them
even if this involves a number of repetitions. Interestingly, if the
experimenter reordered the pictures correctly, the child will accept the
new order but not alter his story to fit it.
However, I think Piaget's reiterated claim that this inability
to make up a coherent story is evidence that the child has no concept of
order is not entirely justified: what the child does not yet possess is
enough experiential knowledge about the world to reconstruct the most
probable (logical?) sequences and to always perceive the causal relations
suggested between the pictures. (Piaget has in fact, since, rejected all
his early work on causality.) In this respect, the young child's know¬
ledge of order in time could be compared to Vygotsky's (1962) character¬
isation of the child's perception. He perceives things but is still
"unconscious" of his perception. In the same way, the child under seven
years of age has difficulty in consciously looking at order although he
implicitly knows what it is. The implicit knowledge of order, though,
in young children, often recognized by the use of "et puis" (and then)
is in fact only one aspect of syncretic and subjective thought (cf.
Piaget, 1926, ch. 3). That the notion of succession (i.e. the order of
experience) in time is present in the child of five and six (if not
earlier) is proved by the fact that the children in the same study,
given two pictures representing cause and effect, all answered cor¬
rectly the question "Which happened first?" Thus the youngest (five
and six years old) do have a clear idea of before and after even if the
seriation in the stories is very muddled.
It seems to me, then, that Piaget has not proved that the
child has no notion of order but only that the child has a certain dif¬
ficulty in reconstructing and narrating events in order. On the other
hand, children of that age do speak spontaneously of events in order
with no apparent difficulty, so it is not clear whether Piaget has
adequately explained his data or not.
3.3 The final group of studies does not look directly at language
at all although the investigators are, of course, dependent on the
child's verbal replies for interpreting his concept of time. In a
series of studies reported in 194-6, Piaget had become more concerned
with the separation of the concepts of space and time in children between
the ages of six and ten. This separation is dependent on the recognition
of the relation between the distance covered and (different) speed(s).
Until this separation occurs, order in time is equated directly with
spatial order, and duration is equated with the amount of distance
covered. This means that the young (six-year old) child will make such
(paradoxical to adults) statements as those in the following dialogue:
E: - De l'ecole a la maison, tu mets combien de temps?
Lin - Dix minutes.
E: - Et si tu cours, tu vas plus vite ou plus lentement?
Lin - Plus vite.
E: - Alors tu mets plus do temp3 ou moins de temps?
Lin - Plus de temps.
E: - Combien?
Lin - Plus de dix minutes. (194-6:39; child aged 6;4)
Children will likewise claim that of two people starting and stopping
at the same time, one must have taken longer because he went further.
The child of five or six then positively correlates the dimensions of
time and distance covered rather than looking for the inverse relation
between speed and distance which in turn correlates with time. Piaget
reports several experiments designed to explore the gradual acquisition
of these relations between speed, distance and time which takes place
between 6-7 and 8-9 years. He is chiefly concerned with the 'operations'
involved and hence does not look at any linguistic formulations of these
'operations' since he does not consider that language necessarily re¬
flects accurately what is developing on another plane. He does con¬
cede though that the only way to study time in younger children (under
five) is through language, since one cannot question young children
about their operations in the same way one can older children.
Papert and Voyat (1967) investigate some psychological as¬
pects of time: what is the relation between time and perception, or
knowledge, and the structure of thought? Their area of enquiry is
broadly conceived as "la recherche des systemes de composition a la
base des jugements (dits alors cognitifs) du temps et les rapports
entre ces jugements et les jugements directs (dits perceptifs) ou
interm^diaire (dits sani-cognitifs)" (1967:131). In studying duration,
there are three essential problems:
1) the relations between time, speed, and distance
2) the relation between time and spatial coordinates
3) the very nature of time itself (is time a simple, direct
intuition or the result of some such intuition?)
Piaget (194-6:273s.) showed that the development of time is
dependent (as are many other domains of cognition) upon the progressive
decentration that it implies, i.e. the loss of egocentricity and
syncretism on the part of the subject. At first, there is no differen¬
tiation of spatial and temporal ideas. The differentiation is sub¬
sequently made as a result of distinguishing speeds. Papert and Voyat's
study is complementary to Piaget's earlier work for they make duration
and its relation to cognitive and perceptual phenomena their central
concern. They recognize that there are strictly cognitive elements
present even in pre-operational thought, citing for instance (1967:113s.)
the global perception of liquids which is sacrificed by the child to a
recognition of one dimension only, i.e. the level of the water regard¬
less of the size or volume of the containers. For example, in Figure I
below, A and B are judged equal, but when the contents of B are poured
into C, then C is judged to hold more than A. Again, apparently working
from the same dimension, D is judged to be greater than E, although
the reverse in fact is true.
Insert Figure I about here
They attempt to show that the notion of time as it develops
is characterized by a similar concentration on one dimension only by
the child, or on a direct correlation of two factors following such a
concentration on only one dimension. For instance, in a task involving
equal temporal durations but different speeds and distances covered,
70% of the five-six year-olds correlated more speed with more time
(not recognizing the equal durations involved); however, this percentage
Figure I
A = B = C
(after Papers & Voyat, 1967)
is entirely reversed in the next age group (seven years) where 11% of
the children now equate less speed with more time. This reversal, they
claim, indicates that there is a dividing line between the pre-operation-
al and the operational stages in dealing with duration in time.
They thus confirm Piaget's thesis that the concept of dura¬
tion is gradually constructed from visual and spatial data. In addi¬
tion, when the child has to judge two synchronous durations, his first
stage involves the claim of a direct relation between speed and time;
at the second stage, he perceives the inverse relation between the two;
it is this that eventually leads him to recognition of the equality of
the time intervals. The children may be aware of the simultaneous
departures and arrivals and still not deduce equal time duration for
each moving object.
This last group of studies actually seems to have more af¬
finity with the philosophical analyses than with the linguistic and
vocabulary-oriented studies discussed earlier. The investigators are
most concerned with the mental operations needed to grasp certain complex
relationships inherent in the adult concept of time.
3.4- There are several interesting facts that emerge from the
language (vocabulary) studies as a whole, which will be returned to
later. Firstly, children begin early to have a global concept of time,
an awareness at an imprecise level of the difference between past, and
present and future. In the tense system, the past is the first to be
separated. On the other hand, terms referring to the future (but not
the past) are liable to appear earlier and to be given a relatively
precise meaning before the corresponding past-time term is used as
consistently. The sense of order in time also develops early3 the first
in a series is pointed out by using "first" or "before". It is only
later that the corresponding terms, "later" or "next" are applied in
appropriate contexts. Although children do not learn the complete
structure of the calendar names until five or six upward, they can
name points in time from early on by relating the point in time to a
contiguous event in space (and hence also in time). By three or four,
the child is able to recognize points in time, and also - to a certain
extent - is able to order short sequences of events in time, in his
speech. Although the children in Piaget's early studies appeared to
find difficulty in narrating such sequences, there is considerable
evidence from records of spontaneous speech (e.g. in the present study -
Chapter VII) that children are able to do this from three and a half
onwards in a non-experimental situation. One notable ommission, though,
in the studies of temporal vocabulary, has been the lack of interest in
the relational words which link clauses so as to indicate the temporal
order of the events described. There have been a few studies of sentence-
development in young children, in which different clause types are des¬
cribed but there has been no systematic observation of when these tem¬
poral clauses develop, or what role they play (if any) in contributing
to the notion of time that the child of three or four entertains.
IV. Sentence Structure la Language Acquisition: Survey
4.0 The studies that I shall discuss below comprise past at¬
tempts to measure language development. They have produced fairly
accurate measures based on the average length of the child's utterances,
but other factors have not, until recently, been taken into account.
For instance, the correlation between different sentence-types or types
of subordinate clause and utterance length is not very high, yet the
variety of sentence-types in the child's speech is probably more indicative
of his language skill. I shall consider here some of the linguistic fac¬
tors which may affect the young child's ability to describe events in
time.
The indices that have been used to evaluate language develop¬
ment fall into two main groups. First, there are studies of utterance-
length (usually counted in words). There is a reasonable correlation
between utterance-langth and language development for the first ten
years or so (few studies have looked at older children in terms of this
criterion although some work has been done comparing High School written
composition with adult writing, e.g. Bushnell, 1930; Seegars, 1933)* The
other main index of development has been the vocabulary count. Different
studies of vocabulary are sometimes difficult to compare as the authors
have collected material over different time periods, and have used very
disparate ways of classifying their data. Some vocabulary studies have
also looked at the incidence of the parts of speech, e.g. Nice, 1915;
Young, 194-1 • The indices used in previous studies are taken at their
face value in the following summary although many of them raise questions
of definition, e^g. 'sentence', 'word', etc., which have yet to be sat¬
isfactorily settled. I have used 'utterance' rather than 'sentence'
in discussing most of these studies (cf. Lyons, 1963:171-172).
4-.1 Nice (1925) was one of the first to study the relations be¬
tween utterance-length and other aspects of language development. She
related different stages in length to general vocabulary growth. She
had earlier (1915) done a vocabulary study of one child in which all the
vocabulary up to the age of 1;6 years was recorded; added to this were
one month records kept just prior to the child's third and fourth birth¬
days. Vocabulary data were collected in a similar way by Boyd (1914-)
who looked at the vocabulary present in 1250 utterances collected at
the end of the child's second, third and fourth years. The vocabulary
was classified under various headings, e.g. nouns, adjectives, con¬
junctions; each area of vocabulary showed an increase with age. Bush
(1914-) and. Court (1920) presented their less extensive data in a simi¬
lar way; these two studies were also based on records from one child
alone. Smith (1926) gave detailed statistics on the vocabulary and
utterance-length of the pre-school child. This investigation was fol¬
lowed up (1935) by a special study of different factors which in¬
fluenced the development of utterance-length in pre-school children;
in particular, she showed that children tend to use longer utterances
when talking to adults than when talking to other children.
Davis (1937b) compared developmental curves based on the
mean of the five longest utterances used by each child and curves show¬
ing the proportion of one-word responses with the curves of mean
utterance-length. She claimed that the mean of the five longest ut¬
terances showed linguistic development more clearly than any other
single measure. This is largely because there are so many one-word
responses (e.g. answers to questions) at the earlier stages of language
development. On the other hand, the number of such responses declines
with age, so it is possible that Davis' claim could best apply only
over a three- to four-year period (between the ages of three and six
approximately). McCarthy (1930) gives further data on utterance-length
and also includes some data on the kinds of utterances used at dif¬
ferent ages by pre-school children. McCarthy (194-6) summarizes most
previous studies of utterance-length (cf. 194-6:520-521, Table 4.) and
also compares her own work with that of Day (1932) and Davis (19372-),
looking at the percentages of different types of utterances used at
different ages (194-6:525, Table 6). Davis (1937a) followed the methods
of Day (1932) and of McCarthy (1930) in her comparison of the linguistic
skills of twins, singletons with siblings and only children. In this
study, Davis compared her norms for length of utterance, type of ut¬
terance and frequency of the different types of clause with those of pre¬
vious research. Several other studies have also pointed to the sig¬
nificance of environmental factors, especially of socio-economic con¬
ditions, for language development (cf. Davis, 1937a; Templin, 1953).
LaBrant (1933, 1934) used a 'subordination index' as a measure
of development; she counted the number of finite predicates i.e. clauses
containing a finite verb form, in children's compositions, and divided
the number of subordinate clauses by the total. She was particularly
interested in the relation of subordination to chronological age, mental
age and I.Q., and studied the distribution of subordinate predicates
according to the function of the clauses in which they occurred (i.e.
adverbial, adjectival, noun clause, etc.). She also attempted to show
further qualitative differences between the grammatical forms used by
younger and older children (Grades 4 - 12),(cf. also -Anderson, 1937).
Young (1941) was concerned with the incidence of different
parts of speech occurring in young children's conversations. She pre¬
sents data on 74 children and also summarizes the results of several
other studies. Her main concern is to make the different studies
equivalent by reconciling differences of definition of the grammatical
terms used. She attempts to collate the different studies, using
•Tespersen's Essentials of English Grammar (1933) as a source for defi¬
nitions of the word-classes. Carroll (1939) studied adjectives as a
class in children between about 2;6 and 5;0 years. He found that both
definite and indefinite adjectives (excluding the articles) increased
in number with age, but the latter showed the greatest increase. For
the articles, the use of "a" leveled off between 3;6 and 4;&, Hut for
"the", there was a sharp rise in the age-range studied (3j6 - 5;0).
These results are confirmed by the data in Young (1941). More recently,
Brown (1957) undertook to show how a grammatical practice, the alloca¬
tion of words to one or another part of speech, could affect cognition.
In his paper, Brown compared the percentages of parts of speech used by
adults to those used by children, and showed that nouns used by young
English-speaking children are more reliably the names of things and
verbs the names of actions than is the case in adult speech. Children
also use the part of speech membership of new words as a clue to their
meaning.
Finally, a few studies have been done using linguistic fac¬
tors as indices of development in a general, social sense in children.
For instance, Goodenough (1938) collected samples of the spontaneous
conversations of 203 children in two psychologically dissimilar environ¬
ments. Each sample of speech (fifty consecutive responses) was analyzed
with respect to the frequency of usage of certain specified pronouns.
As a whole, the percentage of pronouns in the data showed little
consistent change with age or sex after the age of three. Some pro¬
nouns, though, did show changes both with age and with the conditions
of observation, e.g. the children used first person singular pronouns
(including possessives) far more often when playing with other children
than when alone with an adult, while third person pronouns with non-
'
personal antecedents (it, they) showed the opposite proportions.
"Neuter" third person pronouns decreased with age5 this was most
probably because the child usually used these pronouns in placo of the
name of an unfamiliar object. Another study done by Fahey (1942) in¬
vestigated the typo of questions that children ask, but more from the
pedagogical point of view than from the developmental one. He sum¬
marizes some of the literature, and reports that the earliest and most
numerous statistical analyses of questions were concerned with the
chronological age at which various question-forms and interrogative
words were first noticed in children learning to speak (Soyd, 1916j
Davis, 1932). There is, however, no great agreement among the different
reports as to the order of appearance of the different interrogative
words, except that "why" questions are said to be the last to appear.
The main indices, then, that have been studied are utterance-
length, vocabulary growth, parts of speech (including increase or de¬
crease in use of particular items), and different utterance-types. In
the next section, I will examine the studies that have looked in de¬
tail at the latter: the development of different utterance-types, and
their incidence at different stages of development in language. Un¬
fortunately, there have been very few studies of oral speech: this as¬
pect of language development has mainly been studied through written
language. As most attention has been concentrated on written English,
the children studied have been older, at least of an age to write
(7;0 or S;0 upwards). Nonetheless, such studies can give us some in¬
dications of the tendencies children have in using various utterance-
types at different ages.
A.2 Guillaume (1927a), in talking of the child's earliest ut¬
terances — one- and two-word sentences, — claimed that although these
utterances can be called "predicates of the situation" and have some
psychological unity (derived from the fact that the child uses similar
utterances in like situations), "cette unite [de langage] n'a pas encore
celle d'un organisms grammatical obeissant aux lois d'une langue definie"
(l927a:7). However, it now seems that, even at this early a stage in
language acquisition, the child already uses some 'rules of grammar',
although the earliest rules may indeed be language universal rather than
language particular.
Evidence for this point of view is found in some recent
studies of children's early utterances (at the two-word stage) which
have shown that such utterances do not consist of random pairs of words;
the selection of words to form the utterances is rule-governed. Braine
(1963a),(Brown and Eraser, 1963; Brown and Bellugi, 1964 ) and Ervin
(196a) have all collected data from young children. Braine's subjects are
the youngest, none of them producing any two-word utterances before the
study began. His data come from records kept by the parents of the
children. Both Brown's and Ervin's subjects are older, using some two-,
three- and even four-word utterances at the time when they began to
record the data. Braine, Brown and Ervin all found that the children
seemed to select words from primitive grammatical classes in a fixed
order. One class was fairly restricted in size and its contents
(which vary from child to child) have been called variously "pivot",
"modifier" or "operator". The other class contains all the other
vocabulary of the child: the "open" class. Utterances were made up of
a Pivot + Open or of an Open + Open pair of items. The Pivot class
contains relatively few members and is slow to acquire new ones,
whereas the Open class contains a large number of different items which
can be added to freely. Because of their smaller number, the Pivot class
words are all used more frequently than Open class words. Braine (1963b)
points out that, in fact, the Pivot words in this respect resemble
'function'"*" words in adult speech. However, it is just these 'function'
words which are omitted by children at the two-word stage ("telegraphic
speech", cf. Brown and Bellugi, I964J, and besides, the child's Pivot
class contains both 'function' and 'content' words according to an adult
classification. In other words, the child is not reflecting adult word
frequency in the items chosen to form the Pivot class; nor is he re¬
flecting an adult grammatical categorization. The child cannot, there¬
fore, be imitating any part of adult speech in setting up the Pivot-
Open class distinction. (This absence of imitation is further borne
out by the different word-order that is frequently observed in children
at this stage, e.g. "allgone milk" vs. (adult) "the milk is all gone".
Given that the child is not imitating, (imitation was the most frequent
"*"i.e. preposition, articles, etc. vs. nouns, etc. ('content' words);
Cf. Fries, 1952.
explanation in the nineteenth and. early twentieth centuries of lan¬
guage acquisition), nor choosing the more frequent words from adult
speech, it is very unlikely that he is able to infer from adult speech
what the generic categories are from which he could gradually sort out
the adult categorization of parts of speech (McNeill, 1966).
Braine (1963a, 1963b, 196$) claims that the Pivots are words
for which the child has learned a fixed sentential position. The im¬
balance between the Pivot and Open classes comes from the fact that,
at first, the position of only a few words is known. As a result, many
P + 0 sentences will use the same few Pivots with high frequency com¬
bined with a large number of Open class words that are less frequent.
However, if the initial selection of Pivot class words is based on word-
position alone, there should be a random assortment of words as membersj
this does not appear to be the case. In addition, it would be difficult
on this basis to account for the pairs of utterances which differ only in
having contrasting word-order, e.g. "carry Mommy" and "Mommy take",
interpreted in both instances as an instruction to the child's mother
(Braine, 1963b:33S). Braine gives the name "contextual generalisation"
(1963b, 1965) to the process by which the child learns language on the
basis of positional cues of the words relative to each other. He
claims that the knowledge of position is generalized by the child,
and that, therefore, language acquisition can be explained as a form
of response generalization, relying on the stimulus-response paradigms
of learning theory. Braine's'position, and in particular, the theoreti¬
cal basis of his stand, are severely criticized by Bever, Fodor and
Weksel (1965). Braine based part of his argument on the simple active
declarative form of sentence which he considers the basic sentence-
type in the grammar and which, he claims, predominates in the child's
linguistic environment. However, data examined by Bever et al. failed
entirely to support the latter claim: out of a sample of parental speech
to small children consisting of 4-32 utterances, 258 were fully grammati¬
cal, and of these only 4-6 were simple declaratives. There is no reason,
therefore, to suppose that a preponderance of this sentence-type helps
the child leam English. The other point that Bever et al. contest is
that the simple, active declarative sentences are the base form of all
other sentence types: this is not so. It would appear that Braine
assumed that all other sentence-types derive from the kernel sentence
(Chomsky, 1957) as Harris (1951) has stipulated. But the kernel
sentence itself does not produce any other sentence-type: it is the
underlying string which can become any one of a number of different
sentence types in surface structure. Chomsky (1957) defined the kernel
as the set of kernel sentences which were the result of applying only
obligatory transformations to the kernel strings. These particular dis¬
tinctions have now, however, been superseded (Kata and Fodor, 19&3j
Chomsky, 19&5). Bever et al. also discuss in detail the question of
sentential position, pointing out that there are so many heterogeneous
expressions that can occur at any given position within the sentence
that it would be no easier for the child to rely on sentential posi¬
tion than on, say, learning adult grammatical categories to facilitate
the acquisition of language. Another argument against any great sta¬
bility in the order of the elements in surface structure is that order
is one of the things most likely to change with transformations, e.g.
cleft-sentence forms. Bever et al. take a mentalistic stand, (like
Chomsky, 1965; Kats, 1966; etc.), pointing out that the complexity
of language is such, and the relations between deep and surface struc¬
ture so indirect, that the child could not hope to learn anything un¬
less he already has some innate knowledge of language universale.
It is these universals that help the child select broad generic cate¬
gories, for instance, which later develop into the parts of speech
hierarchy used by adults (cf. also McNeill, 1966).
Schlesinger (196?), though, has pointed out that Bever et al„'
criticisms are based on the premiss that the child, on learning his
native language, has first to acquire those skills and competences which
he will eventually use when he has acquired an 'adult' mastery of lan¬
guage. However, as Schlesinger points out: "there seems to be no reason
why the end product of a prolonged and very complex learning process
must be acquired directly rather than through various detours" (1967:398)
The mentalist position on language acquisition is not really strengthened
by just pointing out the weaknesses of the empiricist position (Chapter
I above); when the mentalist claims that 'x is innate', x has still to be
accounted for. Schlesinger (1968) suggests that the deep structures with
which the speaker and hearer operate are not exactly those which current¬
ly figure in generative grammar: they do not contain information about
grammatical categories nor about order. That sort of information is in¬
troduced through transformations which change the deep structure into
surface structure. He also argues (in press) that the speaker's lin¬
guistically relevant intentions must serve as input. The Input-
marker contains concepts and the relations between the concepts (I as¬
sume that this would, for example, include theme. Cf. 5.13 below). The
speaker realizes the concepts as words and as the grammatical relations
between words, such as inflection and word-order.
In Table I, the data show the Pivot class of one child from
each of the three studies mentioned earlier (Eraine, 1963a; Brown and
Bellugi, 1964-; Ervin, 1964). The evidence for classifying words to¬
gether (bracketting) is always distributional; two words are consider¬
ed to belong to the same grammatical class if their pi-ivileges of oc¬
currence are the .same. At the two-word stage, children do not only-
produce utterances consisting of Pivot + Open. In fact, the Pivot word
Insert Table I about here
is optional: (P) + 0, where 0 is generally a noun (N). Another utter¬
ance-type consists of two Open class words: 0+0, but two Pivot class
words never occur together to form an utterance. As the different
categories emerge, the rules set up to account for the structure of the
child's utterances become more complex. The Pivot class members are
gradually differentiated into different classes which end up correspond¬
ing to the adult hierarchy. A factor which may contribute to this dif¬
ferentiation of the Pivot class is that different Pivot words may fulfil
different functions; Slobin (in press) claims that some Pivot words are
used to modify or qualify the Open class noun, e.g. Eng.: my , pretty
, allgone ; Ger.: me in , aimer , alle ; Puss.:
khoroshaya, bo-bo (cf. Table II). (The dash indicates the usual
position of the Open class word in such utterances.) A second function
of the Pivot word is to locate an object, e.g. Eng.: there , here
see ; Ger.: da-is ; Russ.: tarn. The Pivots can also
57
Table I (after McNeill, 1966)
Open and Pivot word classes: data from one child in oach group studied.
a
Braino (1963a) Brown (1964)
f f (
allgone boy my Adam L-J thisbyetye sock that Becky
big boat two boot [that
more fan a coat I
pretty > milk the >
coffee
I my plane < hig knee
>see \ vitamins >■ green man
night- hot poor Mommy
night Mommy wet nut









































The youngest child is on the left (Braine's data), the oldest on
the right (Ervin's data) where the Pivot class has already been
differentiated into different grammatical categories. The Pivot
words always appear in the left-hand column of each pair.
describe an act, in the sense of attributing directionality: Eng.:
away. on, come: Ger.: anf ans: Russ.: unala.
tprua. Finally, the Pivot class words can indicate a demand or
desire on the child's part, e.g.: Eng.: more , give j Ger.:
mehr , bitte j Russ.: esche , day . The data given in
Insert Table II about here
support of this idea is still quite fragmentary. It may be quite
plausible, though, to suggest that the child's first differentiation
among members of the Pivot class may be along the lines of the different
functions filled by certain of its members.
Broun and Bellugi (1964.) examined the emergence of different
grammatical classes from the Pivot class of one child over the course of
five months. During this time, five grammatical classes appeared:
articles, adjectives, demonstrative pronouns, possessive pronouns,
and a residual Pivot class (P^) which contained other, 'nother, one.
all and more. Each new class appeared as the subdivision of one of
the Pivot classes in a process of gradual differentiation. At the be¬
ginning of the five month period of study, the child's Pivot class con¬
sisted of Ey, that, two, a, the, big, green. poor, etc. (cf. Table I,
centre column). At that stage, his P + 0 sentences could be repre¬
sented by the rule:
i) (P ) + 0
(Parentheses indicate that the choice of an item is optional.) At the
second stage, both the articles (a, the) and the demonstrative pronouns
(this, that) had become separate classes, leading to the rule:
Table II (from data in Slobin, in press)





















































ii) (Dem) + (Art) + (P ) + 0
By the end of the five month period, adjectives appeared both before
and after nouns; also, the possessive (my) has become a separate class.
The child's grammar now needed three rules to describe it:





c« (Art) + 0 + (Adj)
(Braces indicate that one of the enclosed items must be chosen. How¬
ever, rule (ii) suggests that utterances like that the mv book as well
as that a preen book could occur. Also, rule (iii-b) seems to exclude
utterances such as that rcv book, etc. So it is questionable on distri¬
butional grounds as to how satisfactory these rules would bo if applied
to other data.
Another illustration of the increasing complexity in the
structure of the child's sentences can be found in the rules necessary
to describe the development of the Auxiliary and its relation to Nega¬
tives and Questions in English. Klima and Bellugi (1966) made a de¬
tailed study of three children's data in which they found a very con¬
sistent development of negatives and questions; this consistency led
them to claim that they were studying the children's competence direct¬
ly: this issue will not be taken up here as I have already indicated
, some of the pitfalls that are to be found in the search for competence
in developmental studies (cf. l.l). Klima and Bellugi's claim is based
on a description of the children's output which can no more provide a
true characterization of competence than such a description in the
case of an adult. However, the stages in development of these con¬
structions are probably due to the children's observance of similar
if not identical rules to those proposed by Klima and Eellugi.
In the earliest stages (two- to three-words utterances),
the negatives and a growing class of interrogative words occur at the
beginning of the utterance, modifying the sentence as a whole. At the
next stage, (2), the auxiliary first appears, always in conjunction
with a negative, e.g. can't, don't. It is only after this stage that
the modals and do appear inverted with the subject in interrogative
sentences, but only in Yes/No questions for the moment; there is still
no inversion in questions introduced with an interrogative word,
where. what, etc. At the same time (stage 3), modals (but not do)
appear independently of negative and interrogative structures. It is
only after this stage, (3), that the inversion of the auxiliary verbs
extends to questions which begin with an interrogative word. Negation
is still tied to the auxiliary verb at this stage, but the relation be¬
tween negation and indefiniteness has yet to be established, e.g. the
children use not some rather than not any. The roles which describe
the development of the negatives are closely allied to those which
describe the intex-rogative structures in the children's speech.
Such syntactic rules as those in Klima and Bellugi (1966),
by accounting for the data, are desci-iptive rules, but, interestingly,
the appearance of the rules changes at each stage to a form which more
nearly resembles the equivalent adult rule (Klima and Bellugi, i960;
cf. also Menyuk, 1963, 1964-). Thus, although it is very difficult
(if not impossible) to extrapolate from a description of performance
to the underlying competence possessed by the child, the developmental
changes in performance are good indicators of changes in the child's
grammar which, in becoming increasingly complex as new utterance-types
develop, mirror more accurately the distinctions in language which the
adult speaker observes. Such roles are not merely a descriptive
device for, in some way, they do reflect the creative use of rules in
languagej for example, some of the child's verb forms can be accounted
for by positing a rule to deal with past tense endings. The child him¬
self will add the regularly required 'past' morpheme (usually /ed/)
even to nonsense syllables in contexts requiring a past tense. Berko
(1958) was the first to demonstrate the presence of these actively-
used rules in children's speech. She presented children with a variety
of pictures depicting items which she 'named' with nonsense syllables;
then, by asking for descriptions of various kinds, she elicited a num¬
ber of different morphological endings which obeyed regular rules in
the children's speech. Similar work on the role of rules in language
acquisition, based on a feature analysis of speech sounds, has been
done in phonology by Anisfeld (Anisfeld and Tucker, 1987; Anisfeld,
Barlow and Frail, 1968).
The elaboration of rule3 such as those described by ICLima
and Bellugi (1966) eventually leads to the description in terms of
rules of the many different utterance-types found in adult English.
In the next section, I will examine some of the literature dealing
with 'compound' and 'complex''utterances in children's speech.
4.3 Although it has recently been stated more than once that
the child is in possession of all the main construction-types in
English by the age of five (e.g. McNeill, 1966), not very much work has
been done on the development of specific 'compound' and 'complex'
utterances (to use the traditional labels) in children's speech.
Moreover, little of the work on English that has been done in this area
has looked at records of oral speech; the majority of studies have con¬
sidered written English, which immediately puts their youngest subjects
in the seven- or eight-year old group. The children's written English
is not necessarily an accurate reflection of their speech, although
it is likely to mirror certain tendencies, i.e. preferences for some
structures over others.
Among the studies of younger children (l;10 upwards, where
the records are necessarily oral in nature), Bloch's (1921, 1924.)
studied the emergence of subordination (complex utterances). Ke stated
that many utterance-types are in fact present long before the necessary
subordinating conjunctions are explicitly used, e.g. "J'ai peur ja
tombe" (1924:34). He emphasized the fact that one has to know the exact
circumstances of the utterance (the physical context) and the child's
current state of linguistic development and knowledge in order to in¬
terpret such utterances as rudimentary sentences and as subordinate
clauses of various types. "...Progressivement les idees se subordon-
nent, meme en 1'absence du terme de subordination: ce qui le prouve,
e'est la comparaison de phrases coenistantes ou cette relation est
exprimee, et aussi la necessite du sens" (1924*32). Bloch's insistence
on the latter point (necessite du sens) is of course closely tied to
the need to take into account'the entire context of the child's de¬
veloping speech, something which Slama-Cazacu (1961, 1965) has also
emphasized. Bloch pointed out that: "Bans le courant de la troisieme
annle, mes enfants sont devenus tous les trois aptes a composer des
groupes exprimant des circonstances de cause, de temps, le but,
l'hypothese, mais lis ont tous les trois commence regulierernent par la
simple juxtaposition, et meme quand ils ont acquis les conjonctions
appropriees, il n'est past rare qu'ils aient continue a s'en passer"
(1924.:35). Guillaume (1927b) agrees with Bloch that: "Dans la liaison
de deux propositions la conjonction est d'abord latcnte: 'Donne le
couteau [pour] couper la belle dame', 'Tu vas voir [comme je] fais la
musique, Elle veut pas [que je] le fais' etc," (l927b:21?)» Gregoire
(1941, 194-8) likewise agrees that French-speaking children do not use
many conjunctions until the end of the third year (2;8 - 3;0) when they
still seem to be omitted quite frequently. Slama-Casacu (1965) also
agrees about the time of appearance of complex utterance-types, in
Roumanian; it occurs around the age of three years. Woodcock (1934-),
in looking through nursery school language records for 17 children
found that the conjunction why, because, and so. with coming
slightly later, all appeared between 2;8 and 3;0 years. These data
agree with those discussed by Bloch (1924-), Guillaume (1927b), and
Gregoira (1948), that the subordinate clause seems to appear first be¬
tween 2;6 and 3;0, even though the conjunctions may still be sporadi¬
cally omitted. According to Bloch's data for French, the child begins
using -parce que (because) at 2;6 - 3;0, and quand (when) at about 2; 10 -
3;0. Si (if) also appears at about 2;10 though it is implied by the
overall context as early as 2;6. The time period covering the ap¬
pearance of the conjunctions appears to correspond very closely to both
Woodcock's and Slama-Cazacu's data. Woodcock also concluded from the
contextual data that the relations expressed by the conjunctions were
actually present earlier on, often from 2;2 upwards, although they were
not marked in any overt manner. The actual beginning of causal
expression is largely obscured, Woodcock claimed, by the use of pre¬
forms such as and instead of ££ (that). or by the complete omission of
the conjunctions.
Nice (1925) reported only one or two compound and complex
sentences per 50 utterances recorded from each child, and McCarthy (1930)
merely stated that the number was very small in pre-school children,
(i.e. under 6;0) although it increased in older groups. O'Shea (1907)
tried to determine the order of appearance of the conjunctions in his
own children but came to no definite conclusions, convinced that "none
of the conjunctions expressing refined shades of meaning is employed
with precision before the fifth year". He was presumably defining
'precision' from an adult viewpoint. Another study of one child's
speech was done by Boyd (1926-7). Taking the speech of one child be¬
tween the ages of three and eight years, Boyd distinguished the kinds
of utterance used at different ages and the development of different type
of clause according to three main grammatical categories: noun, adjective
and adverbial. He then, however, compared the child's speech, thus
analysed, to adult conversation as portrayed in novelsi On the whole,
no really systematic analysis of the compound and complex utterances
used by young children was attempted before Davis' (l937a)„
Davis (1937a) made extensive oral records for three groups
of children, whose average ages were 5;6, 6j6 and 9;6 years. She first
analysed the mean numbers of subordinate clauses per 100 sentences, and
found that the percentage increased considerably with age (cf. Table III)
Insert Table III about here
TableIII(afterDavis,1937a:T l4 )
Meannumberofsubordi ateclausespe100sente c s.

























Among the complex utterances (those containing a subordinate clause),
she found that adjectival clauses seemed to be the least important.
However, of the noun clauses and the adverbial clauses, the former de¬
creased during the early school years (between 6;6 and 9;6) while the
the number of adverbial clauses increased considerably. The reason for
the increase in the latter group could be just due to increased pre¬
cision in the use of language rather than to a true functional varia¬
tion, i.e. earlier on, the subordinate relation may have gone unex¬
pressed altogether. The adverbial clauses fall into eight groups:
time, place, condition, cause, manner (including comparatives), pur¬
pose, result and concession. In the 5;6-year old group, the largest
category is time, the next largest being cause, and then condition. By
6;6, the largest category is cause, followed by time, and then condi¬
tion; this ranking among the three largest categories is maintained in
the 9;6-year old group. The overall distribution of the different ad¬
verbial clauses, by age, is shoxra in Table IV.
Insert Table IV about here
Stormzand and O'Shea (1924.) found a similar distribution of
adverbial clauses in written material for 9j0 - 10;0-year old children:
52$ of the adverbial clauses were time clauses, 26$ were condition, and
13.1$ were cause. IaBrant (1933), Stormsand and O'Shea (1924-), and
Boyd (1926-7) all agree with Davis' finding about the importance of the
time clauses. These clauses make up between 20 - 50$ of all the ad¬







































































Of the conjunctions as a whole, Davis found that coordinat¬
ing conjunctions are used approximately five times as often as sub¬
ordinating ones. And accounts for 84$ of all coordinating conjunctions
at 5;6 and at 6;6 years, and for 88$ at 9;6 years. But makes up 10$
of the total number of coordinating conjunctionsat 5;o years, 11$ at
6j6 and 5$ at 9;6 years. Of the subordinating conjunctions, because,
if and although are the most frequent. (Davis did not include any tem¬
poral conjunctions among the latter, although elsewhere she counts them
as subordinating conjunctions.) In a later article, inspired by Heider
and Heider (194-0), Davis (194-1) examined the position of the subor¬
dinate clause in the sentence. Eeider and Heider (1940) suggested
that there might be particular difficulty in placing a subordinate
clause (in written English) at the beginning of a sentence, because of
interrupting the main thought by a qualification or by the expression
of a possibility. The Heiders suggested this to account for the dif¬
ferences in usage between deaf and hearing children who were asked to
write the story of a short film they had all been shown. Davis (1941)
found that clauses of time and condition usually introduced the main
clause. She also found that the placing of the subordinate clause
first was correlated with greater linguistic development: it was used
by the older children (9;6 years) more often. It was also correlated
to some extent with intelligence: it was only used by the more intelli¬
gent children in the 5J6-year old group. The total percentage of time
clauses occurring before the main clause in her data, though, was con¬
siderably smaller than the 90$ found by Heider and Heider (1940). In
her younger group (5;6), time clauses preceded the main clause in 45$
of the instances, following it in 55$ of themj in the oldest group (9;6),
the time clauses preceded in 57$ of the instances, following in 43$ of
them. For the youngest group, conditional clauses preceded 76$ of the
time, and followed 24$ of the time. Bushnell (1930) got similar re¬
sults in comparing the oral and written compositions of 15-16 year-old
children. In the oral compositions, time clauses preceded the main
clause in 78$ of the instances, while in the written, this happened in
60$ of the instances. The oral conditional clauses preceded in 80$ of
the instances, and the written ones in 67$ of them. There seem to be
similar tendencies, therefore, in both oral and written English as far
as clause-position is concerned, although the numbers are higher for
oral English.
The two main studies of written English are those of LaErant
(1933, 1934) and Heider and Heider (1940)• LaBrant studied composi¬
tions written by children in Grades 4 to 9 (aged approximately 10 - 15)
and Grades 9 to 12 (15 to 18 years) which she compared to some adult
writing. Her main unit of analysis was the finite predicate (a clause),
which was classified into two principle categories, main and subordinate.
She computed an index of subordination for each individual by dividing
the number of subordinate clauses by the total number of (written)
clauses. The clauses used by the first group of subjects (grades 4 to 9)
were also classified as adverbial (time, condition, cause, etc.), substan¬
tive (noun clauses), or adjectival in type. In looking at the functions
of the subordinate clauses used by this group, LaBrant found that the
distribution of the dependent clauses remained fairly constant with
age. However the content of these subordinate clauses became more
exact with the maturation of the children, e.g. time clauses changed
from when being used in every instance to the more precise after, whilef
etc. She also found that the time clauses were more frequent than all
the noun clauses or than all the adjectival clauses together, and more
than twice as frequent as any other adverbial clause. Heider and Heider
(I94.0) made a quantitative analysis of the differences in (written) sen¬
tence structure between deaf and hearing children. The age-range of
the hearing children -was from 8 - 14 years, that of the deaf from
11 - 17 years. Apart from utterance-length and ratios of compound and
complex utterances to simple ones (in which the hearing were the most
advanced), a comparison of the seven kinds of subordinate clause that
occurred most frequently in the data showed that the differences between
deaf and hearing children did not correspond entirely to the differences
between younger and older children. However, to take only the data on
the hearing children, the percentages of both compound and complex
utterances increased with age, though not very greatly (cf. Table V).
Insert Table V about here
Of the different types of adverbial clauses, the time clauses
are the most frequently used, occurring twice as often as the next most
frequent clause type (noun clauses introduced by 'that'). In 90% of
the instances, the time clause preceded the main clause while causal
clauses always followed. If the temporal conjunctions are considered,
though, most of them occurred introducing the clause in both first and
second position (although the first position was more frequent): whenf
TableV(afterHeide&i er,1940:tablIII)






















while, ag, after, and before all occurred in both positions} as soon as
occurred only in first position, and until only in second position. The
hearing children used, in all, fourteen different forms (of which the
above are the seven most frequent, in rank order) to introduce temporal
clauses, as compared to the deaf's fives when, after, while, until, ag
soon as (in rank order of frequency). Also, in the deaf children, there
was a less marked tendency to place the time clause first: 75$ of the
instances as opposed to the hearing children's 90$. (Both these per¬
centages are very high compared to the other data cited above; it is pos¬
sible that this is due to the composition task set the children: a nar¬
rative description of the events shown in a short film. In spontaneous
speech, other than story-telling, and in non-narrative writing, there
seems to be a lower percentage of time clauses.)
To sum up, the studies of very young children (between 2;0
and 5;0 approximately) find that the subordinate clause of various types
is implicitly present by the middle to end of the third year; some of
the subordinating conjunctions also appear at that time, although the
child may still omit the conjunction at times. Both at this stage, and
much later (around 9-10 years old), compound utterance-forms are more
frequent than complex (subordinate clause) ones. Of the different types
of subordinate clauses in the speech and writing of the older children
studied (from 5;6 upwards), there seems to be a consensus that the ad¬
verbial clauses are the most frequent. Of the adverbial clauses, clauses
of time, cause and condition make up the three largest groups in the
children's speech between the ages of 5;6 and 9;6. The time clauses are
the most frequent at first though causal clauses become about as frequent
later. The subordinate clause occurs in both first and second position
with respect to the main clause, but there is a preference for first
position in time and condition clauses compared to a preference for
second position among causal clauses.
In the final section of this chapter, I will consider a few
studies which suggest that it is the child's conception of order in
time which may cause him comparative ease or difficulty in dealing
with certain linguistic constructions.
There is a certain amount of work which has related the
chronological order of the events or facts being described to the lan¬
guage they are described by. Minkus and Stern (1923) suggested that
it was difficult at certain stages in language development to deal with
sentences which speak of events out of time-order or in any way counter
to one's expectations. They examined the difficulty of different con¬
junctions, both coordinate and subordinate, in German, for children
aged Ilj6, 12;6, 13j6 and 15j6 years. They found that the order of
relative difficulty remained unchanged by age, although each category
did improve with age. The different conjunctions were presented in
utterance-completion tasks. The question of temporal sequence in the
two clauses, as well as the relationship of their content (i.e. casual,
conditional, etc.), was very important. Minkus and Stem found that
the difficulty of causal constructions in which the temporal sequence
was interrupted was greater than that of the instances where it followed
2 'the direct temporal sequence. They also found that sentences involving
However Clark and Clark (forthcoming) found that there is a marked
tendency for adults to recall 'because' clauses better in second place
as opposed to 'when' clauses, which are better recalled in first place
concessive conjunctions which serve to contradict the expectations re¬
sulting from tho content of the first clause were particularly dif¬
ficult. LaBrant (1934) found that this type of sentence wn3 extremely
rare, even in 18 year-olds. Piaget (1926, 1928) obtained results simi¬
lar to those of Minkus and Stern with children between the ages of six
and nine, also in utterance-completion tasks. For instance, when
children were asked to complete the utterance 'The man fell off his
bicycle because they appeared to assume that the first event men¬
tioned was the first event. This assumption on their part would explain
why the utterance was so frequently completed by the children's intro¬
duction of an event which would logically follow rather than precede:
'The man fell off his bicycle because broke his arm'- It is evident
from such responses that the children ignored the meaning of the con¬
junction which would have told them that the first event mentioned was
actually the second event in time. In the utterance-completion tasks,
then, the children appear to have based their responses on assumptions
about the time sequence, seeing it as directly related to the order in
which a series of events is described. In their spontaneous speech,
though, one rarely finds this type of mistake, even when the chronologi¬
cally second event is described first. Piaget's explanation is that: "In
his language, the child frequently omits from between his successive
judgments such relations as we would expect to find, and is content
to juxtapose these judgments without any conjunctions or simply by
in a memory experiment. The errors for 'because' clauses mainly con¬
sisted of repositioning of the subordinate clause after the main clause,
while 'when' errors were the inverse of this, i.e. repositioning of the
subordinate clause in first place, where the stimulus sentence had had
it in second place.
means of the term 'and'" (1928:224). It is apparently this replace¬
ment by 'and' that causes the child to make mistakes of succession.
Piaget claimed, at that time, that all relations in the
early stages of language development (his youngest subject in this
series of studies, however, was already over five) are either unmarked
altogether, (i.e. there is merely juxtaposition of two utterances) or
the utterances are linked by 'and'. If the relation between the ut¬
terances is an adversative (contrary-to-expectation) one, the utterances
may be linked by 'but'. All the non-adversative relations, expressed by
subordinating conjunctions, develop from 'and', and all the adversative
ones from 'but'. Werner and Kaplan (1963) maintain a similar hypothesis,
but claim that the development of explicitly causal conjunctions is
characterized by a stage during which the relations are seen as temporal
rather than causal. The description of the events will, at this stage,
follow the order in which the events are experienced. If this deriva¬
tion for the causal clause were correct though, I think it is somewhat
strange to find a preference for the causal clause in second position
(Clark and Clark, forthcoming) in English. Werner and Kaplan assume
that because-clauses always occur in first position in adult speech,
but do not cite any data in support of their position. However, it does
seem to be true that children describe events in order where they are
perceived as being related in time. Thus, when the notion of causality
is acquired, it must overlay the time relation that was recognized pre¬
viously.
Werner and Kaplan further claim that for a long period of
time in the early stages of language acquisition, all the dependency re¬
lations are expressed explicitly by coordinate conjunctions linking the
clauses. They claim that this arises through the child's strong ten¬
dency to transform intrinsically subordinate relationships, such as
v *
causality or conditionality, into more concrete relations of a purely
spatio-temporal nature. Again, the relation between coordinate clauses
and temporal relations is not supported by any data, so it is very
difficult to assess what is meant by 'concrete relations' here. Indeed,
data showing that children begin using subordinate relations very early
on (cf. A.3) appear to contradict Werner and Kaplan's hypothesis. In
addition, the spatio-temporal aspects of English are largely dependent
on the system of prepositions and adverbials, which can hardly be called
'coordinate' in nature. It is possible that some of the confusion in
Werner and Kaplan's discussion comes from their too close an identifica¬
tion of language structure with the structure of thought, or even of
images; for example, they talk of the simple coordination of thoughts
compared to the subordination of one thought to another, implying
that this does not occur until the child uses coordinate and subordinate
utterance-types in an adult way.
Piaget, on the other hand, has recently modified his posi¬
tion in this respect, saying that the relation between language and
thought is not close enough for us to assume that one can study thought
processes directly by means of language; thus, linguistic differences
are not explanations of cognitive differences but are, to some degree,
reflections of them (1950). In his comments on Vygotsky (1962), there¬
fore, Piaget rejects much of his earlier work: "It took me some time
to see, it is true, that the roots of logical operations lie deeper
than the linguistic connections, and that my early study of thinking
[1926, 1928] was centered too much on its linguistic aspects" (1962:5).
The hypothesis (in Piaget, 1926, 1928; and Werner and Kaplan,
1963) that most subordinate relations develop from and, with the adversa¬
tive ones coming from but, is not supported by data from the studies dis¬
cussed above. The main subordinate conjunctions appear very early on,
barely two or three months after the appearance of and (at 2;8 - 3j0
years), whereas Piaget's subjects were already over five, or older, in
the data he reports. In spontaneous speech, moreover (especially in
in the present study), children appear to use the subordinate con¬
junctions correctly, as far as can be judged from the context of their
use, though it is quite possible that, at the age of three, the child
does not attach the exact adult meaning to any particular conjunction
he uses. It may be that Piaget was misled by the large proportion of
coordinate to subordinate conjunctions in children's speech at that
stage; Davis (1937a) found that compound utterances were about five
times as frequent as complex ones in children between 5?6 and 9;6
years, and in Heider and Heider (194-0), the ratio of compound utterances
to complex ones was three or four to one for 8;0 to 14-jO year-old
(hearing) children.
Of the subordinate clauses that have been studied, the ad¬
verbial clauses of time are significantly more important than any
other clause type (cf. 4-.3). There seems to be a progression towards
more precise indication of exact time relations as the child gets older;
LaBrant (1933) found that, in written material, the time clauses ranked
as follows for frequency of usage and increase in age: when (used in
almost every instance by her younger group of subjects); after: until.
before: while: as soon as; as. A similar progression has been remarked,
less formally, by others, e.g. O'Shea (1907). Finally, a number of
studies (e.g. Heider and Heider, 194-0; Davis, 194-1; etc.) have pointed
out that time clauses in the majority of instances occur in first posi¬
tion in the utterance. In addition, the figures supporting this in
Davis (1941) suggest that in the youngest group (5;6) the inverse is
true, i.e. the time clause more often occurs in second position to begin
with. The clause-position will be investigated in this study by looking
at extensive data from still younger children. The tendency for the
time clause to occur first in older children is very likely to be re¬
lated to the observance of time-order among the events described. The
majority of temporal conjunctions in English refer to the first event,
and therefore the subordinate clause which they introduce would have to
be placed first if the time-order of the events was to be reflected in
the clause order in language.
It is clear from the studies of children's notions of time
(cf. Chapter III above) that the idea of order is present very early
on, during the third year, and we have seen above that this notion of
order appears to be reflected directly in some cases in the sentence
structures used to describe time. I will further assume that the ten¬
dencies observed in the data cited above are reflections of some under¬
lying organizational principles which operate when one is describing
events in time. I shall claim that such principles play a role both
in adult speech and in the ontogenetic development of utterances used
to describe events in time.
v. Three Principles aM a Envelopments,! Hypothesis.
5.0 In this chapter, I shall outline three principles which inter¬
act to determine which of several possible descriptions an adult may give
of two events in serial order in any particular context. The three
principles are supported by both linguistic and psychological data,
some of which are discussed following the relevant principle. These
three principles also affect the child's use of the different des¬
cription-types. They do not, however, directly predict any order of
acquisition unless the function of each description-type in English
is taken into account. In the second part of this chapter, the speci¬
fic predictions which can be made in the case of a developmental
hypothesis will be set out in some detail, before discussion of the
subjects and data (in chapter VI),
5.1 The three principles will be discussed in turn under the
headings: order of mention, derivational simplicity, and choice of
theme.
5.11 Order of mention The first principle is that the order
of mention, the order in which two events are described by a speaker,
is 'simpler' when it coincides with chronological order, i.e. the
order in which the events are perceived or are believed to have
happened by the speaker.
In English, order of mention may or may not coincide with
chronological order. First, if the speaker uses only single clauses,
the only way that he can recount a succession of events is by keep¬
ing to the chronological order of their occurrence:
(1) He opened the door. He came in. He sa<fcdown. He picked up
a book from the table. He began to read.
The same applies if the speaker uses compound sentences'^" to describe a
succession of events:
(2) He opened the door and he came in.
Event 1 must be described before event 2. But events may be mentioned
out of chronological order if the speaker uses an appropriate temporal
conjunction between the clauses. For example, we can speak of the re¬
sult before mentioning the cause:
(3) He took a taxi because he missed the bus.
The compound clause construction (with coordinate and) in (2) is there¬
fore simpler than (3) by the principle of order of mention.
There is psychological evidence which supports this principle
by showing that people prefer to use a linguistic description of events
in which order of mention corresponds to chronological order. Clark and
Clark (1968), in a memory experiment, found that subjects remembered best
-the meaning of those sentences in which order of mention coincided with
chronological order. In addition, the subjects often made errors by
interpreting order of mention as equivalent to chronological order when
they had forgotten the appropriate conjunction. Thus the sentences in
which temporal order was best remembered were of the type:
U) He came in and he shut the door.
(5) After he came in, he shut the door.
"^Compound sentences are defined as two clauses joined by a 'coordinate'
conjunction such as and, and then, so. or but in the present data. Cf.
Chapter IX, below, for further discussion.
(6) He came in before he shut the door,
rather than the alternative descriptions:
(7) He shut the door but first he came in.
(8) He shut the door after he came in.
(9) Before he shut the door, he came in.
Groethuysen (1935-36) also found that adults would recount the
events of the preceding day in the order in which they occurred, i.e.
in chronological order. Fraisse (1963) discusses many studies which
show how difficult it is for adults to repeat a sequence of digits or
letters just heard in any other order than the one in which they were
perceived. Children, likewise, repeat any such list in the order given,
unquestioningly. Also, in an experiment in which pairs of sentences
that described a series of two events were compared, Katz and Brent (1968)
found that both adults and children (Grades 1 and 6) tended to prefer
those sentences in which the order of mention coincided with the chron¬
ological order of the events, e.g.
(10) The boy fell off the bicycle and he broke his leg,
was preferred to the (incorrect) order:
(11) The boy fell off his bicycle because he broke his leg.
(82$ of Grade 1 responses preferred form (lO); 100$ preferred it in the
other two groups.) There also appeared to be a clear preference in all
three groups for temporal over causal constructions when chronological
order of mention was adhered to, e.g.
(12) When he turned the switch, the room got dark,
was chosen on average, for the three groups, 83$ of the time over:
(13) Because he turned the switch, the room got dark.
Finally, the preference for chronological order in the order of mention
could explain why children make the mistakes they do in some sentence-
completion tasks (e.g. Piaget, 1926, 1928j cf. 4.4 above). When they
are asked to complete sentences like 'The man fell off his bicycle be¬
cause....', the children assumed that the first clause describes the
first event, and they therefore expected to fill in the second of two
events in their completion of the sentence. Therefore, they would com¬
plete the sentence without taking any notice of the meaning of the con¬
junction. Their assumptions overrode the information offered by the
presence of the conjunction.
5.12 Derivational simplicity The second principle is that of de¬
rivational simplicity. This notion of simplicity applies only to the
so-called complex sentences, i.e. those with a main and subordinate
clause:
(14) They arrived after the play had begun.
(15) He was late because the road was closed.
(16) When Tom got in, he opened all the windows.
Simplicity here refers to the number of steps (transformations) in the
derivation of a sentence from its deep structure. Derivational simplicity
is seen in the case where the only difference between two sentences with
identical meaning and with almost identical surface structure is the
clause-order, i.e.:
(17) He got up from his chair when he saw the door open.
(18) When he saw the door open, he got up from his chair.
The principle of derivational simplicity states that the first of these
sentences, (17), is transformationally simpler because the second, (18),
has undergone an additional transformation which has proposed the sub¬
ordinate clause into first position in the sentence. This principle
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therefore is dependent on a particular model of grammar (Chomsky, 1965)
for its formulation.
Linguistically, the source of the subordinate clause can be
shown to be an adverbial or adjunct constituent of the predicate phrase.
For example, the sentence Re arrived when it was dark has a high level
constituent structure like that of He arrived then (cf. Lees, 19olj a
similar analysis is suggested in Smith, 1961, and in Doherty and Schwartz,
1967). The subordinate clause is derived from a node in the phrase-
marker to the right of the matrix sentence into which it is subsequently
embedded (see Figure II). Figure II is essentially taken from Chomsky
(1965), but is modified in the light of evidence discussed by Lakoff and
Ross (1966). In this derivation, the subordinate clause is first
Insert Figure II about here
attached to the predicate phrase of the main clause by an embedding
transformation (see dotted line in Figure II); it is only after this
2
that it may be preposed into first position.
Additional evidence for this derivation of the surface structure
position of the subordinate clause comes from one explanation of the
pronominalization and proverbalization rules within the sentence in
The possible sources of the subordinate clause itself, apart from its
sentential position, are discussed in some detail in Chapter VIII below,
where the different conjunctions used to introduce subordinate temporal
clauses are analyzed.
Figure II
Derivation of subordinate clause position
English. Consider the following examples:
(19) John came in when he finished cutting wood.
(20) When John finished cutting wood, he came in.
(21) When he finished cutting wood, John came in.
(22) He came in when John finished cutting wood.
In (19), (20) and (2l), John and Jje may refer to the same person. How¬
ever, in (22), John and he must refer to different people. To exclude
(22), then, as an instance of intra-sentence pronominal!zation, we may
assume that pronominal reference can only be anaphoric — i.e. referring
to someone or something which has already been mentioned — and at the
same time that this pronominalization can take place either before or
after the preposing transformation, as, for instance, in (20) and (2l).
The restrictions on (22), with anaphora, are only explicable if the
subordinate clause is derived from a high level constituent to the right
of the main clause. Proverbalization works in the same way:
(23) He jumped over the fence after he decided to do so.
(24.) After he decided to do so, he jumped over the fence.
(2$) After he decided to jump over the fence, he did so.
(26) He did so after he decided to jump over the fence.
As with pronominalization above, the proverbalization (do so) in (26)
must refer to something other than iumo over the fence. There are other
problems which arise in connection with anaphoric reference, but these
problems are not related to the derivation of the subordinate clause as
such (cf. discussion in Lakoff, 1968). Given these facts supporting the
derivation of the subordinate clause from a constituent to the right
of the main clause in deep structure, we can conclude that the simpler
form of sentence with a subordinate clause is the one with the subordi¬
nate clause second, i.e. to the right of the main verb. A later trans¬
formation can then prepose the subordinate clause, as (l6), (18), etc.
Derivational simplicity is not dependent on the chronological
order of mention because, in English, the subordinate temporal clauses
can describe either the first or the second event, e.g.
(27) He ran round the garden after he got out of the pool.
(28) He went swimming before he ran round the garden.
However, for the majority of temporal conjunctions (when, since, after,
etc.) the subordinate clause describes the first event:
(29) He came home when he was ready.
(30) He will pick up the mail Tom fetches him.
(31) He read the book after he heard about the reviews.
In (29) - (31), the simpler derivational form does not allow chronologi¬
cal order of mention. Event 2 in each instance is described before
event 1. There are, however, two subordinating conjunctions in English
which d£ make the chronological order of mention and the derivationally
simpler form correspond, before and until:
(32) He ran across the road before he picked up the ball.
(33) He banged on the door until he was let in.
Although the 'simpler' sentence with a subordinate clause is
derived to the right of the main clause, this does not mean that sub¬
ordinate temporal clauses necessarily occur in second position in
surface structure, particularly when 'performance' considerations
(e.g. choice of theme, 5.13 below) intervene. However, Clark and
Clark (1968) did find that there was a preference for the subordinate
clause in second position, e.g.
(3A) He cane in before he shut the door.
rather than:
(35) Before he shut the door, he came in.
This preference interacts with the one for descriptions in chronological
order (see above, 5.1l). The fact that the derivationally simpler form
of sentence has the subordinate clause second, though, does have develop¬
mental consequences (cf. for instance, data discussed in Chapter IV
above).
5.13 Choice of theme This is the choice made by every speaker when
he decides what he is going to talk about. Any communication in English
is organized into theme and rheme- The theme is the first member of the
sentence and is the "subject" of the utterance. The rheme comprises the
information about the theme.
There are certain general properties of themes. In English,
the theme is generally the (animate) subject of the sentence, but it may
also be the object of the verb (the surface structure subject) in passive
sentences (Svartvik, 1966). In Wh-questions, the theme is the interro¬
gative word, and in clauses beginning with 'link' words (adjuncts)
like therefore, so, however, then, the adjunct is the theme. Theme is
not only a within-sentence choice, but also one that acts across sen¬
tences; the rheme or part of the rheme of one sentence is often re¬
peated in the theme of the following one. Such sequences in language
provide a natural link between different utterances. Compare:
(36) I saw a man. The man was mending a box.
(37) I saw a man. The box was being mended by the man.
The first of these sequences is more 'natural1 than the second where
there is no rhematic-thematic continuity between the two successive
utterances.
Theme has mainly been discussed in terms of it3 occurrence with¬
in the clause (Mathesius., 1928; Firbas, 1959; Halliaay, 1967a, 1967b).
However, I shall extend this notion and claim that, within the utterance,
the theme of a sentence can be a whole clause rather than one word or
phrase. This is substantiated by the fact that many (subordinate)
clauses can occur in a "deleted" form, leaving a word or phrase as
theme:
(38) After I had lunch, I saw Joan.
(39) After lunch. I saw Joan.
(4-0) I ate lunch. Then I saw Joan.
In (39), the theme of the sentence is the adverbial phrase, After lunch,
but in the context suggested by (38) above, this is most probably de¬
rived (in adult speech) from the clause. After I had lunch.^ Thus, the
whole clause when preposed, can act as the theme. In (40), the theme
of the second sentence, Then, takes the place of the first sentence;
this example again shows the relation between clause and adjunct as
theme. The underlined words are thematic.
Theme can be chosen independently of both chronological order
and derivational simplicity. If the speaker choses the first event as
his theme, he will use the simpler order of mention. With this con¬
straint, he may select a simple coordinate sentence,
-^Although there may be some ambiguity with regard to the deleted
elements, i.e. After lunch in (39) could be understood as After they
lmsii, I .saw Jpan or as After ste. jaM lunch, I sm Joan, etc., I do
not think that this affects the status of After lunch as the theme of (39)
It is, therefore, still equivalent functionally to the full clause in (38)
(41) He clo3ed the door and he went out.
a derivationally simple subordinate construction,
(42) He closed the door before he went out.
or a derivationally complex one,
(43) After he closed the door, he went out.
But if the speaker chooses the second event as his theme, he must use a
sentence with the more complex order of mention. Here he may select
an adversative coordinate sentence,
(44) He went out but first he closed the door,
a derivationally simple construction,
(45) He went out after he closed the door,
or a derivationally complex one,
(46) Before he went out, he closed the door.
We should keep in mind, however, that conjunctions like before are un¬
common in English; (42) and (46) are used only in limited contexts.
Furthermore, adversative or contrary-to-expectation constructions like
(44) are very rarely used by young children, and are understood only
with difficulty by older children (cf. data discussed in 4.4 above).
This suggests that the speaker's choices may actually consist of (41)
and (43) for simpler order of mention, and of (45) for complex order
of mention in most contexts.
One last point should be made about the difference between com¬
pound (coordinate clause) and complex (subordinate clause) con¬
structions. Let us take the instance in which the choice of theme
makes the order of mention for both constructions the same as the chron¬
ological order:
(47) I saw George and I went home.
(48) After I saw George, I went home.
\ *
The relation between the two events described in (48) is far closer
than in (47); I shall call this relation the contingency relation be¬
tween events. In (48), my going home is contingent on, or follows from
(in my mind), my seeing George. With a coordinate conjunction between
the two clauses (as in (47)), though, there is not necessarily any such
relation between the two events. Contingency between events is found
where one event (described in the main clause) is dependent on the
other event (in the subordinate clause); in coordinate clauses, both
events have an equal status, therefore one cannot be said to be overtly
"contingent", in this way, on the other. Thus, where the choice lies
between the coordinate- or subordinate-type of construction in describ¬
ing events in chronological order, the presence or absence of contingency
between the two events as they are perceived by the speaker may determine
which description-type is used. The existence of this contingency re¬
lation is presumably one criterion adult speakers use for deciding be¬
tween (47) and (48).
The effect of theme on how people normally produce utterances
has been shown experimentally by Prentice (1967). In her study, a sub¬
ject was cued with either the word for the actor or for the object in a
situation. Next, the situation itself, portrayed in a slide, was pre¬
sented to the subject. The subject was then asked to describe the pic¬
ture he had been shown. Her data, as might have been expected, show that
when the subject was cued with the actor, he produced a majority of
active utterances containing the word-order actor-obiect. while, given
the object as a cue, he more often used the word-order ob.ject-actor
and produced a large number of passive utterances. Tannenbaum and
Williams (196S) obtained similar results in a study where the subject's
attention was first focussed on either the subject or the object of a
situation which was then presented pictorially. Each picture was marked
with an A or a P indicating that the subject was to describe it with an
active or passive sentence. The latencies for producing an active or
passive description were then observed. Passives always took longer
than actives even when the focus was the object; however, the passive
took less time to generate when the focus was the object than when it
was the subject. Turner and Rornmetveit (1968) did a similar experiment
with children, using pictures of one or two nouns in an utterance as cues
in a memory experiment for active and passive sentences. They found that
12% of the errors were due to the children taking the noun presented in
the Retrieval-cue picture as the theme of the sentence they recalled.
Theme, then, is largely dependent on the context, whether this
consists of cuing or focussing beforehand as in the studies discussed
above, whether the context is what has occurred previously in a conversa¬
tion, or whether it is the physical situation — objects and other people
which surrounds the speaker. The recognition of theme, and its place at
the beginning of the sentence is probably one of the factors which pre¬
cedes the learning of various linguistic structures, including, of
course, descriptions of successions of events.
5.2 From these three principles I propose an hypothesis which pre¬
dicts the following stages of development in the child's progress towards
adult-like descriptions of events in time:
(1) The child uses short sentences, describing the
events in chronological order.
(2) He uses compound sentences (coordinate clauses),
still describing the events in chronological order.
(3) He recognizes, at some time prior to (4-), that the
order theme-rheme is the usual (unmarked or simpler)
one in English.
CO He develops an alternative to the coordinate clause
construction for when the second of two events is his
themej this involves a non-chronological order. He
uses a main clause followed by a (potential) subor¬
dinate clause. At first, the conjunction may be
omitted.
(5) After the conjunctions are freely used in (4.), the
contingency relation between the events is recognized,
much as the unmarked theme was in (3).
(6) In appropriate thematic contexts, the subordinate
clause is moved to first position so that the order
of mention again reasserts itself so as to correspond
to the chronological order observed in (l) and (2).
This hypothetical sequence of stages in development _i§ derived
from the three principles — and their assignments of simplicity —
but not directly so. In addition to the principles themselves, we
consider the functions of the description-types. First, consider an
adult trying to choose among Ha ate and he left, He left after hq had
eaten, and After he had eaten, he left. For the adult, He ate and he
left is simplest: it has the simpler order of mention and no derivational
complexity. But there is no way of differentiating the simplicity of
k *
the other two constructions. He left after he had eaten is simpler
derivationally, whereas After he had eaten, he left is simpler in order
of mention. We have no a priori reason for deciding whether derivation¬
al simplicity takes precedence over order of mention or vice versa.
There is no evidence that I know of for deciding which principle is
most important psychologically in determining difficulty in adult
speech.
In children, though, we have functional reasons for differen¬
tiating all three description-types, for we must answer the question,
Why does a particular form develop at all? In the child, as in the
adult, He ate and he left is simplest. This compound sentence develops
to indicate two related events occurring in succession; the only prin¬
ciple operating here is order of mention. With this perfectly adequate
way of describing two events, why should the child develop either of the
other two constructions? The first reason is that he comes to recognize
what theme is and finds occasion to talk about the second event rather
than the first. He needs an alternative order of mention, one that is
not chronological. So he acquires the use of He left after he had
eaten, which allows him to have the second event as his theme. In
using this form, however, he learns that it also implies a contingency
relation. Later, when he wishes to imply congingency and retain the
chronological order in the order of mention, he acquires the third
description-type, After he had eaten, he left. Thus, for functional
reasons, the child develops He ate and he left first, He left after he
had eaten second, and After he had eaten, he left last. This, in brief,
is the argument for the hypothesis I have presented. I will now con¬
sider the reasons for each stage in detail.
In stage (l) when the child begins to describe a succession of
two events in time, he does it by using 'simple' utterances, one sen¬
tence per eventj these sentences follow the chronological order of the
events in the order of mention. This assumption is based on the child's
limited memory span, observations of hi3 linguistic knowledge, and his
utterance-length in the early stages of language acquisition. At stage
(2), he begins to coordinate clauses, joining two or more of his ut¬
terances by and, and then or He opened the door and he came in.
He still talks about events in the order in which they occurred.
Somewhere in the first stage, the child begins to realize that
the theme of an utterance is always the thing that is mentioned first.
Gruber (1967) has discussed the unordered "topic-comment" construction
(from which theme-rheme develops) in the speech of one 2 - 2j6 year-old
child. The child used both topic-comment and comment-topic freely:
ffi.re trv.ck there; all brclren jdlSSl (1967:4-9, 50). The utterances given
in his data, though, never refer to more than one event. Leopold
(194-9, 3:70) pointed out that utterances in which his children's
word-order differed from the adult word-order were comparatively rare ;
when this occurred, it usually indicated some emphasis on the first
item mentioned, the 'psychological subject' of the utterance. Stern and
Stern (1928:201) noted that young children used word-order rather than
stress in German for emphasis (cf. also Chomsky, 19655222). These
observations are further evidence of the recognition of theme or topic
in utterances.
Once the child recognizes that the order theme-rheme (earlier
topic-comment) is the usual one for the English sentence, he will look
for an alternative construction when he wishes to talk about the second
of two events. The second event is mentioned first as theme and is fol¬
lowed by the first event. He now chooses the construction with the sub-
(ydjdinate clause second. The conjunctions may, at first, be omitted
(cf. 4.3 above), i.e. You're not going in jay im. - ymlll Stuck
(A.G., in present data). In such cases, the intonation patterns usually
differentiate these forms from the simple short sentences. The primitive
subordinate clauses are preceded by a main clause which does not have
sentence-final (falling) intonation, while each clause in the chronologi¬
cal series of short sentences does have sentence-final intonation and
is thus a complete utterance in itself: "He came in. He closed the door.
He sat down." Subordinating conjunctions begin to appear around 2j6 -
3;0 years (Bloch, 1921j Woodcock, 1934; etc. Cf. Chapter IV).
At stage (i) when the child begins to use the construction with
the subordinate clause second, he has an alternative to the coordinate
clause construction. He can now make either the first or the second of
two events the theme of his utterance: "He picked up the book and (he)
sat down" or "He sat down when he'd picked up the book". These two
contractions are functional alternatives in describing time sequences,
and this contrast provides the motivation for the child's learning to
use subordinate clauses at all. If there were no need to speak of
events other than in the order in which they occurred, there would
also be no reason at all to have any construction with the temporal
subordinate clause second in the language.
The question which now arises is why, in that case, is there a
sentence-type with the subordinate clause preposed? Isn't this a re¬
dundant structure given the presence of the coordinate clause construc¬
tion where the theme is also the first event? Compare "He opened the
door and (he) came in" and "After he opened the door, he came in".
The coordinate sentence is less specific in describing the relation
between the two events, whereas the subordinate clause (After..) is
very specific and contrasts with when. as. since, while. etc. The
contingency relation of when. since. after, etc. cannot be expressed
by a coordinate clause construction in a compound sentence (cf. 5.13
above). Earlier, there is no need for a thematic equivalent to the
coordinate clause construction, but there is a functional need for a
thematic alternative to the coordinate construction. The child does
not need to develop the construction with the subordinate clause first
until he wishes to describe more specific temporal relations than those
indicated by and or and then. The child, at this stage, (6), is nor¬
mally between 3;6 and 4;6 years old.
A corollary to the predictions about the emergence of the sub¬
ordinate clause in second position with its subsequent, optional, trans¬
ference to first position, concerns the particular conjunctions that
are used. Is there any sequence of appearance for particular conjunc¬
tions? The few investigators who have considered this question have
come to no firm conclusions, and say only that they observed an in¬
crease in specificity of meaning over time, i.e. the children, as they
grew older, began using conjunctions with a specific rather than a
general meaning (cf. Chapter IV, especially 4.3, above). This
development is reflected in the frequency of use of each conjunction.
From this point of view then, I would predict that the least marked of
the conjunctions (the ones simplest in meaning and with the fewest
syntactic constraints) should appear first and be used most frequently
to begin with. When should therefore appear in all the protocols. It
is the least marked of the temporal conjunctions since it also serves
as the interrogative pronoun as well as the relative, and, in addition,
it can indicate a simultaneous point in time or be semantically equiva¬
lent to the conjunction 'after1. When imposes no aspectual constraints
on the verbs which occur with it, although it does require tense con¬
cord. Other conjunctions, like before and after are restricted as-
pectually and therefore have at least one extra degree of marking not
apparent in when. The other conjunctions all appear to have additional
features and therefore enjoy different degrees of marking; however,
it is very difficult — if not impossible — to predict which types of
marking take precedence developmentally over others, and therefore,
beyond predicting that when should occur earlier than the other con¬
junctions in all the protocols, little more can be said here (cf.
Chapter VIII below).
As far as the main hypothesis is concerned, there are three
stages which would give it very tangible support: the presence of
utterances illustrative of stages (2), (A) and (6) appearing in that
order, in the protocols. The utterances representing these three
stages will be examined in the first part of the data analysis in
Chapter VII. The data will also be examined to find out if there is a
discernible progression in the use of the different subordinating
conjunctions (cf. Chapter VIII). In the next chapter, I shall give
a brief account of the subjects in this study, and of the methods
of collecting and analyzing the data before proceeding to the
analysis itself.
VI Sy.fr j r;qt,s ^ tj.afra.
6.1 The subjects in the present study were fifteen children attend¬
ing a Nursery School run by the Social Sciences Research Council Cog¬
nition Project at the University of Edinburgh. The Edinburgh Cognition
Project (directed by Dr. Margaret Donaldson and Roger J. Wales) is a
study of the development of cognitive and linguistic skills in child¬
ren between the ages of three-and-a-half and five years. All the child¬
ren selected to attend the school came from the same socio-economic
background — lower to lower-middle class — and therefore had neither
deprived nor very intellectually stimulating homes. Typical parental
occupations were plasterer, miner, laboratory technician. Most of the
children had either younger or older brothers and sisters. The
children's Stanford-Binet test scores on entering the school ranged
from 92 to 127. At entry to the school, all the children were within a
few months of 3;6 years of age. Nine of the children were boys, the
other six girls. They came daily to the Nursery School, which was set
up for the purposes of research, and spent two and a half hours there
every weekday morning.
During a typical morning, the children would spend nearly an
hour in free-play, with two or three adults in attendance. Then, after
a milk-break, someone would read them a story and ask them about their
activities of the preceding day or week-end. They then played outside
if the weather was fine, or took part in communal songs and games (if
they wished) for the rest of the morning. During the morning, some
children might be taken out individually for testing on various cog¬
nitive tasks being investigated by the members of the Cognition Project.
The School started at the beginning of February, 19675 five of
the children began attendance immediately (A.G., W.J., S.R., B.L.,
N.W.), one more began in March (L.C.), and the remaining nine (B.F.,
C.W., M.F., G.S., C.L., L.I., B.H., N.A., M.C.) in April, 1967, when
the Summer Term began.
6.2 The main body of data used in this study was collected by the
author between the beginning of February, 1967, and the end of June,
1967 (when the Summer Term ended). Some additional data were collected
during the following School year (September, 1967 to June, 1968) by
Anne Grieve. These are used to provide some supplementary evidence
for my hypothesis in the case of those children whose language had not
developed as far as the others1 by June, 1967. These two collections
of data will be referred to as Data (i) and Data (ii) respectively.
Most of the data were collected on tape, using a portable Sony
tape-recorder. The children's spontaneous speech was recorded for
varying intervals, often five or ten minutes at a time, though some¬
times less, depending on the noise level in the Nursery, the children's
activities (whether they stayed sufficiently "in range" of the micro¬
phone), and their desire to talk. The children were sometimes recorded
individually, when one was playing alone with something, but more often
in small groups (two to five) playing with the same toy(s), i.e. Lego
(small, fitted plastic bricks), Pla-doh (plasticene-lilce soft modelling
clay) or jig-saw puzzles at the various small tables set up for such
activities. There was also a sand-tray indoors (and a sand-pit out¬
side), a Wendy-house, a bookcorner (where the morning story was usually
read), painting easels, and a water-tub in the room. In addition, there
was a piano in one corner and a chute nearby, as well as assorted large-
size x^ocaen building blocks and three "boxes"; tho latter were large
wooden cubes with one side missing and a circular opening opposite the
missing side. The children used them for climbing in and out of, as
tunnels when laid on their sides, or for climbing on with one stacked
on top of another. The boxes wore fitted with a microphone terminal
for recording as the children would often sit inside talking to each
other. However, these microphones were not installed until tho second
term of 1967, so the present author did not take much advantage of re¬
cordings of this form.
As the recordings were extremely difficult to transcribe some¬
times (because of the background noise: the Nursery was situated in a
very resonant room), detailed notes were kept whenever possible of both
the speech and its exact context, e.g. which child, what he was playing
with, where he was in the room, who he was talking to (whether an adult
or another child), whether he was answering a question or making spon¬
taneous observations as part of a conversation with the group around
him. So as to be as accurate as possible, the tapes were transcribed
the day they were made by the author; the children's voices were all
identified; the parts of the tape that were inaudible because of
extraneous noise were omitted unless the notes were detailed enough
to fill the gap. The transcript of each day's tape was then collated
with the notes taken at the same time, the two together making up the
full transcript from which the data analysis was made. Great em¬
phasis was laid on the detailed notations about the child's physical
environment as much of the transcript would be uninterpretable without
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this kind of information. Any members of the Cognition Project, of
course, had the added advantage of knowing what Pla-doh was or where
the sand was in the room. The notes on the context allowed some check¬
ing of certain descriptions by the child from the point of view of ac¬
curacy. However, in studying descriptions of temporal order, complete
accuracy on the child's part could seldom be checked, especially in
those instances where the description is dependent on a reconstruction
in memory. In such instances, the fact that a time-order was remembered,
as long as it was not totally improbable, was accepted as an adequate
reconstruction. The contextual notes also took in unusual phonetic
forms in some of the children's speech (e.g. S.R.'s), and anomalous
intonation patterns (e.g. W.J. in some topic-comment or comment-topic
utterances) which were noted opposite the appropriate utterance in the
main transcript. The full transcripts were later sorted into separate
ones for each child,"'' with each utterance typed under the data-heading
so that it could easily be found in the original transcript.
The first set of data (Data (i)), collected by the author, which
is the main source for this study, consists of 4-882 utterances fairly
evenly distributed among the fifteen children. The second set of
data, (ii), much less evenly distributed among the children, consists
of 3208 utterances. (The utterance boundaries were determined by in¬
tonation patterns, reflected by the punctuation in the transcripts.)
In Data (i), the data are divided up into four parts for
H am greatly indebted to the Secretary of the Cognition Project for
typing the individual transcripts, from Data (i) during the summer of
1967.
convenience of analysis, each part covering a period of three to four
weeks. There are two periods in the first term (five children in the
first, six in the second), and two during the second term (fifteen
children in each). The data collected in the first period from each
child will be referred to as I (Roman numex-al), those in the second as
II, and so on. Some children (those who began school at the beginning
of the second term) only have I and II in their protocols, while others
have I - IV. For those children present during four periods, there was
a gap of a month between II and III; similarly, for the one child pre¬
sent for three periods, there was a gap of a month between I and II.
Otherwise the periods were consecutive.
In Data (ii), the data are again divided up for convenience, this
time into eight periods, each covering three to four weeks. There are
two periods for each child in the first term (Autumn 1967), then a gap
of about one month; three periods in the second term (Spring 1968),
followed by another gap of one month, then three more periods in the
last term (Summer 1968). Data for each child in Data (ii) are numbered
I through VIII, though some children have nothing in some periods, owing
to sustained illness and absence from school (e.g. A.G.), Fewer data
were collected during the second year although the overall period of
collection covered a longer span.
6.3 In analyzing the data, all the sentences which were temporal
descriptions were labelled either A ('compound' utterance), B ('complex'
utterance with the subordinate clause second) or C ('complex' utterance
with the subordinate clause first). The critex-ion for compound utter¬
ances was that the two clauses be joined by and, and then, or so; in
addition, there were a few instances where but was used as the ccn-
2
junction in a temporal description. Coordinate predicates in which
the subject of the second clause had been deleted were also counted
in this group: (A), i.e. He jumped over the box and fell down. The
criterion for subordinate clauses in complex utterances was that they
be introduced by one of the following (temporal) conjunctions: after.
before, when. while, till (until). since, if. unless, because (cf.
Chapter VIII). Each instance of A, B and C from the individual proto¬
cols was typed onto an IBM card, and the card was subsequently coded
on a keypunch for various kinds of information. For example, each
child was given a number so as to identify his data; the two sets of
data ((i) and (ii)) were coded as was the utterance-type: A, B, or
C, In addition, the coding showed which conjunction was used, which
tense (past or present), whether the tense was the same in both clauses
of the utterance, whether progressive or perfective aspect was used in
either or both clause(s), and whether there was any sort of temporal
adverbial present in either or both clause(s). This coding simplified
the sorting of data for the children as a whole, and for overall counts
of different construction-types in Data (i) and (ii). Other data counts
(not involving the compound and complex utterances) were made directly
from the transcripts.
In the Tables, each child's protocol is 'named' by his initials
wherever individual comparisons are being made. Otherwise, the data
periods (Roman numerals) are used, or the two different sets of data,
Data (i) and Data (ii).
sewhere, I have referred to these conjunctions as 'coordinate'
conjunctions. Cf. Chapter IX,
VII Results.
7.0 In this chapter, I will present the general results froia an
analysis of the data, and show how they support the hypothesis set
out in Chapter V. First, I shall give various statistical aspects
of the data, and then cite examples of typical utterances which il¬
lustrate the roles of each of the three principles in the hypothesis
I have proposed.
7.1 The three constructions which would provide the most convincing
evidence for the development sequence (cf. 5.2) are the compound utter¬
ance and the two complex utterances, one with the subordinate clause
second, the other with it first. To fully support the hypothesis, they
should appear in the following order:
(1) compound (temporal) utterance — type Aj
(2) complex utterance, with temporal subordinate clause in second
position — type B;
(3) complex utterance with temporal subordinate clause first —
type C.
Table VI lists the occurrences of these utterance-types for each child
and for each period within Data (i).
Insert Table VI about here
If there is a developmental progression in the appearance of
constructions A, B, and C, there are a number of possible forms that
this progression could take. For example, the progression could go
Table VI
Syntactic Constructions present in the Children's Speech.
Data (i)





A? B A, B A, B
A.G. (3j6) A, B A, B A, B A, B
W.J. (3 5-4) A, B B A, B A, C
B.L. (355) A A A, B, C A, B
N.W. (353) A, B A, B, C A, B, c A, B,
L.C. (355) A A, B A, B, c
B.F. (333) A A, B
C.W. (3j6) A, B A, B
M.F. (334) A, B, C A, B
G.S. ■(334) A A
C.L. (3;6) A, B A, B
L.I. (3j4) A, B, c A, B
B.H. (339) P P
N.A. (3j6) A, B A, C
M.C. (4}0) A, B, c A, B
jZS - none of the three temporal constructions present.
%
Age at which child entered Nursery School. Mean age was 3j6 years.
from. A to B to C (A>33>C), or vice versa, C>B>A. On the other hand,
the development could go from the simultaneous appearance of any two
of the above constructions to the other one, e.g. (A, C)>B, or con¬
versely from any one to the other two, e.g. B>(A, C). Or, only one
or two of the three may develop at all. The possible developmental
progressions are shown in Table VII. Opposite each category are
noted the protocols which illustrate that particular progression. For
example, let us take W.J.'s protocol: in I, he has A and Bj in II, B
alone| in III, A and B again, and in IV, he has A and C. This proto¬
col goes into the category (A, B)>C since A and B occur at the same
time, and both occur before C,
Insert Table VII about here
The progression in the development of the syntactic forms A,
B, and C predicted that the sequence should go from A, the compound
utterance form, to B, the construction xri-th the subordinate clause
second, to C, with the subordinate clause in first position. For the
hypothesis to be verified, there are three specific predictions to be
confirmed: i) A, coordinate clause construction must precede B,
subordinate clause secondj ii) A must precede C, subordinate clause
first, and lastly, iii) B must precede C.
Each of these predictions is fully supported by the data. In
particular prediction (i), that A appears earlier than B, is supported
by four of the protocols (B.L., L.C., B.F., G.S.), and is refuted by
none of them. The small number of protocols supporting this prediction
Table VII
Possible Developmental Progressions in the Description
of Temporal Sequences.
Possible Progressions Protocols Total
A > B > C L.C. 1
A > C > B
B > A > C
C > A > B
C > B > A
B > C > A
(A, B) > C U.J., N.W., N.A. 3
A > (B, C) B.L. 1
(A, C) > B
B > (A, C)
G > (A, B)






(A, B, C) L.I., M.C., M.F. 3







was due to the fact that most of the children had already acquired both
forms A and B by the time the data were collected. Prediction (ii),
that A appears before C, is supported by eleven protocols, and, again,
refuted by none. The eleven protocols are firstly L.C., W.J., N.W.,
N.A. and B.L. in which A did precede C. In addition, all the protocols
in which C has not yet appeared, but where A is present, also support
this prediction, i.e. S.R., A.G., C.W., C.L., B.F. and G.S. The last
prediction, (iii), that B precedes C, is borne out by nine of the
protocols, and likewise refuted by none of them. Four of the protocols
(B.C., W.J., N.W. and N.A.) showed that C appeared later than B, and
five implicitly support the prediction (S.R., A.G., C.W., C.L. and B.F.)
since C has not yet appeared there at all. Subjects M.F., L.I., B.K.
and M.C. neither support nor refute any of these predictions.
Additional, but less extensive data (Data (ii)) were collected
from all the children during the following school year (September 1967
to June 1968). There is little to be gleaned from the data for those
children who had already acquired all three constructions by June 1967,
the last period in their protocols (cf. Table VI). Five of the seven
remaining children, though, did acquire the constructions they were
lacking. A.G., C.W. and C.L. went from (A, B) to (A, B, C) within the
next six to twelve months. B.H., who had not used any of these con¬
structions prior to June 1967, acquired all three in the order A > B > C
in the next eight months, and G.S. went from A to (A, B), Only two
children showed no change (S.R.1 and B.F.), continuing to use only
(A, B). (This lack of visible change could be an artefact of the
very sparse data that were collected for some of the children in
Data (ii)«) Thus, the five children who did show development provide
further confirmatory evidence for the hypothesis proposed here. The
levels of significance by a sign test for the confirmation of each of
the specific predictions are, respectively: (i) A > B, with six cases
confirming and none aisconfirming, < .016$ (ii) A > C, with
thirteen cases confirming and none disconfinning, £ < .001$ and (iii)
B > C, with thirteen cases confirming and none disconfirming, £ < .001.
(The numbers of confirmatory cases include some from Data (ii) for
the children who had not shown all the stages in Data (i)»)
7.13. There was a fairly high correlation between average utterance-
length for the last period of data collected (Data (i)) and the number
of temporal construct!on-types used by each child. Opposite each
child's average utterance-length for the last period, it was noted
whether he used no temporal constructions ($), one (A), or two (A, E),
or all three (A, B, C), (cf. Table VIII). The correlation coefficient
between utterance-length and the number of construction-types used
(0, 1, 2, or 3) was .64 (significant at £ < .01).
Insert Table VIII about here
Although this correlation is fairly high, it is not perfect.
Utterance-length does not seem to be directly connected with the develop¬
ment of different syntactic structures, although it is clearly cor¬
related with the child's linguistic development (cf. Chapter IV above).
It is possible that there is only an indirect relation between in¬
creasing utterance-length and increasing derivational complexity (see
Brown and Hanlon, in press) in spite of the close relation between
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Table VIII
Average Length of Utterances in Morphemes in Data (i).
Protocol I II III IV Increase over time studied
a)
b)
S.R. 4.54 5.05 5.35 6.10 1.56
A.B. 4.20 4.38 5.56 5.48 1.28
W.J. 4.77 4.80 5.30 6.37 1.60
B.L. 3.86 4.42 4.93 5.00 1.14
N.W. 5.35 5.25 6.26 7.45 2.10
L.C. 3.70 4.68 4.70 1.00
B.F. 5.06 4.90 -0.16
c.w. 4.80 4.92 0.12
M.F. 4.46 6.17 1.71
G,S. 3.91 3.97 0.06
C.L. 4.56 5.17 0.61
L.I. 5.60 6.04 0.44
B.H. 4.18 4.60 0.42
N.A. 6.12 6.67 0.55
M.C. 5.35 6.36 1.01
utterance-length and the presence/absence of specific item3 such as
function words, or the auxiliary in negatives and questions (Klima and
Bellugi, 1966). This indirect relation could be the reason for the
absence of compound and complex temporal clause constructions in
B.H.'s protocol, and also, for example, why S.R., in the last period
of recording (IV), has an average utterance-length of 6.10 morphemes
as opposed to L.C.'s 4»70 morphemes when, at the same time, L.C.
produced all three constructions (Table VI) and S.R. only produced
two of the three. The children's utterance-length in morphemes was
calculated using as nearly as possible the criteria of Brown and
Bellugi (1964). The details of their procedure can be found in Slobin
(1967:18-20).
7.12 The number of different interrogative pronouns (why, where.
how, when. what, which, who. whose) in each child's protocol was also
tabulated for Data (i). There appeared to be a fairly clear order of
appearance in the children's speech as a whole: what and where occurring
in all the protocols (even those for B.F. and G.S. who seemed to be the
'youngest' as far as language acquisition was concerned). Next in
order appeared who (in ten of the protocols), followed by why (five
protocols)j next came how, whose and which for some children (these
three did not appear in any stable order, and were found in only six
protocols altogether — how in three; whose in three, and which in one).
Finally, when appears (always after what and where. and optionally
after who) in five protocols. The correlation coefficient between
the number of interrogatives used (a possible total of eight) and the
number of different temporal descriptions (0, 1, 2, or 3) used by each
child was calculated; it showed no relation between the two: r = -,04..
This could be due to the method of data collection, since the sampling
was not entirely systematic.
In addition, because of the linguistic derivation of the
temporal subordinate clause (see below, Chapter VIII) as a form of
relative, the number of relative pronouns used in each protocol
(Data (i)) was also counted* The relative pronouns counted were why,
where, how, when, what, which, that, who, whose, making a possible
total of nine. No child used them all during the time-period covered
by Data (i). The order of appearance in the children's speech of the
relatives appears to differ slightly from the order remarked for the
interrogatives. What and where. though, are again the first to ap¬
pear (in twelve and ten protocols respectively); when comes in next
(in twelve protocols), followed by how (five protocols), and then who.
that♦ which and whose in no discernable order in three protocols. For
the relative pronouns, the correlation coefficient with the number of
different temporal constructions used by each child was .36 (o < .10).
7.13 Table IX supplements Table VI by tallying the occurrences of
each construction, coordinate clauses (A), subordinate clauses second
(B), and subordinate clauses first (C). The number of occurrences of
each construction, A, B, and C in Data (i), was compared with the total
number of utterances in the data for that period, and with the number
of children using each construction. There is,predictably, an increase
in the proportion of these constructions over time out of the total
sample of speech collected. In periods I and II, the three con¬
structions make up approximately l& of the total number of utterances,
while in periods III and IV, they make up 8$ of the total. Only those
instances in which a conjunction was present were counted.
Insert Table IX about here
There were, however, several instances in each period of data
of sentences with an implicit subordinate clause second. The child's
intonation seemed to indicate that the second clause was subordinate
to the first (cf. Lyons, 1968:179-180), for example: You're not going
to go in my box - you'll get stuck., or We can both go in together -
there's enough room. This usage seems to occur most often in sub¬
ordinate clauses where because would b3 supplied by adult speakers.
A similar thing happens with the coordinate conjunction so. Although
here, there is no intonational evidence, it is clear from the context
that the second event in time is a consequence of the first, e.g. It's
ifli £az jsai iusi 1111 ii in iM HS&L& in <?<?"! ii
off (regardless of the strange function attributed to the ovenj). Note
that adults, too, often do not use these conjunctions. The addition
of these 'potential-conjunction' forms (or at least those recognized
as such) to the numbers in Table IX would not significantly alter the
ratio of temporal descriptions to total speech in any one period.
A similar increase in the proportion of temporal descriptions
out of total speech is found in Data (ii) where in periods I and II,
the three constructions make up 9»i$ of the total sample of utterances
(see Table X). During the second term (Hip IV, and V), the
Insert Table X about here
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proportion increases to 17.6%, then decreases slightly in the last term
(periods VI, VII, and VIII) to 16.7% of the total speech sample. There
'is therefore a large increase over time between the first term (I and II)
of Data (i) where the temporal descriptions made up just over 1% of the
total number of utterances, and the last term (VI, VII, VIII) of Data
(ii) where such utterances make up 16.7% of the total.
The proportion of subordinate clauses (both B and C) out of
the total temporal descriptions (A, B and C) shows a steady increase
over time, going from 37% in I, Data (i) to 51% in VIII, Data (ii).
The proportion of subordinate clauses in first position (C) out of the
subordinate clauses as a whole (B and C) also increased from an average
of IB% in Data (i) to an average of 2&% in Data (ii) over a time period
of approximately eighteen months (cf. Table XI).
Insert Table XI about here
7.Li If we look at the number of temporal descriptions which main¬
tain the chronological order of the events in their order of mention,
we find that there is very little difference between Data (i) and Data
, . u~
(ii;. There is a ainusple increase in the percentage of utterances
which have a chronological order of mention: 66.5% of the temporal
descriptions in Data (i), as opposed to 68.1% of the temporal des¬
criptions in Data (ii). In each of the two sets of data, the majority
of the compound utterances (construction-type A) have chronological
order, as do all the complex utterances with the subordinate clause
first (C). Of the complex utterances with the subordinate clause
second (B), only those clauses introduced by until or before have a
chronological order of mention. Of the utterances in Category A,
most pairs of clauses had the same tense in each, with a few pairs
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Table XI
Proportions of Compound (A) to Complex (B and C) Utterances
in Data (i) and (ii).
Period A : 3 : C % Subordinate Clauses % of C :
Data (i)
I 62 : 33 : 3 37 11
II 43 : 28 : 3 42 10
III 19 : 15 : 8 55 35
IV 12 : 8 : 3 48 27
Total 136 : 84 : 19
Average 41 18
Data (ii)
I 24 : 15 : 3 43 17
II 27 : 8 : 9 39 53
III 37 : 17 : 6 38 26
IV 57 : 36 : H 47 28
V 24 : 13 : 7 43 35
VI 22 : 5 : 3 29 37
VII 40 : 26 : 6 UU 19
VIII 35 : 32 : 10 54 24
Total 266 :152 : 58
Average LL 28
containing a past tense verb followed by a present tense one. In a
few instances, it was difficult to tell whether the child had made a
'mistake5 by omitting the tense marker on the first verb (i.e. present
tense in first clause, followed by past tense in second), whether he
did not consistently observe the tense agreement rule, or whether he
had made an order of mention mistake. There were, in fact, some clear
cases of non-chronological order of mention in compound utterances
where the child's ordering of the events he describes is made clear by
the adverbs and/or the tenses used in each clause, e.g. It's mended now
but it was broken, with some stress on 'was'. In general, the children
used tense agreement in an adult manner in the complex utterances
(B and C). Although there are occasional 'missing' tense markers in
B- and C-type constructions also, there usually appears to be no am¬
biguity over the order of mention. The numbers of each construction
type with a chronological order of mention are shown in Table XII.
Insert Table XII about here
The number of occurrences of each construction is approximately doubled
in Data (ii) for compound utterances (construction-type A) and for com¬
plex utterances (construction-type B). The complex utterances (C),
though, are tripled in number in Data (ii). The overall proportions
of utterances with chronological order of mention in each category do
not change, however, in spite of the increased number of C-type utter¬
ances, because there are far fewer instances, relatively speaking, of
B-utterances (with until or before) than there are in Data (i).
The reason why C has 100$ chronological order of mention (95$ in Data (i)
TableXII




































because of one instance of before being preposea) is that only when
and if of all the conjunctions used in second place are proposed;
these two (when and if), when proposed, make the utterances chronologi¬
cal in their order of mentions The one instance of before occurring in
first position in Data (i) was never backed up by any similar instances;
before and until are never preposed elsewhere in anv of the data. The
unique instance of before could be due to sampling in the data col¬
lection, but that explanation is not very satisfactory when we look
at Data (ii) where there are no instances of before being prepcsed at
all. This is not true of other 'rare" conjunctions, e.g» after.
The majority of the compound and complex construction-'types
used by the children observed a tense agreement rule: "if the first
verb used is in the present (past) tense, the second is to be in the
same tense'. In Data (i), 86%> of the compound utterances have the same
tense in each clause; the ratio of present to past tense is approximate¬
ly 13;5« In the complex utterances, 88% of B have the same tense (ratio
of present to past is 4;l) &&d 79% of C have the same tense in both
clauses (ratio of present to past 2:l)« In Data (ii), 97% of the com¬
pound utterances contain the same tense in each clause, but the ratio
of present to past tense has reversed, 2:7, for there are over three
times as many past tense temporal descriptions as present tense ones.
The same tense in each clause was found in 83% of the B-type con¬
structions where the proportion of present to past tense was 5:4
(this is likewise a change from Data (i)). All the C-type constructions
observed the tense rule, and the proportion of present to past tense
in these constructions was 2:3. Like the case of A in Data (ii), the
ratio of present to past in C is also a reversal from the data in
Data (i). The differences seem to be due to a greatly increased use
of the past tense by all the children. There is, however, an arte¬
fact in the method of data-collection in Data (ii) which possibly
accounts for some of the apparent increase in the use of the past
tense: much of the data was collected at a time in the morning when
the children were being asked what they had been doing the afternoon
or day before — their replies, quite naturally, were in the past tense.
7.15 The totals of the different temporal description-types for
each period in each set of data according to the conjunctions used are
shown in Tables XIII and XIV. The most frequent coordinate conjunction
in Data (i) is and which occurs 109 times in descriptions of events in
time, in contrast to a total of only 27 occurrences for the other three
Insert Table XIII about here
coordinate conjunctions. Of the subordinate conjunctions occurring in
second position (following the main clause in the sentence), when and
because are the most frequent (29 and 27 instances respectively), fol¬
lowed by if and until (9 and 11 instances). Of the subordinate con¬
junctions occurring first, when is the most frequent (12 instances,
followed by if (with only 4 instances). Apart from one instance of
before, no conjunctions other than when and if ever occur in first place.
In Data (ii), and is still the most frequent coordinate con¬
junction, occurring 202 times versus 34 instances for the other co¬
ordinate conjunctions; the ratio of and to the other three has slightly
Insert Table XIV about here
Table XIII
Totals of Different Temporal Conjunctions for Each Period in Data (i)
Conjunction I II Ill IV Totals
and 55 33 12 9 109
and then — 3 1 1 5
(and) so 4 6 6 2 18
but 3 1 - — 4
2. when 13 9 4 3 29
while "1X - 1 - 2
if 4- 5 - - 9
because 12 8 4 3 27
until? till 2 4 3 2 11
before 1 1 1 - 3
after — 1 1 - 2
unless - - 1 - 1
1 when 2 1 6 3 12
while — — - - -
if 1 2 1 - 4
because - - - - -
until — — - - -
before — - 1 - 1
after — - - - -



























































































































































until before after unless
K
U;
decreased compared to Data (i). When and because continue to be the
most frequently used subordinate conjunctions introducing the clause
in second place (65 and 68), followed by if (10). The subordinate
clause in first place is introduced most often by when (4.3 occurrences),
and otherwise by if (13). After was the only other conjunction that
was proposed, once.
The number of children who used each conjunction in Data (i)
and (ii) as a whole is shown in Table XV. The largest number of
children used those conjunctions which are the most frequent in the
data. Although this is not surprising, it does indicate that there is
an overall consistency in the acquisition of the conjunctions since
there is no other a -priori reason to expect ail the children to begin
with the same conjunctions, and then to gradually learn the rest of
the conjunctions belonging to the temporal set (see 5.2 above). The
most significant increases are in the number of children who come to
use and then in Data (ii) compared to those in Data (i), and the number
Insert Table XV about here
of children who come to use when in first position in Data (ii), as
compared to those using it in Data (i). Overall, there is a general
increase in the number of children who begin to use certain conjunctions
(compare each child's column from Table XVIto that in Table XVII).
since several of them are in the process of acquiring construction-
types B and C during the course of data-collection for both Data (i)
and (ii), (cf. 7.1 above, esp. Tables VI and VII).
The range of different conjunctions used by each child, in
each set of data as a whole, are set out in Tables XVI (Data (i)) and
Table XV
Number of Children Using Each Conjunction
Conjunction Data (i) Data
and 14 14
and then 4 10




















XVII (Data (ii)). One child (3.II.) uses no conjunctions in temporal
descriptions at all in Data (i) though by the end of Data (ii), he
'uses and. and then.when . if . because ,, and when . (Subscripts on the2> _2» • 2. 1
conjunctions indicate pre- and post-position with respect to the main
clause.) All the children using construction-type A (compound utter¬
ance with the two clauses joined by a coordinate conjunction) use and
in Data (i); only four (B.L., L.C., C.L., and L.I.) use and then, nine
use (and) so (S.R., W.J., L.C., N.W., M.F., C.L., L.I., N.A, and M.C.),
and only four use bi.it (A.G., N.W., L.I., M.C.). I should emphasise, at
this point, that these fig-ores apply only to the temporal descriptions
in the children's speech. I have not counted instances of conjunctions
used where there was no temporal description involved. Of the children
using construction-type B (complex utterance with the subordinate clause
Insert Table XVI about here
in second place), eleven out of thirteen use when (S.R., A.G., W.J.,
L.C., N.W,, C.W., M.F., C.L., L.I., N.A., M.C.), and eleven out of
thirteen use because (S.R,, A.G., W.J., B.L., N.W., B.F., C.W.,
C.L., L.I., N.A. and M.C.). Seven of the children use if (S.R.,
A.G,, N.W., C.W., M.F., N.A. and M.C.), and six use until. (A.G.,
W.J., N.W,, M.F., L.I. and N.A.). The remaining conjunctions are
used by a minority of the children: while (S.R. and W.J.), before
2 2
(L.C., N.A. and M.C.), after (L.C. and C.W.), unless (N.W.). Eight
2 2
of the children in Data (i) use construetion-type C (complex utterance
with the subordinate clause first), and out of the eight, six use when
(W.J., B.L., L.C., N.W., L.I. and M.C.), the three use if (N.W., M.F.
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2wheni/32 while-* if because until before after unless
2
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In Table XVII (Data (ii)), there is surprisingly little data
for some children e.g. S.R., W.J. , and C.L. which would give a mis¬
leading impression of the children's speech development, at least as
far as temporal descriptions are concerned, unless Data (i) has already
been studied. There is always a danger in this sort of developmental
study that the data are being collected too late to reveal the phenomena
that one is interested in. It seeias as though there must always be an
optimal period in which to collect particular data, and outside that
period, too early or too late, the developmental sequence may not be
seen at all. Of course, a large number of studios are necessary first
to pin-point these optimal periods. I hope in this study, in particu¬
lar with Data (i) to have pin-pointed an important period in the develop¬
ment of subordinate clauses, and related this development to descriptions
of time. Of the two children who did not use construction-type B in
Data (i), both (G.S. and B.H.) now use when , and 3.H. also uses if.-
Insert Table XVII about here
Only three children use until (L.C., C.W. and L.I.)j three use before
2 —
(N.W.. B.F. and L.I.) and two use after (M.F. and N.A.). Of the
2
children who did not use construction-type C in Data (i), four more
now use it (A.G., C.W., C.L. and B.H.), and a total of twelve children
use when (A.G., C.W., M.F., C.L., B.H. and N.A. in addition to the
six using this conjunction in Data (i) ) . Three more children (C.W.,
L.I. and M.C.) also use !£ in Data (ii), and one (L.I.) uses after .
1 1
Taking the most widely used conjunctions (and, when . if 22 ~2
because , when , and ), we find that there seems to be the following2 JL JL
Tablexvii











































































































































































































































until before after unless
H
v.0
ranking in order of appearance in the children's speech (based on the
order of appearance of conjunctions in each period within each set of
data):
(1) and
(2) when , because
2 2
o) if2
(4.) when , if .
1 1
Occasionally a somewhat different order of appearance is found. Al¬
though and always appears first, because and if may appear before
2 2
when , or when and jyr appear before because . Also when or
2 2 2 2 1 1
occasionally appear at the same time as because or if . In the
2 2
protocols as a whole, end appeared first in six (S.R., B.L., L.C.,
B.F., G.S. and B.H.). When appeared before when in nine (S.R.,
2 1
A.G., W.J., N.W., C.W., M.F., G.S., C.L. and N.A.), and both appeared
within the same period in three protocols (L.C., B.H. and M.C.); in
these three cases, the two conjunctions appeared within a week or so
of eachother, and, In fact, when was the first noted in each protocol.
However, as the occurrence of both falls into the same period of data,
they have not been counted with the other nine above. Because^
appears before any preposed conjunction in eight of the protocols (S.R.,
A.G., W.J., B.F., C.W., G.S., C.L., B.H., N.A.), and in the same period
as when or if in four protocols (B.L., N.W., L.I. and M.C.). If
1 ^ _2
precedes if in seven of the ten protocols containing if (S.R., A.G.,
L.C., N.W., C.W., B.H. and M.C.), and appears in the same period as if
in three others (M.F.. L.I., N.A.). However, as in the case of when
2
and when , within the same period of data if precedes i£ in each of
1 2 1
these three instances.
7.2 Having looked at some general statistical feat-ores of the
data, I would now like briefly to illustrate each of the stages pro¬
posed in the hypothesis (5*2) and show how the three principles I
proposed earlier play a part in the child's development of temporal
descriptions. The examples I shall quote from the protocols (Data (i))
are representative of the data as a whole.
7.21 At stage (l) we expect to find short sentences describing
events in chronological order. Although there are not very many
examples in these data, this is clearly the first stage and has been
reported in other studies of younger children (e.g. Bloch, 1924-;
C-uillaume, 1927j Stern and Stem, 1928Leopold, 194-9). One particular
context in which the present group of children used these short sen¬
tences was as the accompanying monologue to tasks such as building with
blocks or making jig-saw puzzles. These commentaries were necessarily
in chronological order, and therefore may be one of the sources of
chronologically ordered descriptions. For example, S.R., doing a
puzzle: Does it go there? This bit goes there. This bit r.oes there.
Where does this one go? and so on until he finished the puzzle. Sim¬
ilarly, B.L., first asking me to build a tower for him, said: Build my
building? Please. That one (pointing to a block). Just a bit more
there. Here. That one (indicating each time where he wanted the
blocks to be placed). Later on, speaking to another child, he comments
on the blocks: That's go there. That one can go there? Those go up.
Go there. And this goes up too. Watch that fall. (The occupation
for the day was building towers up till they fell.) Another child,
N.A., who used a mixture of short sentences and coordinate clauses,
talking about a visit to the sea and his swimming, said: I went too
fa? and I couldn't get back again♦ I paddled to Egypt. 1 saw a sip
[ship]. And JI was clever and paddled to Mummy. This utterance is
divorced from its physical context, unlike the commentaries above,
since N.A. is saying what he recalls and not commenting directly on a
sequence of actions before his eyes.
There is considerable evidence at this and later stages that
children are aware of the temporal order of two events. To give one
instance from these data as an illustration: A.G., when playing on the
boxes one morning, called out: I'11 fall off and jump. but immediately
corrected himself, I '11 jump and I Ml fall. Later the same day, I want
to get on there (onto the box). 1"' 11 jump. I"11 fall. - No, you won't
A will. I will fall. I can't stand up. It was very clear from the
context that A.G. was perfectly well aware of the sequence involved in
jumping and falling while playing on the boxes. This would account for
the correction he made of his earlier utterance.
7.22 Although and is used before this stage by the child, it seems
to be always with the meaning and The ampersand (&) implies an
unordered sequence, so that "Y & X" is exactly equivalent to "X & Yi!.
The other meaning of and 'and subsequently' is derived from its use in
conjoining simple sentences which describe events in chronological
order. At first, the child merely uses and to join the short sen¬
tences describing events in order, but as the child is constrained to
keep the chronological order in his order of mention (as long as he
wishes to indicate sequence), and takes on the meaning of 'and sub¬
sequently' in such contexts. At the same time, the order of mention
constraint rules out the possibility that and could instead take on
the meaning of 'and previously', the other alternative.,
Hence, at stage (2), the succession of events in time is
usually clearly stated in compound-sentence constructions. The
children made commentaries, recounted past actions and occasionally
referred to immediate future sequences. S.R.'s I wonder if I can hold
this on my head and get down (speaking about a toy he was trying to
balance as he climbed off the box), and A.G.'s I want to look at them
(some visitors) and come back in. are two utterances typical of this
type. L.I.'s protocol contains several examples in which the chrono¬
logical succession is further stressed by the use of temporal adverbs:
I'11 finish S003 and somebody else can have them (referring to the
shapes used to cut out Pla-doh). and to Mrs. B.: FIRST you'll have
your coffee and THEN we'11 go outside (to the playground).
Of the temporal adverbs used by the children in Data (i),
the commonest were now (87 instances), then (18), again (37), today (22)
vat (17 — always used in combination with a negative) in the non-
compound and non-complex (temporal) utterances. In the latter, the
most frequent adverbs were now, then and again: now occurred most often
in the first of a sequence of two clauses, then and again occurred
usually in the second of two clauses (as in L.C.'s utterance cited
above). In Data (ii), the most frequently used temporal adverbs were
row (33), today (33), yesterday (30), then (2l), last time/night (2l),
after (sometimes followed by a noun) (1$), again (13) and one day (17).
In the compound and complex utterances, then (still used most fre¬
quently in the second of two clauses) has become far more frequent than
any other adverb of time, including both now and again. In both sets
of data, more temporal adverbs occur in the compound temporal des¬
criptions than in the complex (subordinate clause) ones. This could
be because 'and' or 'but' has little inherent temporal meaning, and
the adverb is a means of making the temporality explicit.
7.23 Although attention to theme is apparent in many of the
children's utterances, it is so closely bound to the physical context,
the nursery school, that it is difficult to demonstrate convincingly
to anyone unfamiliar with the details of that context. I have there¬
fore selected a number of examples to illustrate stage (3) — choice
of theme — which are more dependent on the linguistic context, what
various people were talking about, than directly on the physical set¬
ting. That children do attend to context is shown by their use of
pronominalization in referring to someone or something mentioned in a
previous utterance. For example, Mrs. 3. - Has anyone seen William
this week? - I saw HIM a few days ago. - Is he feeling better? -
HE said no but I said ves (N.W.), Similarly, during a slight alterca¬
tion, S.R. and B.L. had the following exchange: - Knocked they books
down. Steven'11 pick THEM up. - No, I'11 not. You knocked some of
THEM down so you'll pick THEM up. (Pronouns referring to someone or
something already mentioned are capitalized.)
There are many examples in the children's speech which show
that they also choose theme from context. In these cases, the rheme
or part of the rheme of the preceding utterance is taken up as the
theme of the following onej this process may directly influence the
choice of construction, i.e. a subordinate clause second instead of a
coordinate clause construction. The relation between the rheme of one
utterance and the theme of the next is demonstrated in the following
example. To begin with, A.G. takes his initial theme from the physical
context: he is holding up a biscuit which he refers to deictically,
• Tfoat' a a biscuitt i grvt from, rsy Granny. i gn&ci in ss& MB. she's in
the ward. SHE'S sick (she was in hospital). The capitalized pronoun
in the rheme of his second utterance (her) becomes the theme (capitalized
she) in the following ones.
Another example: one morning, N.W. was screaming rather
loudly; Mrs. B. - Don't scream, Nicola. - Why not? They're screaming
when the ball goes (a game being played by some of the other children
nearby). In this instance, it is N.W.'s choice of 'they're screaming'
as her theme that makes her use a subordinate clause in second place.
Her utterance would have sounded rather odd had she used a compound
sentence with two coordinate clauses instead, e.g. "Why not? The ball
goes and they scream", as there would be no direct link between Mrs.
B.'s remonstrance and N.W.'s protest. If she had alternatively used
something like "Why not? They scream and the ball goes", the relation
between the children's actions and the ball's is no longer evident.
7.24 There are a number of other examples in which choice of theme
decides whether a subordinate clause is used in second place, at stage
(4). One morning when several of the children were playing with the
'car' (a pile of blocks, one of which had a steering wheel attached
to it), and B.L. was taking the part of the policeman but not using
the right signals, S.R. jumped up, saying: No. this (holding up his
hand appropriately) is what a policeman J.oq}:s, JJJm when a gaj: stons.
Another time, A.G., trying to prevent M.F. from touching the piano keys
while he was playing, called to Mrs. B.: He's to wait till I've fin¬
ished. Another day when L.I. asked for some Pla-doh shapes to play
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with, C. W. answered: You can have one of my ones after I've finished.
An interesting example which shows both the adverb (adjunct) position
at the end of the clause and the rheme of one utterance taken as the
theme of the following two-clause utterance is L.I.'s: ¥e've never been
out today, but we'11 no out when Mrs. Bruce comes back. The adjunct in
the first clause is today: been out is the rheme which becomes the
theme in the second of the three clauses. The occurrence of the sub¬
ordinate clause in second position here is clearly governed by the
thematic choice.
7.25 In support of stage (6), I will cite a few examples of sub¬
ordinate clauses occurring in first position. W.J., who was con¬
structing a garage from Lego (small plastic bricks), pointed to it and
explained: 'When the train stops. this is where it goes. N.W. used this
construction on several occasions, e.g. If wee Brian's naughty to me,
I'll smack him, and another time, using compound sentences as well: My
mummy's got baths in ±hn house a&d when I a little baby, I
used to go in the bath and I still go in the bath. On the same topic,
which preoccupied all the children one week, M.C.: When I was g baby, J
got washed in a basin. An interesting utterance was produced by L.C.:
Before I went home for tea. I buyed something for tea-time. This
particular construction was very unusual, and was the only example in
all of the protocols of a conjunction attached to the second event
and placed first (of. 7.14-). Such sentences are marked (complex) in
two respects: for order of mention and derivational simplicity. In
English, there are only two conjunctions, before and until, which
produce this doubly marked form of construction. None of the children
ever proposed any clause introduced by until in the present data.
Finally, I would like to point out that unlike some early
uttorance-types used in children's speech, the different constructions
used in making temporal descriptions throughout the different stages
in development do not supplant each other as the child's linguistic
knowledge is extended. In fact, the constructions introduced at the
different stages hypothesized here are all to be found in adult speech.
For instance, although stage (l)-type constructions (a series of
short simple sentences; cf. 5.2 above) are rare, they do appear when a
radio commentator describes a football game or a race: he resorts to
simple chronologically ordered utterances. A novelist may do the
same thing to give an impression of suspense. Clearly the function
of stage (l) may be slightly different in adult speech, but this type
of construction is still present. It goes without saying, of course
that the other syntactic constructions are also present in adult
speech: the compound utterances from stage (2), the complex ones with
the subordinate clause second from stage {4), and the complex ones
with the subordinate clause in first place from stage (6).
7.3 To sum up, the main hypothesis about the order of appearance
of particular syntactic constructions is fully confirmed in the
children's data. The individual predictions are highly significant
statistically in all three cases: for A > C and B > C, < .001, and
for A > B, o < .016. There are no disconfirming cases among the pro¬
tocols. The principles (cf. 5.l) all appear to be validated: the
children seem to be aware of chronological order and to pay attention
to theme in the context of their speech. Derivational simplicity also
has an effect developmentally since B-type constructions (with the sub¬
ordinate clause second) always appear before C-typa constructions (with
the subordinate clause first) throughout the data (cf. examples in 7.2).
There are five subsidiary findings: first, as in past studies
(.4.1), the children's average utterance-length is fairly highly cor¬
related with their language development. In the present instance, I
took the number of temporal description-types (A, B, C, or ft) in their
speech as a measure of their development. Since the correlation is by
no means perfect (.64, £ < .01), it seems to me that length is a some¬
what gross indicator of language development. Length does not dis¬
criminate the presence or absence of particular constructions, except
in a very rough way; for example, Kliraa and Bellugi (1966) found that
questions and negatives did not really develop until the auxiliary
verbs were used. The presence of the Aux could be shown by average
utterance length, but no more detailed constructions connected with
the auxiliary could be predicted from length alone.
The second subsidiary finding is that the number of interro¬
gative pronouns used by the children has a slightly negative correla¬
tion with the number of different temporal constructions used. This
lack of correlation possibly shows the relative independence of the
learning of interrogatives and of temporal conjunctions. On the
other hand, the number of relative pronouns used has a positive,
though not very high, correlation, (.36, £ < .10) with the temporal
constructions. This is to be expected since many temporal con¬
structions are closely related, linguistically, to relative pronouns
(cf. chapter VIII for further discussion).
The third point is that the percentage of utterances with
chronological order of mention (5.11 above) is practically the same
in both sets of data. Nearly all the compound utterances (A) and the
complex ones with the subordinate clause first (C) are in chronological
order, i.e. event 1 is described first, followed by event 2. Not sur¬
prisingly, nearly all the complex utterances with the subordinate
clause second (B) are not in chronological order since event 2 is
usually necessarily described first.
Fourthly, the majority of temporal descriptions have the same
tense in each clause. This is true for an average of 31% in Data (i)
and 96% in Data (ii). Nearly 15% of the compound utterances are in
the present tense in Data (i), but only 25% are in the present in
Data (ii). For the complex utterances, approximately 80$ and 65%
respectively are in the present in Data (i), as opposed to 55% and 4-0$
in Data (ii). There is, therefore, a very large increase in the pro¬
portion of past-tense temporal descriptions in Data (ii), especially
in compound utterances.
lastly, the order of appearance of the most widely used
conjunctions seems to be fairly stable in all the children's protocols:
and appears first, followed by when , because and if , which, in
2 2 2"
turn, are followed by when , and 1£ . In addition, a subordinate con-
1 1
junction being used in second place, in every instance, preceded its
being used in first place in an utterance; for example, when^ always
preceded when in the protocols. Therefore, the prediction that B-
type constructions occur before C-type ones is true not only for the
conjunctions as a whole, but also for each one individually.
There are, in addition, two distinct differences between Data
(i) and Data (ii). They are the increased use of and then and of when
in Data (ii). 'Then' in and then is an overt mark of temporal se¬
quence when combined with the coordinate conjunction and. Its in¬
creased use may signal the child's growing awareness of the difference
in meaning between the true coordinate and (&) and 'and + sequence'
(cf. further 9.1 below). The increase in usage of when reflects
1
the larger number of children who have gone through the stages hypothe¬
sized (5»l) by the end of the period covered by Data (ii). Because
of the general sampling problems with this kind of data, it is not.
possible to claim an absolute overall increase over time (between
Data (i) and Data (ii)) in the number of different conjunctions used
and the number of children using them, although this also appears to
be the case.
Many previous studies of older children have commented on
the importance of temporal (subordinate) clauses, e.g. Stormzand and
O'Shea (1924), Boyd (1926-7), LaBrant (1933) and Davis (1937a). In
adult speech and writing, temporal clauses make up between 20$ and 50$
of all the adverbial clauses used (cf. 4.3). Ia the present study
(with children aged 3;6 - 4j6 years), there is a marked increase in the
percentage of temporal descriptions in the total speech. In Data (i),
this increase goes from 4$ to 8% of the total number of utterances
recorded, and, in Data (ii), from 9,1% to 17.6/0 to 16.7$ at the end
of the third term (June 1968). The proportion of subordinate adverbial
clauses out of the total temporal descriptions in this study is 37$
in Data (i), increasing to 54$ In Data (ii). These percentages
indicate that the temporal adverbials (which make up, on average,
nearly half of the temporal descriptions) very early comprise an im¬
portant utterance-type in children's speech.
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The most frequent conjunction in Data (i) is and. It occurs
.four times as often as all the other coordinate conjunctions together,
and three to four times as often as the most frequent subordinate
conjunction. These proportions are very close to those found in
previous studies, e.g. Davis (1937a), cf. also 4.3 abovej coordinate
and subordinate conjunctions as a whole, though, appear in almost equal
proportions. Davis, however, found that, in the speech of 5j6 - 9jb
year-olds, coordinating conjunctions occurred almost five times as
often as subordinating ones.
The fact that the largest number of children use the most
frequently occurring conjunctions points to an overall consistency in
the acquisition of particular items. This was predicted in the case
of when ($.2); in addition, earlier studies have observed that
because and if are also among the first subordinating conjunctions to
appear in children's speech between the ages of 2;0 and 3j0 years
(Bloch, 1921, 1924j Guillaume, 1927bj Woodcock, 1934J Slama-Cazaeu,
1965; cf. 4.3 above). I therefore expected that the majority of the
children would use these two conjunctions, at least, as well as when.
In Data (i), the most frequent subordinating conjunctions are in fact
when and because , which occur equally often. Next come if and
2 2 2
until . Of the subordinating conjunctions found in first position,
2
when is nearly three times as frequent as . In Data (ii), and
1 1
occurs three times as often as all the other coordinating conjunctions
together. When and because still occur with about the same fre-
2 2
quency, followed by i£ • ^ first position, when occurs just over
2 1
three times as often as if . There are not very large changes,
therefore, in the proportions of different conjunction-types to each
other in the two sets of data.
What many earlier studies, like those above and all the
vocabulary studies (Boyd, 1914J Smith, 1926j cf. further 4.1 above)
do not indicate is how the conjunctions were used: did the children
use them in appropriate contexts? Did they observe tense and aspect
restrictions? Did they place their subordinate clauses in first or
second position in the utterance? These are some of the questions
which I think have been answered in the present study, at least in¬
sofar as the usage of 3j6 - 4;6 year-olds is concerned.
VIII Analysis of Temporal Conjunctions
8.0 Before I talk about more details of the children's data, it is
worthwhile looking at a syntactic analysis of the adult forms of tem¬
poral subordinate clauses (the coordinate constructions will be dis¬
cussed in the next chapter). Such an analysis may help to explain
why children use the particular conjunctions they do (cf. Tables XVI
and XVII) and why certain subordinating conjunctions should be common
to nearly all the protocols in Data (i). The temporal conjunctions
that appear earliest, developmentally, are when , because , if and
2 2 2
until . when and if in Data (i). and. in Data (ii): when . because .
2 11 2 2
if , when and if (cf. 7.15J 7.3). These are the conjunctions that
2 1 1
occur most frequently and are most widely used by the fifteen children
in this study.
Traditionally, adverbial clauses have been classified on a
semantic basis according to the type of adverbial conjunction intro¬
ducing the subordinate clause. I would also claim that causal and con¬
ditional clauses are psychologically related to temporal clauses be¬
cause of the time relations between the events described in each type
of utterance. In addition, temporal clauses are closely related to
adverbials of place (cf. 2.2; 3.3 above), besides being related to
the temporal prepositional phrases and temporal adverbs, e.g.
(l) i. He came in when he heard the gong,
ii. He came in before lunch,
iii. He came in then.
In this analysis, I will attempt to clarify some of the re¬
lations which hold between temporal adverbs, prepositional phrases and
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conjunctions by positing certain features which have to be present in
the subcategorization of the category Adverbial in the deep structure
of the sentence (Chomsky, 1965) in order to allow the occurrence of
either an adverb (of time or place), or of an adverbial prepositional
phrase (composed of a Preposition followed by a Noun Phrase), or of
its related conjunction introducing the embedded subordinate clause.
I shall discuss the derivation of the conjunctions in an
unformalized Transformational Generative framework for convenience,
although a more 'abstract' case-grammar (with later segmentalization
rules for the derivation of prepositions, etc.) might ultimately be
more suitable for a complete developmental model of language acqui¬
sition (cf. Fillmore, 1968; Schlesinger, in press). The difference
between the two forms of grammar, though, is irrelevant for my pur¬
poses here.
8.1 If we take the Phrase structure rules for the base component
suggested by Chomsky (1965:102):
(2) i. S > NP Predicate-Phrase
ii. Predicate-Phrase > AuxVp (Place) (Time)
the optional Place and Time in (2ii), he states, will serve to introduce
all those Adverbial Phrases which occur outside the Verb Phrase, and
are associated with the full Predicate-Phrase. In English, however,
Time and Place are very closely related. To show this relationship
for the segment of English grammar that I wish to discuss, I will
therefore replace the rule in (2ii) by:
(3) Predicate-Phrase > Aux VP (Adverbial)
As in (2ii), this rule associates the Adverbial with the full Predicate-
Phrase. The change from (Place) (Time) in (2ii) to Adverbial in (3)
1A7
will account syntactically for the close relation between:
(4) i. on Tuesday/Thursday, etc.; on the first of the month;
ii. in tho morning; in March; in I960;
iii. at lunch (time); at two o'clock; at the end of the day;
and
(5) i. on the roof; on Mont Blanc;
ii. in the house; in Paris;
iii. at the theatre; at home.
All the above examples involve the Prep^P rewriting rule. The
simple adverbs seem to show a similar relation to the Prep^NP forms
and to the conjunctions:
(6) i. at that place - there - where
ii. at that time - then - when.
If Chomsky's Phrase structure rule (2ii) were retained, there would
be no way of indicating, at this (most general) level, the relations
between Place and Time. In fact, in the present formulation, all the
Prepositions contain the feature [+Locative] in their subcategoriza-
tion rules. This is justified by the fact that all the temporal
'conjunctions' appear to be derived from spatial prepositions, e.g.:
(7) i. before - in front of
ii. behind - after (aft - back)
iii. until - up to, close to
iv. at, on, in - locative prepositions
The presence of such spatial prepositions in temporal con¬
junctions and in temporal prepositional phrases is partly due to the
conceptualization of time implicit in the structure of English."*" Time
■*"! am particularly indebted to H. H. Clark for much discussion of
this phenomenon.
14.8
'flows' from the future towards the past (cf. all the temporal meta¬
phors with the verbs ia come,, to go by, to go past, etc.). In
»
addition, every event is assumed to have a 'front' and a 'back', with
the 'front' facing the speaker/perceiver. Thus, 'X happened before
Y' means 'X happened to the face of Y', i.e. in front of, and hence
'X happened first'. After is similarly interpreted; 'X happened
after Y' means 'X happened at the back of Y' i.e. behind Y, in a
line going towards the past and also facing the past. Points in time,
or specified periods treated as points, are characteristically as¬
sociated with the locative prepositions at, £n and in. One result of
this close relationship between temporal and spatial terras is that the
temporal and spatial conjunctions may often be used interchangeably in
particular contexts where it is actually impossible to say the rela¬
tion expressed is only Time or only Place:
(8) i. Go back to where you stumbled and read it again,
ii. Go back to when you stumbled and read it again.
The rule which shows the source of Time and Place preposi¬
tions and conjunctions in English I shall now rewrite as follows:
(9) i. Adverbial > Prep NP
ii. NP > Det N
Each of the category symbols, Prep, Det and N are then rewritten as
Complex Symbols (CS) containing the feature complexes resulting
from subcategorization; e.g.:
(10) i. Prep > CS/ NP [+Locative]
[+Simultaneous [+Prior]]
[+Terminative]
ii. Det > CS/ N [+Definite]
L±Proximal]
iii. N > CS/ Prep (Det) +Time:
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The complex symbols for Det and N in the environment of
Prep [+Locative] are subcategorized, in the case of Det for [+Definite],
i.e. 'on the next day' versus 'once upon a time'. In addition, Det is
subcategorized for [+Froximal]: 'at this time' versus 'at that time'.
Otherwise Det is subcategorized as elsewhere in the grammar, e.g.
deletion of Det in the environment N[+Proper] or [+Abstract], N is
subcategorized as [+Locative [+Time]]. The feature [tLocative] is
posited as the head of this hierarchy (cf. Figure III) so as to
exclude nouns like 'anger', 'fear', etc. which would otherwise have
to be characterized as [-Time] when, in fact, they appear to have no
spatial features at all. This is why the feature name is not taken
to be [+Place], but [+Time] under [tLocative], It is possible that
Insert Figure III about here
this hierarchy of features is parallel in other respects to the hier- <-
archy proposed by Chomsky (1965185) for the features of N. For
instance, all nouns that have the features [+Locative [-Time]] will also
have the feature [+Concrete],
The CS for Prep contains a number of different features
which are not necessarily all organized hierarchically. First of all,
all the prepositions appearing in the rewrite of the category Adverbial
are [+Locative], The Prep can also be [+Simultaneous]; for instance,
[+Simultaneous] would result in a Prep terminal node such as at, on.
in. during, but not before. after, etc. which are specified by
[-Simultaneous]. If the Prep contains the feature [-Simultaneous],
then there is a further division, [+Prior] which will result in items
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like before and after. Finally, there is the feature [tTerminative].
If [tTerminative] is one of the defining features, it can result, for
example, in until (in combination with [+Prior]) or in after (with
[-Prior]). If [+Simultaneous] is combined with [+Terminative], the
event is punctual; with [-Terminative], it is durative. The feature
complexes of some common temporal (spatial) prepositions are shown
in Figure IV,
Insert Figure IV about here
I shall also suggest that Adverbials that appear either as
Adverb or as Prep NP have a number of features in common. This is
shown by their semantic (featural) identity in some contexts, as well
as by their syntactic properties, e.g.
(11) i, at that time - then
ii. at this time - now
iii. during this/that time - meanwhile
In the same way, we can derive late and early as adverbial realiza¬
tions of the features which also occur in the forms after and before.
The inherently comparative nature of the temporal construction becomes
clearer if we compare:
(12) He left earlier (later) than I did.,
with the alternative form:
(13) He left before (after) I did.
Historically, the form of the comparative with than is de¬
rived from a temporal construction in Middle English. Than is a varient
of then, from O.E, "£>onne = 'at the time (that)'. Before than and then
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Prep > CS/_ .(Det) N [+Locative]
[-Simultaneous [-Prior]]
([+Terminative])
Prep > CS/ (Det) N








became differentiated as to function, one found instances like:
(Li) "That is no more then is our commission" (Marlowe, The*
Jew of Malta. 1.251, c.l590).
A comma before then makes the originally temporal nature of such
comparatives clearer:
(15) "Yet of the two, the Pen is more noble, then the Pencill"
(Ben Jonson, Discoveries, p. 59, 1641).
(Cf. further Curme, 1931:274.). Temporal clauses and comparative
structures were, therefore, related diachronically. Evidence for the
synchronic relation is provided by examples such as (12) and (13)
above.
In the rule Adverbial > Prep NP, there is no recursive
device, yet several [+Time] Adverbials can occur in the surface form
of the sentence. Likewise, there may be combinations of [+Time] and
2
[+Place] Adverbials in the same surface sentence, e.g.
(16) He arrived in Paris yesterday at three o'clock in the
morning.
There do not seem to be any surface structure ordering restrictions
between [+Time] and [+Place], However, there does seem to be a
preference for (a) the [+Place] Adverbial(s) to precede the [+Time]
one(s), (b) the more general Adverbial to precede the more specific
one — the latter often being the one referring to the smaller unit
of time, and (c) all the [+Place] Adverbials to be contiguous, and
all the [+Time] ones to be contiguous within the utterance. In order
2
[+Place] is of course equivalent to [-Time] (Figure II), and is
only used for the sake of clarity in discussing the traditionally
named Place and Time Adverbials.
to allow the occurrence of several Adverbials modifying the Predicate-
Phrase as a whole without introducing a recursion rule, I would sug¬
gest that there is just one (optional) Adverbial per in the base
component. This avoids a syntactic limit on recursion; however,
recursion would always be possible according to the semantic prin¬
ciple of part-whole inclusion, i.e. at the nth second of the £th
minute., hour., day., week., month., year, etc. The part-whole
inclusion relation is probably derived from restrictive relative
clauses, e.g. H& arrived on the first of May from H& arrived on the
first and May has a first day. This, of course, would provide further
evidence for the relation between locative and possessive con¬
structions (cf. Lyons, 1967). This would still mean that each surface
structure Adverbial is derived from a different base string. Where
any two or more //S//s have an identical NP VP structure, the two #S#s
can be conjoined with deletion of the second NP VP (cf. a similar
proposal in McKay, 1968). Provided that the Adverbials are not of
the same subtype , the 'conjoining elements' (in deep structure) are
then also deleted. Hence, I would derive (16) from roughly the fol¬
lowing base strings:
(17) a. He arrived in Paris
b. He arrived yesterday
c. He arrived at three o'clock
d. He arrived in the morning
3Adverbials of the same subtype refer to the same kind of time-
period: i.e. today, yesterday, tomorrow, a day, Tuesday; an hour,
sixty minutes; morning, afternoon, evening; etc.
Next, the transformation to conjoin the base strings with identical
NP VP's is applied, followed by the deletion of redundant NP VPs:
(18) T-conjoin: He arrived in Paris + he arrived yesterday +
he arrived at three o'clock + he arrived in the morning
(19) T-delete identical NP VP's after first occurence in
conjoined strings: He arrived in Paris + yesterday + at
three o'clock + in the morning.
The last step in the derivation of (16) is:
(20) T-deletion of +: He arrived in Paris yesterday at
three o'clock in the morning.
In allowing the occurrence of several Adverbials in this way,
though, there are some co-occurrence restrictions which have to be ap¬
plied when several [+Time] or [+Place] Adverbials occur together. While
(16) above is quite acceptable, (21) belox/ has to be excluded:
(21) *he left last night in the afternoon.
From (21), one would infer that the afternoon is a part of the night,
when in fact these two time periods are incompatible, while, in (l6)
there is no incompatibility between 'yesterday' and 'in the morning'.
The restrictions on the co-occurrence of adverbials can be
characterized partly in terms of not allowing two Adverbials of the
same subtype as in:
(22) *he came yesterday today
unless they are overtly joined on the surface by a conjunction like and:
(23) He came yesterday and today.
In other words, the T-deletion of + in (20) does not apply in these
instances. If there are" more than two Adverbials of the same sub¬
type conjoined on the surface, then we must allow optional, replacement
of and, by ',' between all except the last two occurring in succession.
In the case of (2l) however, this is not an adequate restriction
because 'last night' and 'in the afternoon' are not Adverbials of the
same subtype. Therefore, I propose that in addition, the CS for the
lexical item 'afternoon' must contain a feature like [+Diumal] which
would block the T-conjoin (18) when the Adverbial in the first #S#
in the base contains the contradictory feature [-Diurnal] ('night').
Words like 'yesterday', the names of days, etc. which can refer to the
whole twenty-four hour period would contain the feature [Diurnal] with
no plus or minus value on it, thus allowing combinations like:
(24-) i. yesterday evening
ii. tomorrow morning
iii. Tuesday moming/afternoon/evening/night
The two main constraints seem to be first, more than one Adverbial of
the same subtype can only occur with overt conjunction in the surface
structure sentence, and, secondly, the Nouns that are subcategorized
as [+Time] must also contain some selectional features which restrict
their co-occurrence with certain other (incompatible) [+Time[] Nouns.
The compatibility of features constraint is also needed in
determining whether or not the Relativization transformation can take
place when a sentence (S^) is embedded in the Adverbial of the matrix
sentence (S ). In Figure V, the Adverbials are marked with a star *
where the features of Prep NP in each sentence have to be compatible
with eachother. The compatibility involves the minimal number of
Insert Figure V about here
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features necessary to specify identity of times and the existence of
no contradictory features. For instance, (25) is derived from the
two base strings (25 ii a and b):
(25) i. He came home when he had finished work,
ii. a. He came home at that time
b. He had finished work at that time
The first transformation to be applied is the preposing transformation
which acts on (25iib):
(26) T-prepose adverb: at that time he had finished work
(27) T-relativization: at that time - = > Wh-at that time
(28) T-embed: He came home at that time at which time he had
finished work.
> He came home when he had finished work.
Although 'at that time' can be deleted after T-rel and T-embed have taken
place (cf. Kuroda, 1968), this is largely because it is always recov¬
erable from the context. This is in contrast to:
(29) He left home the month (that) he finished school,
which is not equivalent, semantically, to.:
(30) He left home when he finished school.
The relativization rules are fairly well known so I will not go into
them further here beyond pointing out that, as elsewhere, the identity
of the NPs, i.e. their compatibility, is the necessary pre-condition
for embedding the subordinate (temporal) clause in the Adverbial of
the matrix sentence.
The relative pronoun in temporal clauses can take several
forms:




At which is generally replaced by when or that. In Middle English,
that was used to introduce any subordinate clause, and it appeared
after who. when. where. before. yrhile. until. if. because, etc.
(Jespersen, 1927:77; Currae, 1931:209; Kruisinga, 1932:400ff.). In
Modern English, that is used to introduce temporal (or causal or con¬
ditional) clauses only after NP:
(32) i. after the time that - *after that - after
ii. on the condition that - *on that - (if)
iii. for the reason that - *for that - (for), because
Previously, therefore, 'the time' in (32i) was deleted; at present,
both 'the time' and 'that' are deleted. Either that or when may occur
after Prep NP. If when appears as the relative after a punctual or
durative NP, Prep NP may be deleted entirely:
(33) i. He was coming downstairs when the bell rang, (at the time)
ii. They stayed inside when the children were asleep, (during
the time)
When is ambiguous, therefore, between a punctual and a durative inter¬
pretation in many contexts. If the Prep is not punctual or durative,
but [-Simultaneous], then both NP and Eel are deleted, and the Prep
alone functions as a conjunction introducing the embedded clause:
(34-) He came home before it got dark, (before the time at which/
that)
In a few instances in English, there are separate lexical items which
/-N
may be used as the conjunction forms instead of the longer Prep NP
Rel forms, e.g.
(35) i. during the time that - while
ii. at the time that - when
I should perhaps point out here that there are three ways of
distinguishing when used (i) to introduce a complement and (ii) as a
conjunction. First of all, the when conjunction introducing a sub¬
ordinate clause dominated by the node Adverbial in the matrix sen¬
tence can always be preposed:
(36) i. They fled when they saw the tree beginning to fall,
ii. When they saw the tree beginning to fall, they fled.
This clause-preposing transformation cannot be applied to a complement
clause (except under conditions of Object preposing for stylistic
reasons):
(37) i. He knew when they would arrive,
ii. *when they would arrive, he knew.
Secondly, the complement, but not the Adverbial clauses, can have a
cleft-sentence form:
(38) i. What he knew was when they would arrive.
ii. *what they fled was when they saw the tree beginning
to fall.
(Cf. also Jacobs and Rosenbaum, 1968:208-211). The third way of dis¬
tinguishing the two types of when was pointed out by Jespersen
(1924:264.-265): when (conjunction) is followed by a verb in which
the time-indicator does not have to be fully specified (cf. also
Chapter IX below). For example, in (39), the first when is the com¬
plement form, the second is the conjunction:
(39) 'We do not know when he will come, but when he comes, he
will not find us ungrateful.' (Jespersen, ibid.)
The absence of 'time-indicators' in the tense of the verb in the sub¬
ordinate clause is very frequent after conjunctions of time (and
condition), e.g.:
(40) i. We will go away before he arrives, (will have arrived)
ii. He had crept down the fire-escape after he heard their
voices, (had heard)
The tense itself is the same though, in each clause: present in (4-Oi),
and past in (40ii). The rule for tense will be further discussed in
9.2 below.
Of all the temporal conjunctions, when seems to be the most
general in meaning. With the feature [+Simultaneous], when refers to
an event or state that occurs at the same time as the event or state
being described in the main clause. However, when can also be
specified as [-Simultaneous] if the event so described ends before
the event in the main clause, i.e. it contains the features
[-SimultaneousPrior]] so that when is equivalent in meaning to
after. Examples of these two meanings are:
(^l) i. He was running when he tripped. [+Simultaneous]
ii. The door opened when he had knocked twice.
[-Simultaneous[-Prior]]
Poutsma (1929:666-7) points out that when occasionally occurs after
a negative main clause where one usually expects before ([+Prior]),
e.g.
(4.2) He had scarcely walked a mile when he turned back.
However, this when seems to me to be ambiguous between [-Simultaneous
[+Prior]] and [+Simultaneous] combined with a negative:
(4-3) i. When he turned back, he had not walked a mile, (at
the time that)
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ii. He had not walked a mile before he turned back.
(before the time at which)
The unmarked (simpler) form of when is the one with the underlying
feature [+Simultaneous] and its marked form is [-Simultaneous]. But
within the marked form, there is a further subdivision which distin¬
guishes, for example, between before and after: [+Prior], one of
which ([+Prior]) is unmarked with respect to the other. Although the
linguistic evidence for this secondary marking is not very clear in
English, developmentally, it seems that children begin by using
words like first, before. Fr. d'abord. avant (Decroly and Degand,
1913; cf. further Chapter III above). Before. however, does not seem
to be used as a conjunction much earlier than after is (cf. Table
XVIII, and discussion of data in 8.2 below).
How are the causal and conditional clauses to be included
under the rewrite of the Adverbial? To begin with, I propose that they
should be derived in the same way from Prep HP so that they contain
all the [+Time] features of the Prep and that, in addition, they
\
contain the features [+Cause] or [+Condition] in the subcategorization
of HP. If shares the features of 'on (the) condition that' and
because shares the features of 'for the reason that'.^ Therefore,




^Further evidence that causal conjunctions are probably locative
in origin is seen in examples like: 'John trembled out of anger'
and 'Pete trembled from fear', where out of and from are both [+Cause],
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Other conjunctions like as and since that were originally temporal,
but are now frequently used with an indeterminately temporal-causal
interpretation have optionally added the feature [+Cause] to their CS.
Such temporals assume their causal force because "what precedes an act
is naturally construed as its cause" (Curme:1931;314). When can like-
vase imply cause or condition, the latter especially in general
'timeless' statements and instructions, e.g.:
(46)
r
you turn on the tap (A), raise the lever (B).When
If
The former (causal) interpretation is shown in:
(47) I When she fell down, she hurt herself.
( Because
Kruisinga points out that "such shiftings [in meaning], especially of
conjunctions denoting time or place, are common in other languagesj
and, indeed, in English itself, in other classes of words" (1932:465).
These shifts in meaning are generally due to inferences made by the
hearer, as suggested by Curme (1931014-); such Inferences, therefore,
based on our knowledge of the world, are very important in the inter¬
pretation of temporal conjunctions. In the following sentences:
(4.8) i. He broke the lock when he was trying to lever it open,
ii. He broke the lock because he was trying to lever it
open.
the hearer may infer that the reason given (because - /+8ii) is co-
occurrent with the time of the event. In the same way, the hearer
will infer from (4-8i) that the lock broke as a result of the action
described in the temporal clause.
A final observation about the conjunctions is that those
conjunctions which contain a set of features corresponding to those
in Prep NP (35), are the ones which may occur with just an Adjective
(as well as just an NP) following them, rather than a full sentence, e.g.
(49) i. when happy (when a child)
ii. if tired (if a carnivore)
iii. because worried (because a tyrant)
iv. while capsizable (while an acrobat)
In these instances, the Adjective or HP following the conjunction gen¬
erally refers to the subject of the main clause, e.g.:
(50) When a child, he used to collect snails.
These constructions differ from the Prep alone used as a conjunction
(3A) which cannot be followed by an Adjective:
(51) i. ^before yellow
ii. *af'ter wide-awake
iii. ^during tall
Whether this constraint on Prep is due to the absence of any NP features
I do not know, but if all the features combined from Prep and NP d£>
appear in the specification of the (semantically) equivalent con¬
junction, this is at least one distinct difference between the under¬
lying featural structures of the constructions in (4.9) and (5l).
This is a very brief sketch of some of the considerations
in dealing with conjunctions, prepositional phrases and adverbs which
are derived from the Adverbial node in the Predicate-Phrase. Through¬
out this discussion, I have assumed a grammar approximately of the
form proposed by Chomsky (1965). I now wish to look at some more
details of the children's data to see if their usage corresponds in
any way to the forms that are 'simpler' in the adult grammar. For
instance, those adverbs and conjunctions with the feature
[+Simultaneous] are unmarked beside those which are [-Simultaneous],
Some types of marking, I assume, will show up in developmental data
since the unmarked form is frequently less specific or has fewer
constraints on its range of meaning than its marked counterpart (cf.
Bierwisch, 1967j Donaldson and Wales, in pressj Clark, in press).
8.2 The lexical items containing unmarked features (the '+'
values in my notation) appear to be simpler than those containing
marked features for language processing tasks (cf. Clark, 196$). If
this simplicity of the linguistic description is also reflected in the
acquisition of language, there are some specific predictions that can
be made. Conjunctions with [+Simultaneous] should precede the ap¬
pearance of [-Simultaneous] ones. Similarly, [-Simultaneous[+Prior]]
conjunctions should precede [-Simultaneous[-Prior]] ones, and lastly
[+Terminative] should precede [-Terminative]. The principal con¬
junction with the meaning [+Simultaneous] in the protocols is when;
only in a few instances does it appear to be equivalent, instead, to
after. This backs up, indirectly, some of Decroly's data (1913J
cf. Chapter III) in which he found that children very early on
learnt to associate particular events to particular 'times' in a regu¬
lar routine. It would seem quite natural to me that in learning to
use subordinate clauses, children should also take the simplest
instance first, the form expressing the 'simultaneous with' relation
in time (cf. 3.2), and only later begin to use the before-after rela¬
tions of succession in time (cf. also Grigsby, 1932). When in its
other functions — as interrogative and as relative introducing a
complement — is also [tSimultaneous] rather than [-Simultaneous
[-Prior]].
As we saw in 7.14 above, when is the commonest conjunction
and appears in most of the protocols. It is also the conjunction that
is most frequently preposed to first position in the utterance (cf.
Tables XVI and XVII). This would indicate that when is the first sub¬
ordinate conjunction to go from being used in constructions with the
subordinate clause second (B) to constructions with the subordinate
clause first (C). The only other [+Simultaneous] conjunction that
occurs in the data is while; however, it was used by only two children
(S.R. and W.J.) in Data (i), and by none in Data (ii). While is more
complex than when, although it is [+Simultaneous], because it is also
[-Terminative], This complexity is possibly also reflected in Piaget's
(1946) studies that found that the meaning of duration is learnt
rather later than that of simultaneity.
Apart from the specific predictions based on the featural
analysis, two of the three principles combined, order of mention and
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derivational simplicity, would also predict that conjunctions like
before and until in second position should be easier or simpler.
This is because an utterance with one of these conjunctions is deriva-
tionally simpler (5.12) and it describes the events in chronological
order (5.11). These two conjunctions are the only two in which these
principles coincide. This can be seen in the data. Before appears
in three protocols in Data (i), but only in one (L.C.'s) does it
occur in first position as well as in second. In Data (ii), it ap¬
pears in three more protocols in second position only. Until appears
in six protocols in Data (i) and in two more in Data (ii). There are
no instances at all of until being preposed. Since chronological order
is maintained in descriptions using these two conjunctions, why are
they needed? Why is and or and then not used instead? There seems
to be no thematic reason here to introduce a subordinate clause.
However until does mark a very specific contingency relation (5.13)
in that it means that the first event is terminated by the occurrence
of the second event. This relation cannot be indicated by and.
Before also contains the feature [+Terminative], although the relation
between the two events is not exactly equivalent to that with until.
Of the [-Simultaneous[-Prior]] conjunctions, the children
use after, if and because. After, which is marked in relation to
before and until since it contains the feature [-Prior], only occurs
in two protocols in Data (i) and in two more in Data (ii). L.I.'s
protocol (Data (ii)) is the only one in which after appears in first
position. Elsewhere, it always introduces the subordinate clause
in second position. Before and until are used in a larger number of
protocols (six and eight) throughout the two sets of data than after
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is (four protocols). However, in adult speech when may also be
[-Simultaneous[-Prior]] and it is impossible in the present data to
separate those descriptions in which when is actually equivalent in
meaning to after from all those in which it has the meaning
[+Simultaneous].
The two other conjunctions that contain the features
[-Simultaneous[-Prior]] are because and if. These both have a slightly
different status from the purely temporal conjunctions, but I would
argue that psychologically, at least, they are related by the time
relations inherent in the understanding of cause and condition at
the most elementary level. In addition, the subordinate clauses they
introduce can be derived linguistically in the same way as the temporal
clauses. Because of the features which appear in it, we would expect
if to resemble after and when, as indeed it does. It appears more
frequently than after in the data, in seven protocols in Data (i);
in three of these it occurs in first as well as in second position.
In Data (ii), it appears in second place in two additional protocols,
and, in three others, it is now also used in first position. If.
therefore, seems to be much closer to when as far as the children's
usage is concerned in that it is used first in second position and
is later preposed to first position. Except for one instance of
before and after being preposed, when and if are the only two con¬
junctions used in C-type constructions by this group of children (3;6 -
4;6). There is only one instance of unless being used, in second
position, in the whole data (N.W.). Intuitively, unless seems to
be more complex than if, especially as .if.. .not could be used in¬
stead.
In theory, because should also resemble when. However, this
[-Simultaneous[-Prior]] conjunction shows a somewhat different pattern
' of usage. It appears in eleven protocols in Data (i) and in three more
in Data (ii) (cf. Table XVI). The only child not using it was G.S. whose
only subordinate conjunction (in Data (ii)) was when. Because, des¬
pite its wide usage, never occurs in first position in the utterance.
This contrasts with when. which is also very widely used, and to if
which is somewhat less frequent than because. Poutsma claims that,
in adult speech, because most often occurs in second position because
it is "the weightiest member of the sentence" (1929:682). This, he
says, is because the because-clause contains information that is as¬
sumed by the speaker to be unknown to the hearer. If, on the con¬
trary, the speaker were to use since (with a causal meaning), he would
place it first as he assumes then that the reason is already known to
his hearer. Although this differentiation between becau.se and since
may be a viable one, I have found no-one who agrees on the distinction
Poutsma has drawn. The basis of it seems to have been the theme-rheme
difference (cf. 5.13, and 10.0 below) where the rheme introduces
'new' information unknown to the hearer. It might be possible to test
this by collecting data from older children wrho do, use since and also
to sample a wider number of adult English-speakers than I have done.
However, it has usually been current written usage that has been to
used to back up descriptions in traditional grammar, and there may be
considerable differences between spoken and written constructions
(cf. examples cited in Poutsma, 1929:682ff.). For the moment, all I
can say is that because does not show the typical sequence of develop¬
ment of the conjunctions for it never occurs in first position. It
is, however, used among the first subordinate conjunctions to appear by
the majority of children in this study. Because and when occur in
the same protocols with about the same frequency, if we only count
second position occurrences. When, however, is the most frequently
used subordinate conjunction overall, if we count both second and
first position occurrences.
As all the temporal conjunctions in English can be derived
from spatial prepositions in Prep NP (8.1 above), I would expect to
find a number of the spatial prepositions used as such before the
children begin to use them as conjunctions with an embedded sentence.
I shall first give some examples of how they are used prepositionally
in the data. After occurred in contexts like: after you: after them:
after tomorrow: and after Carmen came Lesley. Before occurred pre¬
positionally: I was before you. Grant. and also as a sentence-final
'adverb' as in You've not seen it before. eh? (S.R.). The sentence-
final 'adverb' before appears less frequently in the children's speech
than first with a similar meaning: You do it first (B.L. )j throved
it all on the floor first (S.R, ); I want to finish this first (C.W.)j
I'11 make another first (N.A.). There were also a few instances of
later on (equivalent to 'after' or 'afterwards'), as in We'11 do it
later on (M.C. (cf. discussion in 3.14-b above; also Table XVIII).
After is used prepositionally (followed by a Noun Phrase) in
six protocols in Data (i), and in two others, it is used as a conjunc¬
tion. In Data (ii), five more children use after as a preposition, and
one more uses it as a conjunction. Therefore, a total of eleven child¬
ren use after as a preposition while only three use it as a conjunction
during the period of data collection. Out of the eleven using it as
Insert Table XVIII about here
a preposition, eight use only the prepositional form; one uses the
prepositional form and. later begins to use the conjunction, and one
U38S both the preposition and conjunction in the same set of data.
Two cases go against my hypothesis: one protocol (L.C.) contains only
the conjunction, and one protocol shows the conjunction being used
before the preposition (C.W.).
Before is used by five children in Data (i); of these child¬
ren four used it as a preposition or as a sentence-final adverb, and
one of them as a conjunction. In Data (ii), five more children use
before as a preposition, and three more begin using it as a conjunction.
Overall nine children use before as a preposition and four use it as a
conjunction. Out of these, five children only use the preposition,
one uses the preposition and later uses the conjunction, and one uses
both the preposition and conjunction in the same set of data. Four
children appear to go counter to the hypothesis: three use only the
conjunction, and one uses the conjunction before he uses the preposi¬
tional form.
Until is slightly different from the two other prepositions
we have considered in that it does not appear as a preposition at all
in Data (i) although six children use it as a conjunction. In Data (ii),
two children use it prepositionally, e.g. Two weeks till ma holiday
(B.L.), till tomorrow (M.F.), and two more children begin using it as
a conjunction. Overall, the preposition appears in two protocols and
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Table XVIII
Children using particular conjunctions and prepositions in
Data (i) and Data (ii).
Conjunctions Prepositions
Child: after before until after before until
(i) (ii) (i) (ii) (i) (ii) (i) (ii) (i) (ii) (i) (ii)
S.R. - - - - - - + _+___
A.G. - - - + - + + — + _ _
W.J. - _ _ + _ - - - - - -
B.L. - - - - - + ____ +
L.C. + - + _ - + ______
N.W. - _++_ *_++__
B.F. _ - _+__ ______
C.W. + + ___ + _+_+__
M.F. - __+_ _+___ +
G.S. - ____ _+■____
G.L. - ____ + +_+__
L.I. __ _++ + ______
B.H. - ____ _+_+__
N.A. _ + + _+ _ _ + - + _ -
M.C. - +___ + ++___
the conjunction appears in eight. As far as the hypothesis is con¬
cerned, it is supported by the child who uses only the preposition,
and also by the child who uses both preposition and conjunction in
the same set of data. It is not supported, though, by the eight
children who use only the conjunction.
Thus, in support of the hypothesis that the prepositional
forms appear earlier than the conjunctions, there are ten protocols
using after, seven using before and two using until. while against it,
thei-e are two protocols using after, four using before and eight
using until. The hypothesis seems to be confirmed in the case of
after, and possibly in that of before. Until. it should be noted,
is not spatial in the same way that the other two prepositions are.
This is possibly the reason for the apparent difference in usage.
However, the amount of data is not sufficient to confirm the generality
of this phenomenon for all prepositions that are used as conjunctions.
I think it is likely that more systematic data should be collected
both from the present age-group and from younger children in order to
find proper confirmation of this hypothesis. In addition, more data
on adverbs like "now", "then", and on prepositional phrases containing
locatives like at, on and in, as the adverbial and prepositional forms
equivalent semantically (though not functionally) to when are also
needed to confirm the developmental sequence: adverb and prepositional
phrase before conjunction.
8.3 To sum up, the main points of the linguistic analysis should
be kept in mind while considering the children's data. First the sub¬
ordinate temporal clauses are derived from prepositional phrases with
embedded relative clauses, e.g.
(52) It began to rain when he arrived, (at the time at which)
(53) The children came home before they were expected, (before
the time at which)
From examples like (52) and (53) above, it is evident that there are
two types of subordinating conjunction, those that come directly from
prepositions (as in (53)), e.g. after, since, before, until, etc.,
and those that come from an adverbial relative like when or while.
These two types, though, are closely related by the underlying features
that are found in all temporal conjunctions.
Thirdly, the prepositions used in temporal expressions can be
subcategorized by a number of different features. These features are
of the type [+Simultaneous], [+Prior] (which is hierarchically de¬
pendent on [-Simultaneous]), [+Terminative]. The meaning attached
to these features is generally evident from the name. For instance,
the two values of the feature [Terminative] contrast punctual (+)
with durative (-) events. There are also some optional features
like [+Cause], [+Condition], etc. which may appear in the subcategori-
zation of some of the prepositional phrases that are [+Locative[+Time]].
Lastly, the relation between time and space is very important
in the conceptualization of time in English. All the prepositions in
the prepositional phrases, for instance, are locative in origin (as
their features indicate, cf. Figures III and IV).
These aspects of the linguistic description have been im¬
portant in the developmental interpretation of the children's data.
In particular, in using temporal clauses, the children appear to ac¬
quire [tSimultaneous] forms (like when) before they use [-Simultaneous]
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ones (like after or until). Next, of the [-Simultaneous] conjunctions,
the children use [+Prior] ones (like before or until) earlier than the
[-Prior] ones (like after). Both these results are fenturally in
accord with many previous vocabulary studies which have recorded the
data of appearance of particular items, e.g. Boyd (1914), Court
(1920), and Gesell and Ilg (1943, 1946); cf. further Chapter III.
Thirdly, there is a certain amount of evidence which suggests
that those prepositions that are also used as conjunctions appear first
in their function as prepositions, and only later are they also used
as conjunctions. The development of the subordinate conjunctions ap¬
pears, therefore, to depend on the featural content of particular
lexical items. The items containing the unmarked forms of each
feature are those that are acquired first, e.g. now: [tSimultaneous]
before yesterday: [-Simultaneous], This seems to be true for the
simple temporal adverbs (cf. data in Chapter III) as well as for
prepositional phrases and conjunctions. The developmental sequence
for these three categories, from the point of view of the featural
analysis, goes from the expression of the 'simultaneous with' (at)
relation in time (cf. also 7.22) to the expression of priority (before,
first), and then to the expression of succession (after) (cf. 2.1,
3.2 above).
Thus, I have suggested that young children (from the age of
2;0 or 2;6 upwards) first acquire some understanding of the spatial
relations which are identified by spatial prepositions([tLocative
[-Time]]). As the child becomes aware of time in a primitive way,
e.g. the identification of two events that occur in the same place,
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at the sane time, and the subsequent recognition of before-after
relations, he begins to extend the use of these prepositions to ten-
i
poral events on the basis of an equivalence, for example, between
after you (in time) and after/behind you (in space, e.g. in a queue).
The simplest locative relations should be learnt first, and should also
be the first to be extended from spatial situations to apply to tem¬
poral events. The simplest locatives are in. on and at, which are
ultimately related to when (containing the same features that underlie
the prepositions). Later, the children will similarly extend the
range of prepositions like before and after to mean both space and
time (cf. Piaget, 194-6; Papert and Voyat, 1967; 3.3 above). Unfor¬
tunately, very little is known about the relative difficulties of
understanding different spatial relations; furthermore, there is not
very much known about the order of appearance of the different preposi¬
tions as a whole which children begin to use at about 2;0 and 2;6
years. There is a need both for collection of spontaneous speech data ».
(with notes on comprehension and context) in this area and for experi¬
mentation to find out which spatial relations are the first to be under¬
stood by the child.
Lastly, there is very strong evidence in my data that the
subordinate clause first occurs in second position in the utterance.
This finding is confirmed by Davis1 (1937a) data in which she noticed a
tendency in the youngest group of children (5;6) to place more of their
temporal subordinate clauses in second position (55^) than in first.
The older children placed most of the temporal clauses in first posi¬
tion. This trend was predicted by my hypothesis (5.2 above). The
temporal clause, whatever the conjunction, is never preposed until the
>child learns to use it in second position (cf. results in 7.1 above).
This was true of all the temporal clauses in the present data.
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IX Coordination and Subordination in Sentences*
9*0 Throughout this study, I have talked about coordinate and
subordinate conjunctions (and constructions). What are the linguistic
differences between these two types of structure, and what criteria
are used in assigning a conjunction to one or the other class? Al¬
though the only construction-types that have been considered here are
those used to describe events in time, their classification is based
on the traditional distinction between coordination (parataxis) and
subordination (hypotaxis). This distinction rests on such syntactic
features as the 'sequence of moods and tenses' in the classical lan¬
guages. Although such distinctions have frequently been challenged
within a more general framework of linguistic theory, I shall retain
the terminology in talking about two groups of conjunctions:
(a) coordinate: and, but, for, orj
(b) subordinate: when, after, before, until, if, unless, because,
since, as, while, etc,
9.1 Chomsky (1957) proposed the following definition (although
'type') has never been precisely defined): "If and are grammatical
sentences, and S_^ differs from only in that X appears in S_^, where
Y appears in S (i.e. S = ...X... and S = .,.Y...), and X and Y are
2 2
constituents of the same type in S and S respectively, then S is a
12 3
sentence, where is the result of replacing X by X+and+Y in (i.e.
S3 = ...X and Y...)" (1957:36). Gleitman (1965) though found that
this formulation was inadequate to account for some forms of co¬
ordination in English (cf. also Dik, 1968:74.-92, for further criti¬
cism). Dik has suggested the following general definition: "A
coordination is a construction consisting of two or more members which
are equivalent as to grammatical function, and bound together at the
same level of structural hierarchy by means of a linking device"
(1968:25) . Dik's definition of coordination does not imply anything
about other types of constructions, and he rejects an exclusive
dichotomy between coordinative and subordinative constructions. The
"term subordination is generally used in constructions where a clause
functions as a modifier (e.g. Chatman, 1964.026 fn„15). Members of
a coordination need not have equivalent grammatical structure but they
must be equivalent in grammatical function. Function here is used in
Longacre's sense: "By function is meant the particular office or role
of one distinguishable part of a construction type in relation to other
parts of the same construction" (1965:65). Therefore, coordinate con¬
junctions "function as signs that the structures they link are function¬
ing as equals" (Strang, 1962:173).
Coordinating conjunctions or particles show a fairly high
degree of resemblance in their usage in many languages and appear to
cover a similar semantic range (cf. Dik, 1968:271-281). However, there
is little agreement traditionally in the literature on how to distin¬
guish coordinating conjunctions from other adverbial, subordinating
conjunctions. There are a number of heuristic tests, though, which
distinguish these two types of conjunction.
The first test is based on the premiss that t\,*o members of a
conjunction can never be joined by more than one coordinate conjunction.
To confirm whether or not a particular particle is a coordinate con¬
junction, therefore, one tests to see whether the particle can follow
Cf. Marouzeau's formulation, 1951:63.
'
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another conjunction which is already established as a coordinate con¬
junction. Compare:
(1) i. He was ill because he had eaten bad food.
ii. He was ill because he had eaten bad food and because
he was hungry.
(2) i« He was ill for he had eaten bad food,
ii, *He was ill for he had eaten bad food and for he was
hungry.
By this criterion, because (lii) is not a coordinate conjunction whilo
for (2ii) is, since two coordinate conjunctions cannot occur together.
The sequence 'and and' is excluded for the same reason, as are the se¬
quences 'and but' and 'and or':
(3) *He shut the creel and John picked up the rods and and they
climbed up the bank.
(4.) *He went into the house but he left the door open and but he
didn't reappear for half an hour.
(5) *He climbed the hill or he went fishing and or he was in town.
A second test for coordination vs. subordination is that a
noun in a subordinate clause preceding its main clause can refer pro-
nominally to the latter (cf. 5.12 above, and also Gleitman, 1965:274
fn. 21):
(6) Because he arrived late in Chicago, John missed his con¬
nection.
(where John and he refer to the same person). This pronominal
reference is not possible in a coordinate construction where the pro-
nominalization precedes its nominal referent:
(?) *He arrived late in Chicago and John missed his connection.
as opposed to:
(S) John arrived late in Chicago and he missed his connection.
A third test is constituted by the permutability of the mem¬
bers of a coordination (except in the case of for). Their permutation
remains grammatically and semantically equivalent to the original form
of the sentence:
(9) i. The children played outside and the dog slept on the
steps.
ii. The dog slept on the steps and the children played out¬
side.
This equivalence is due to the fact that and is not regarded as one
unit with its following clause, i.e. there are no coordinate structures
of the form?
(10) *And the dog slept on the steps, the children played outside.
(Cf. also Ross, 1967:1671.) This does not apply to one-clause utterances
which frequently begin with and. where, from a phonological point of
view, the and is a part of its following clause. The instance in (10)
is a two-clause sentence making up one phonological unit as far as in¬
tonation is concerned. It is in these instances that and is unlike the
subordinate conjunctions since it cannot be preposed. In both (9i)
and (9ii), the semantic and grammatical equivalence is dependent on
and having the meaning of the logical constant &, where 'A & B'
equals 'B & Ac1 Staal (196S), however, has pointed out that there are
two kinds of and, one of which is used to coordinate clauses without
any ordering (as in the examples above), the other one being used to
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relate clauses in sequence. The latter and is equivalent in meaning
to and then or and subsequently. %le (1954) also points out that
'SSSi + sequence' has at least two meanings, though both are dependent
on sequence in time:
(11) She took arsenic and fell ill (in consequence)
(12) She fell ill and took arsenic (subsequently)
(Cf. Kyle, 1954sllS). The 'and + sequence' is also used in reduplica¬
tion :
(13) He ran and ran and ran.
(Cf. further Watt, 1968).
In contrast to (10) above, the subordinating conjunction is
felt to be one unit with its following clause (cf„ derivation discussed
in 3.1 above); the conjunction together with its clause can therefore
be preposed:
(14) i® He dived into the pool when they shouted,
ii. When they shouted, he dived into the pool.
iii. The bus arrived late because the roads were flooded,
iv. Because the roads were flooded, the bus arrived late.
Also, the content of* subordinate clauses and their main clauses cannot
be permuted and the sentence remain semantically equivalent (compare
the coordins.te construction in (9i) and (9ii)),for instance:
(15) Dick ran out of the house before Jim got downstairs,
is not equivalent to:
(16) Jim got downstairs before Dick ran out of the house.
The 'tests' described above which I have used to differentiate
between coordinate and subordinate conjunctions may also be used
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secondarily to distinguish between coordinate conjunctions and certain
adverbial modifiers which (like subordinate conjunctions) may follow
a coordinate one (as in (lii) above), e.g.:
(l7) Tim fell off his bicycle (and) therefore he came home cov¬
ered in mud#
Although•therefore may occur after an (optional) end like be canso in
(lii) above, the clause as a whole may not be preposed (cf. (3.0) above)
and remain semantically equivalent. Nor may the therefore-clause be
preposed at all unless it refers back to a preceding utterance; in
this respsct, it differs from the subordinating conjunctions in (14-)
above. These adverbial modifiers e.g. thus, therefore, &§£££, etc.,
have sometimes been called coordinators in 'sequence signals' (Fries,
1952:24-8), or 'sentence adverbials' (Sledd, 1959:202).
As I have been interested principally in the descriptions
of events in time in this study, I have classified some instances of
these 'sentence adverbials' (combined with and) in the data as co¬
ordinate conjunctions, e.g. and then and and so. together with and
and but.
And appearing alone in the 'compound' temporal utterances in
the data appeared to have the meaning 'and + sequence' (cf. 7.2 above).
But occurred in only a few instances where a temporal description
was involved; neither for nor qt appeared at all in such contexts
(cf. Tables XIII and XIV in 7,15 above). All the subordinate con¬
junctions classified in this study fall under the traditional headings
of Adverbial clauses (Poutsma, 1929:655ff.J Curme, 1931: 259ff.;
Kruisinga, 1932:4.0Off.) of Time (when. after, before, until. while),
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of Cause (because) and of Condition (if. unless). I included Cause
and Condition clauses with the Time clauses because of their under¬
lying temporal ordering of the two events or states described (cf. 8.1).
9.2 Both coordinate and subordinate constructions have various
tense restrictions on their verbs when the clauses are describing
sequences in time. As in most Germanic languages, there are only two
tenses that are morphologically distinguished in English: present and
past (cf. Jespersen, 194-3:26; Each, 1967). Reference to a future
time may be made in a variety of ways: by using the present tense com¬
bined with particular adverbials, e.g. tomorrow, next yssx, etc. (cf.
chapter III above; Crystal, 1966) as well as by using modals like
can, may, id.11 and shall (Poutsma, 1926:9). Combinations of tense and
aspect (Poutsma, 1926:15; Lyons, 1968:315-317) in English may frequent¬
ly seem redundant when other elements (generally adverbs or conjunctions)
are present in the utterance to indicate the time-ordering of the
events being described. Conjunctions (cf. 8.1 above) are used to in¬
dicate the relations 'before', 'after' or 'simultaneous with' holding
between two events. The 'before' - 'after' relations may be indicated
by a tense difference, showing that one event happened first, then the
other. The presence of a conjunction linking two clauses may make
some 'time indicators' redundant.
Tense is not to be confused with time past, present, etc. nor
with points in time. The speaker may arbitrarily define his own present
time (about which he will use the present tense idien he is talking) as
a period infinitely extendable forward and/or back in his own per¬
ceptions of events, e.g. this week, this year, this decade, etc. where
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the present moment is defined by the adverb. The present itself cannot
be placed at any one point; it is only definable in terms of past and
future time (cf. the philosophical issues in 2.1 above). Tense itself
is used to differentiate different points .in time, but it is not to
be identified with 'areas of time', i.e. the past tense is not nec¬
essarily used to refer to past time, nor the future 'tense' to refer
to future time (Lyons, 1968:305ff.). Secondary tense distinctions
('time-indicators') may be neutralized after conjunctions, i.e. the
future modal and the past perfective need not appear after conjunctions
like when (cf. 8.1, (40)).
In coordinate constructions, the second verb (after and,
and then or and so) must be in the same tense as the first verb; the
only exception to this, when the utterance is describing a sequence in
time, is that if the first verb is in the past, the second verb may be
in the present or future modal form J
(18) i. He came in an hour ago and he is coins; upstairs,
ii. He came in an horn* ago and went upstairs.
If the first verb is present, the second verb may have a modal form,
(referring to the future), or else indicate a later time by means of
a future-referring adverb;
(19) I have finished packing and I (will) leave (tomorrow).
If this tense sequence is not observed, it may not be clear that the
speaker is indicating sequence in his description. If a coordinate
construction is used, the events are generally mentioned in chronologi¬
cal order (cf. 5.11; 7.14; Table XII). This is true for 93$ of the
compound temporal descriptions in Data (i) end for 93$ in Data (ii).
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Events could be mentioned out of order in a coordinate construction
only if the speaker were to use for, or but first (or but plus some
other appropriate adverb indicating priority in time, e.g. earlier
on). For never appeared in the present data, although there were a
couple of instances of but used with a present tense in the first
verb, and a past tense in the second verb, indicating (correctly
in the context) that the events were being described in the order 2-1
(cf. 7.14.).
In subordinate temporal constructions, the verb of the first
clause makes a tense restriction on the verb of the second clause. I
would suggest that, in fact, these co-occurrence restrictions are im¬
posed after T-rel and T-embed have taken place (cf. Figure V in 8.3.),
whereby the subordinate clause is embedded into the node dominated by
Adverbial in the matrix sentence. If the verb of the matrix is Past,
for instance, this tense is automatically assigned to the verb in the
subordinate clause. In addition, the conjunctions themselves (through
their underlying prepositional features) exercise aspectual constraints.
For instance, the conjunctions containing the feature [+Terminative]
do not generally allow the occurrence of any verbs with the progressive
aspect (be + ing) in the following subordinate clause:
(20) i. He looked out of the window while they were getting out
of the car
ii. *He looked out of the window until they were getting out
of the car.
iii. He looked out of the window until they got out of the
car (began to get out).
The [-rTerninative] feature in the conjunction also restricts the
occurrence of stative verbs and adjectives in the subordinate clause.
(Stative verbs are generally distinguished by whether or not they
can take the progressive aspect; only non-stative verbs may do so.
(Cf. further Lakoff, 1966).)
(2l) i. "He became very strong after he was tall.
ii. He became very strong when he was tall.
The aspectual restrictions above never apply to coordinate construction
Chronological order of mention (5.11; 7.14 above) is not necessary in
subordinate constructions because the conjunction itself indicates
what the original order of the events in time was. There does seem to
be a psychological preference, though, for a chronological order of
mention whatever the construction (Table XII).
The tense rule is certainly observed by the children most of
the time. On average, the same tense was found in each of the two
clauses for 81$ of all the temporal descriptions in Data (i) and for
96$ of them in Data (ii). In a few instances in Data (i), a past
tense verb was followed by a present tense one; this generally
happened in coox'dinate rather than in subordinate constructions
(7.14, 7.3 above). All the children in the study used both past and
present tense forms, and also used the m.odal will, as well as such
forms as I'm going to. to refer to the future.
9.3 A number cf psychologists (notably Piaget, 1926, 1928; Werner
and Kaplan, 1963) and linguists (e.g. Sechehaye, 1950:20ff.; Bally,
1944:53ff.) have suggested in the past that the ontogenetic develop¬
ment of linguistic relations progresses from (i) juxtaposition of
two (or more) utterances to (ii) coordination of two or more utter¬
ances (parataxis), and finally to (iii) subordination of one or two
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utterances to a main clause (hypotaxis). The linguistic distinction
between (i) juxtaposition and (ii) parataxis has a somewhat unclear
status. Juxtaposition has often been regarded as a form, of coordina¬
tion with intonational rather than conjunctive links between the dif¬
ferent members of the construction. Tesniere points out that
although coordination ('jonction') does not have to have coordinate
conjunctions ('jonctifs') present, coordinate conjunctions mean that
there must be conjunction (1959:82).
In the present study, one could certainly argue that the
child goes through a stage of juxtaposition (cf. stage (l) in 5.2,
and 7.21 above) before he begins to use coordinate conjunctions to
join clauses. Coordinate constructions are used before subordinate
temporal clauses appear. Thus, as far as temporal descriptions are
concerned, the above proposal seems quite feasible. However, this is
at the level of the clause or sentencej whothcr this ontogenetic sequence
applies also at the level of the noun phrase (as Sechehaye implies),
has not (to my knowledge) yet been investigated.
There are further objections to the more specific formula¬
tion of this hypothesis by some psychologists (cf. A.4). Piaget
(1926), for instance, claimed that all the relational terms are first
expressed as and (or as but if there is the meaning 'contrary to ex¬
pectation'). The different relations, i.e. time, eause, etc., are
only later expressed by using subordinate clauses. The problem with
this form of the hypothesis was that Piaget seemed to think that no
subordinate relations appeared before the age of 5,0-7jO years. It
is quite clear, though, both from previous data (Chapters III and IV)
and from evidence in the present study, that children of 3 56 - 4-5 6
use both coordinate and subordinate constructions in their speech.
It is, of course, quite possible that, at the same time, some adult
concepts that are usually expressed with the same terras do not have
the same meaning for the children at this early a stage.
Although the hypothesis about the ontogenetic development
of linguistic relations appears to hold for descriptions of time, it
is not possible to say that it is therefore confirmed. This is beeaus
it was proposed as applying to language as a whole while temporal
descriptions merely make up a small sub-set of possible utterance-
types. The generality of the hypothesis has yet to be proved. Also,
the psychological form of this hypothesis needs revision since the
children Piaget discussed, for instance, were already five years old.
I suspect that the psychological claims may have been based on the
lack of identity between the adult's concepts, of causality, for
instance, and the child's. This has led to claims that the child
does not have any concept of causality. However, although concepts
in the early stages of language acquisition are not isomorphic with
words, the structures that the child uses by the age of 3j6 or 4-50
appear to reflect at least a primitive notion of various relational
concepts! in the present study, the children all appeared to know
how to identify a point in time (by relating to some other —
simultaneous —• event) and many of them were able to relate points in
time, that occurred in succession, to eachother.
X Conclusion
10.0 We have seen that conjunctions containing unmarked features
seem to appear before their marked counterparts (8.3 above), and the
same is true for the simpler (vs. the more complex) constructions
defined developmentally by the three principles (5.2; 7.1 above). I
should like, therefore, in this connection to discuss the notion of
marking derived from phonological theory (Trubetskoy, 1939; Jakobson,
Fant & Halle, 1955; Jakobson & Halle, 1956). I will then present a
slight refinement of the original developmental hypothesis that I pro¬
posed in Chapter V.
10.1 Up to now, the notion of marking has been used chiefly in
phonological theory (cf., e.g. Chomsky & Halle, 1968), and to some
extent in morphology and semantics (cf. Greenberg, 1966; Vachek, 1966)
where, for instance, the notion of 'neutralization5 appears (cf.
Bierwisch, 1967; Lyons, 1968:l66~/+67). In addition, Mathesius (1928)
studied the characterology of language, ascertaining the 'normal1
forms for certain constructions which he then considered to be the
more basic sentence-types, for example, in the language. The 'normal
state' can be said to correspond to the unmarked form (Jakobson, 1957)
whether this applies to word-order, to morphological endings or to
phonological features.
In English, every clause is organized into theme and rheme.
That is, the basis of the statement, known by the hearer from the pre¬
vious context, followed by a 'new' fact to be communicated about the
theme. Mathesius (1928) based his "functional analysis of the utter¬
ance" (cf. also Firbas, 1961b) on these types of relations, rather
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than on grammatical units like subject, object, etc.: "In English
sentencesj accordingly, the theme of the enunciation is expressed as a
rule by the grammatical subject and the central part of the enunciation
actually [is] made up by the grammatical predicate. A definite,
especially personal, subject is preferred to an indefinite one, and
where there are two conceptions at hand which may be regarded as items
of the prospective enunciation, that one is chosen for the grammatical
subject which possesses more actuality" (Mathesius, 1928:59).
In English, the element which is selected as the theme by the
speaker is assigned first position in the clause sequence. Where the
clause is coextensive with the information unit (cf. Halliday, 1967a,
1967b), there Is an association of theme-rheme with given-new. To
borrow an example from Morton (.1966:15):
(1) i. I M2M a house. The hotiSS was built by the man.
ii. I sag a man. The yqan built the house.
where part of the rheme of the first sentence (underlined) naturally
becomes the theme of the second. Compare (li) and (lii) with the rather
odd effect in:
(2) i. I saw a house. The man built the house.
ii. I saw a man. The house was built by the man.
In (2), the rheme of the first sentence is 'displaced' from its expected
position as theme of the second sentence in each pair. The information
pattern is therefore 'given-new, new-given' instead of the 'given-new,
given-new' found in (l). In Halliday's analysis (1967a), given-new
may be a discourse feature while theme-rheme is not one: "The difference
may be summed up in the observation that, in dialogue, 'given' means
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'what you were talking about' while 'theme' means 'what I am talking
about'; and, as is well known., the two do not necessarily coincide"
(1967a :9). While information structures speech so as to relate it to
the preceding discourse, thematization is relatively independent of
what has been said earlier on.
Each sentence-type typically has an unmarked theme; for in¬
stance, the subject of the verb in declarative sentences. Marked
themes are generally associated with a particular information structure
in which the theme is isolated as a separate information unit. There¬
fore, in a clause made up of two information units, there is a tendency
for the first to contain only the theme which is then 'glossed' by the
second. Another name that has been used for the theme-rheme distinction
in the above sense is topic-comment (cf. Hockett, 1958; Lyons, 1968;
334~ff«)« Ik© tendency in English (with an unmarked theme) is to con¬
vert the expression of the actual theme into the grammatical subject
of the sentence. This is seen in a characteristic feature of English,
the frequent use of the passive (Svartvik, 1966) which has generally
been regarded by Prague School linguists as a structural device for
r- ccor.-, ; - ■
dissociating the agent and the theme (cf. Kathesius, 1928; also
Halliday, 1967a, 1967b). Since the word-order in English is generally
fixed, the subject of a clause usually precedes the predicate. Since
the subject is strongly identified with the theme of an utterance,
the order theme-rheme is usual too (cf. especially Firbas, 1964a,
1967+b).
As I indicated above, in Chapter V, I have extended the
notion of theme to apply to a whole clause within a composite
1
sentence . Thus, I would claim that the themes of the sentences in
(3) are the following (underlined):
(3) i. He ran away after he had knocked over the hydrangea,
id* After he had knocked over the hydrangea. he ran away.
Where a coordinate construction is concerned, the 'sentence adverbial'
(e.g. then. therefore) following and is frequently the theme of the
second clause, which, otherwise, seems to be independent of the first
clause (unlike (3)) «*
(4) He knocked over the hydrangea and then he ran away.
However, then in (4) is recapitulating the clause which precedes it,
'He knocked over the hydrangea', and therefore the first clause of the
coordinate construction could also be taken as the theme of the utter¬
ance as a whole. This is possibly more evident in those constructions
which do not have any 'sentence adverbial' introducing the clause
after and. Note that in coordinate constructions, such theraatization
may only really be said to apply when the construction contains a tem¬
poral description, i.e. and has to have the meaning 'and + sequence',
not and '&' (cf. 9.1 above),
10.2 From the ontogenetic point of view, the three principles pro¬
posed in Chapter V can be slightly reformulated in terms of marking for
various syntactic and psychological distinctions. These distinctions
should reflect the developmental sequence exhibited in the temporal
descriptions (cf. 7.1). It may be that the number of marked forms
'Composite sentence' is used here as a term neutral between
'compound' and 'complex' sentences, but including both.
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(vs. unmarked forms) are in some way allied to psychological complexity
in language acquisition.
First, there are two types of marking which apply to sentence
structure: (a) whether the construction is coordinate or subordinate
(the latter being marked), and (b) a further distinction within the
marked form: whether the subordinate clause follows or precedes the
main clause. The latter is marked. These two distinctions give us
the following matrix:
(5) ' coordinate subordinatesubordinate
-L(a) . . . unmarked marked marked(b) unmarked marked
The second distinction, (5b), is based on the evidence discussed in
5.12 above in support of the principle of derivational simplicity which
distinguished between the sentences with the subordinate clause second,
and those with it first (c-f. also Clark & Clark, 1968, and 8.1 above).
As far s.s the principle of order of mention is concerned, the
simpler order of mention (where it coincides with the chronological
order: 1-2) is unmarked. This makes most of the coordinate con¬
structions and the subordinate-cla.use-f.irst constructions unmarked
(cf. discussion in 5.11 above). This does not appear to have any
direct bearing on the syntactic complexity of the constructions used
to describe sequences in time. Nonetheless, it could be said to
contribute to the unmarked status of coordinate clause constructions
in temporal descriptions because of the general constraint that
events are better described in chronological order. If they are not,
it is not clear that a sequence is involved. The 'unmarked' order of
mention is preferred psychologically in a large variety of tasksj
for instance, it seems to be far easier to recall (cf. studies cited
in 5.11 above).
The theme (5.13) may also be unmarked or marked. Where a
clause acts as the theme of an utterance, its unmarked form is the
main clause in a complex sentence structure, or the first clause in a
compound sentence structure. Hence, the choice of an unmarked theme
coincides with the syntactically simpler derivational form (5.12),
and may, at times, also coincide with the unmarked order of mention
(5.11).
10.3 A look at all the data (in Chapters VII, VIII and IX) makes
it clear that there is another factor that can be woven into the
original hypothesis. Some slight refinement of the developmental se¬
quence (5.2) is possible. Of the three principles, derivational sim¬
plicity is the only one that is purely linguistic. The other two,
order of mention and choice of theme, might more appropriately be
said to apply to 'discourse1. We have just seen, though, that, in
terms of marking, the choice of an unmarked theme in a temporal des¬
cription may coincide with the derivationally simpler construction
(in complex sentences). These two principles, therefore, could be
put together since they frequently coincide.
In my original hypothesis, I pointed out that if the second
event in time were chosen as the theme, the child would probably use
a construction with a subordinate clause second. Therefore, the choice
of the second event as the unmarked theme 'triggers' the development
of the subordinate clause constructions in their derivationally simpler
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form. The additional factor here is that and cannot express the mean¬
ings of the subordinate conjunctions. Clearly, more than just sequence
in time is involved in the use of when, because and if (the subordinate
conjunctions that are first used by the children). If it were a ques¬
tion of sequence alone, and could just as easily be used. However,
each of these conjunctions expresses some additional relation besides:
sequence plus condition is expressed by if. sequence plus cause by
because, and simultaneity in time may be expressed by when. Thus, the
unmarked theme is usually the second event in the early subordinate
clause constructions, but the additional factor involved in the choice
of theme is the expression of a relation in time other than simple
sequence.
If it were only a matter of the second event in sequence
being chosen as the unmarked theme, then after should be one of the
first subordinate conjunctions to appear in temporal descriptions.
Similarly, where the unmarked theme is the first event, before should
appear early on (where the principle of derivational simplicity also
applies). After and before are two subordinate conjunctions that ex¬
press pure time sequence (in contrast to when. because and if). The
fact that these two conjunctions do not appear until well after the
appearance of when, if, and because is additional evidence for the
refinement that I am proposing in the principle of choice of theme.
Why, though, can and not be used whenever the first event
is the theme? In the case of until, the first event is the unmarked
theme, but the particular relation expressed by the conjunction could
not be properly indicated by using and. Furthermore, until also seems
to come in later, after the appearance of when, if and. because,. This
is true of twelve of the protocols, in eight of which it is not used
at all, and in four where it only appears after when and because, and
sometimes after if as well. The other three protocols show until al¬
ready being used together with when, if and because so no developmen¬
tal sequence is discernible.
To sum up, in his earliest temporal descriptions, the child
will choose and to express sequence, but later on he may choose the
second of two events as his (unmarked) theme in combination with a
particular time-relation such as when, if or because. This choice
automatically requires him to use the derivationally simpler fon of
complex sentence. The principle of choice of theme has been slightly
refined: it also involves the choice of a time-relation more specific
than that supplied by and.
In discussing the three principles in terms of marking and in
looking at the first temporal subordinate conjunctions that appear in
the children's speech, we must remember that there are at least two
levels of marking that interact here. The three principles define
the unmarked forms of various syntactic constructions while the in¬
dividual conjunctions are also unmarked or marked according to the
various features they contain (Chapter VIIl). The marking in the con¬
junctions predicts which ones should appear in which sequence and the
three principles predict which kinds of syntactic construction will be
used first. The order of appearance predicted by the three principles,
though, also seems to apply to each conjunction individually; for
instance, when always appears in second position before it appears
■
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in first position in an utterance in each of the protocols. This seems
to be true for all the subordinate conjunctions that have been looked
at in these data.
10.4- In this chapter, I have suggested that marking may reflect
psychological complexity, and that differing degrees of markedness
(or difficulty) should be a reasonable predictor of language develop¬
ment. There are, however, many different kinds of marking which may
apply phonologically, morphologically and lexically as well as syntacti¬
cally, In this study, we have seen how some lexical and syntactic forms
of marking interact in the development of particular constructions in
the child's speech. However, we are still far from knowing how all
the different forms of marking interact psychologically and hox; their
interaction affects language acquisition as a whole.
The forms of marking that I have mentioned here are only
meant to account for a particular subset of the composite sentence
structures used by the children. This subset consists of the des¬
criptions that can be used for temporal sequences: events are linked
by the basic relations 'simultaneous with', 'before' and 'after' in
time. Since the linguistic descriptions of these phenomena (the re¬
lations in time) go through a clear developmental sequence (7.1 above),
I think that more phenomena of this type should be studied from the
point of view of language. For example, there is very little known
about the development of deixis in children's speech although psy¬
chologists have looked at some aspects of pronoun-use (as in some of
the egocentricity measures; cf. Piaget, 1926), There are many sets of
relational terms besides the temporal ones that I have looked at here,
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e.g. spatial and degree, that have yet to he systematically investigat¬
ed from the.linguistic point of view. A number of studies are needed
to pin-point periods of rapid development and change in the child's
use and understanding of various terms.
One study that has attempted to do something similax* to this
is Donaldson and Wales' (in press); this study looks at how 3j6 - 4-50
year-olds use comparatives like more-less, same-different, b.igger-wee-er.
etc. The children appear to use the unmarked term (more, same, bigger)
earlier than the marked one. In addition, the marked term, initially,
appears to have the same meaning for the child as the unmarked term.
A somewhat similar phenomenon occurs when the child first uses temporal
adverbs (ef. Chapter III above).
Most language studies have looked at development without con¬
sidering the linguistic function of the different constructions that
the child is beginning to use. By finding out what lexical items and
constructions mean in a functional way to the child, we can find out
more about the development of various relational concepts in the
child's mind, and also more about the relation between language and
the concepts it is used to express.
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